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CHAPTER I
Preface
One of the most significant features of the global economy in the past half century is the
tremendous growth in world trade. The key drivers behind this process constitute the inter-
national integration of product, capital and labor markets as well as revolutionary techno-
logical advances which contributed to a substantial reduction in the costs of transportation
and communication. Accordingly, it has become feasible for firms to locate different stages of
production in different countries in order to exploit locational advantages such as access to
relatively cheap labor and proximity to markets. Production processes therefore increasingly
involve global supply chains stretching across multiple countries with phases of production
being located in those regions where they can be performed most efficiently. The emergence
of global production networks has come along with the integration of low-wage countries
into the world economy. Political reforms as well as the localisation of labor-intensive stages
of production allowed developing countries to realize their comparative advantage in labor-
intensive goods and spur industrial development and economic growth. Therefore, the most
remarkable development in world trade in the past two decades has been the rapid growth
of manufactured exports from low-wage economies. Consequently, the rise of low-wage
countries in world trade, most notably led by China, has created an enormous global supply
shock inducing a severe increase in the intensity of competition in global product markets.
Understanding how firms react and adapt to this changing business environment is essential
12
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in order to evaluate the consequences of international trade in advanced economies.
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters which provide new insights
into the organization of the global supply chain and into the adjustment of firms to interna-
tional competition. In Chapter II, I first investigate how advances in information technology
shape the patterns of global sourcing. Subsequently in chapter III, I research how interna-
tional competition affects the composition of firm investments. Lastly, chapter IV studies the
impact of import competition from low-wage countries on the pricing decisions of firms in
an industrialized economy, namely Germany.
Chapter II investigates the impact of information technology on the organization of the
global supply chain. Prior research suggests that international costs of knowledge trans-
mission and communication have a substantial impact on the patterns of trade and foreign
investment. Nevertheless, the effects of information technology have remained unexplored.
In order to guide the empirical analysis, I develop a theoretical model which illustrates how
information technology affects the decision of firms in the high-wage North whether to off-
shore production to a low-wage country in South. Offshoring to South results in costly com-
munication reflected by the degree of contractual distortions between the Northern head-
quarter and its Southern supplier. More sophisticated information technology allows more
efficient communication and thereby alleviates contractual frictions. The model provides
several predictions about the impact of information technology on the organization of the
global supply chain. First of all, complex industries for which the codification and verifica-
tion of information is a much harder task are more likely to source intermediate inputs in
countries with more efficient information technology infrastructure. Moreover, considering
the mode of firm organization, more efficient information technology infrastructure is ex-
pected to increase the scale of arm’s-length contracting with independent suppliers. These
empirical predictions are tested and validated by using disaggregated industry-level data
on the operations of US industries. Empirically I capture the location decision of multi-
nationals with the number of imported intermediates and the mode of organization with
the share of intra-firm trade. Product complexity is measured by means of the intensity in
non-routine production activities by industry and the primary measure for the level of in-
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formation technology infrastructure is the international internet bandwidth by country. The
econometric analysis is in line with the empirical predictions. More efficient information
technology raises the number of imported intermediates with the effect being stronger in
more complex industries. Furthermore, the share of intra-firm imports is decreasing with
the level of information technology. Again, the effect is more pronounced in more complex
industries. Altogether, these findings are robust to the overall level of economic develop-
ment as well as to well-known sources of comparative advantage and determinants of firm
organization such as factor endowments, financial development and contract enforcement.
Chapter III is jointly co-authored with Jan Schymik and Jan Tscheke.1 In this chapter we
study how the exposure to international competition affects firm investments into durable
and nondurable assets. While the economic literature has put forward several causes for
short-term investment behavior related to uncertainty, investor pressures or agency prob-
lems, we argue that import competition incentivizes firms to shift investments from long-
term assets towards short-lived assets. In order to understand how competition affects the
investment decisions of firms, we develop a stylized framework incorporating the invest-
ment decision with respect to two types of investment: A short-term one and a long-term
one. Our model implies that tougher competition, reflected by a reduction in the future
price-cost margin, reduces the relative value of long-term investments and shifts investments
towards short-term assets. In addition, we investigate how firm heterogeneity determines
the relative size of the effect. The framework predicts larger firms to be less affected by com-
petition and therefore to be less susceptible to reallocate investments towards the short-term.
Based on our framework we derive a difference-in-differences estimation strategy in order
to empirically test our predictions. We test this prediction using data on investment expen-
ditures of listed US companies into seven different asset classes which we order according to
their depreciation rates. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the empirical pre-
dictions. Hence, import competition induces firms to shift the composition of investments
towards short-term categories. In addition, this effect turns out to be less pronounced for
larger firms. So as to provide further supportive evidence of a causal effect, we exploit the
1Jan Schymik is a post-doctoral researcher and Jan Tscheke is a PhD candidate at the Chair of International
Economics at LMUMunich.
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rise in Chinese imports to the US following China’s WTO accession in 2001 as an alternative
source of an exogenous competition shock. Overall, our results turn out to be robust to vari-
ous alternative channels such as uncertainty, financial constraints and the evolution of sector
specific attributes.
Finally in chapter IV, I study the impact of import competition from China on pricing
decisions by firms in the German manufacturing sector. As the rapid rise of China in the
world economy has coincided with a decline in manufacturing employment in many ad-
vanced economies, the real effects of import competition from low-wage countries on firms
and workers at the micro-level have raised considerable interest among economists. The
impact on prices is of particular importance. First of all from a microeconomic perspective,
prices determine the allocative and distributive effects of globalization. From a macroeco-
nomic perspective, the reaction of prices in response to increased import competition reflects
changes in inflationary pressure which may have important consequences for the patterns of
inflation. The chapter is based on unique survey data covering firms in the German manu-
facturing sector. This data provides detailed information about the timing and the direction
of price changes at the product level. After controlling for other price determinants and tak-
ing endogeneity issues into consideration, a negative and significant causal impact on prices
emerges. Subsequently, the chapter is extended in order to study how vertical differentiation
at the sector level and capital intensity at the firm level affect individual price responses. As
such, it is expected that firms in R&D intensive industries in which competition is played
on non-price factors are less prone to lowering their prices in response to cheap Chinese im-
ports. Furthermore, capital intensive firms are supposed to be less hit by low-wage country
import competition as their products are supposed to be consistent with the comparative
advantage of a relatively more capital abundant country like Germany. The econometric re-
sults are in line with these hypotheses and suggest that firms in more differentiated sectors
and more capital intensive firms are less likely to engage in downward price adjustments in
response to imports from China.

CHAPTER II
Information Technology and Global Sourcing
II.1 Introduction
The substantial growth in trade in intermediates throughout the last two decades is widely
considered as a defining feature of the process of globalization. Trade in intermediates oc-
curs both within and across the boundaries of the firm, as firms fragment production and
organize their production activities on a global scale. As a result, countries do not specialize
in the entire production of final goods but increasingly contribute to overall production by
specializing in specific stages of the production process and providing partitions of value
added. This trend in international vertical specialization and the rise of trade in intermedi-
ates has been subject to a considerable amount of research.1 What lies behind this breaking
up of the production process across borders is the reduction in the costs of offshoring due
to revolutionary advances in information and communication technology. The continuous
emergence of more efficient technologies of information transmission has enabled the expan-
sion ofmultinational firms by codifying and communicating complex information in order to
transfer technologies abroad. Nevertheless, international costs of communication still have
a profound influence on the patterns of trade (see Fink, Illeana, and Neagu (2005)). As such,
1See Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Hummels, Ishii, and
Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001) amongst others.
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evidence points out that foreign investment is sensitive to geographic distance and thereby
responds strongly to the costs of international knowledge transfer when making location de-
cisions (see Yeaple (2009) and Keller and Yeaple (2013)).2 Yet, the forces unleashed by new
information technologies and their impact on the patterns of global sourcing have not been
studied so far.
This study examines the impact of the advances of information technology on the orga-
nization of the vertical supply chain. In order to guide empirics, the paper develops a partial
equilibriummodel describing the decision of firms located in the high-wage North, whether
to offshore production to a low-wage country in the South. Offshoring to the South however
gives rise to costly communication. The costs of information transmission are reflected by the
amount of contractual distortions which arise when production is offshored. More efficient
information technology reduces the costs of communication and thereby the degree of con-
tractual incompleteness. The model illustrates how the propensity to relocate production
to a specific destination country increases with its level of information technology infras-
tructure. Assuming that vertical integration is subject to lower costs of communication than
arm’s-length contracting, the model demonstrates how information technology increases the
scale of contracting with indendent input suppliers and thus reduces the share of intra-firm
trade. Since the transmission of complex information relies to a greater extent on successful
codification, the effects of information technology are stronger in more complex industries
characterized by a larger degree of contractual incompleteness. These empirical predictions
are tested and validated using disaggregated trade data on the operations of US industries.
Themodel draws on the theory of the product cycle by Antràs (2005) and features a world
of two countries, the high-wage North and the low-wage South. A headquarter firm located
in North needs to decide whether to purchase intermediates from a Northern or Southern
manufacturer in order to produce a final good. Whenever the headquarter firm engages in
offshoring to South, communication costs arise which vary with the degree of complexity
of the intermediate input and take the form of additional labor costs. Production processes
2While Yeaple (2009) finds total affiliate sales to decline with distance from the US headquarter, Keller and
Yeaple (2013) explain this finding with increased costs at which heaquarter knowledge can be transferred tomore
distant affiliates.
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comprising complex inputs are assumed to be more susceptible to effective communication.
In order to illustrate the degree of complexity of the intermediate good, the paper introduces
partially incomplete contracting on behalf of the manufacturing firm. Complex interme-
diates are characterized by a larger portion of complex tasks and activities that cannot be
perfectly specified in a contract. Thus, more complex products and higher costs of com-
munication are reflected by a greater degree of contractual distortions. More sophisticated
information technology, represented by lower production costs in complex components, al-
leviates contractual frictions. As a result, more effective information technology increases
incentives of firms to shift production to South in order to exploit lower wages. Overall,
the model predicts industries to be more likely to import intermediates from countries with
a higher level of information technology where the effect is supposed to be increasing in
product complexity.
Next, the model deals with the impact of information technology on the organization of
the multinational firm. Following the property-rights approach, asset ownership determines
the bargaining power throughout ex-post renegotiation and determines the ex-ante incen-
tives of each party to invest. Outsourcing provides the manufacturer with larger incentives
to invest but is related to larger costs of communication than integration. When deciding
about the optimal mode of organization, the headquarter firm therefore has to trade off the
contractual distortions arising due to costly information transmission with outsourcing and
the incentives provided to the manufacturing firm. More effective information technology
reduces the scale of communication costs and increases the incentives to opt for independent
subcontracting. Again, this effect is stronger for more complex inputs.
The model’s predictions are tested in the empirical section of the paper. The main mea-
sure for the adoption of information technology is based on the international internet band-
width by country.3 Product complexity at the industry level is measured by making use of
task level data. Production processes that require more complex and non-routine activities
involve less codifiable information thereby implying higher costs of knowledge transmis-
sion. I therefore use data on the specific work activities in each industry in order to estimate
3More precisely, I use the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
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the intensity with which a sector employs non-routine tasks in the production process. Ev-
idence of the impact of information technology on the geography of offshoring is based on
the number of intermediate goods by industry that the US imports from South. In order to
assess the impact on the mode of organization, I use data on the share of intra-firm imports
as a fraction of total Southern imports to the US.4 Since the empirical predictions relate to
the interaction of information technology infrastructure and product complexity, the estima-
tions follow a generalized difference-in-differences strategy including sector fixed effects as
well as country-year-fixed effects. Identification is therefore with respect to within country
variation across industries. This approach allows restricting the set of controls to variables
which influence the level of information technology infrastructure as well as the intensity in
non-routine tasks and might affect sourcing strategies of US firms. In line with the empiri-
cal prediction, the econometric analysis shows that the impact of information technology on
the number of imported intermediates is increasing with product complexity. In addition,
the share of intra-firm imports decreases with the level of information technology with the
effect being strongest for more complex industries. Comparing two industries that differ in
one standard deviation in terms of product complexity, a one standard deviation change in
information technology yields a positive differential effect of 2, 35% in the number of im-
ported intermediates and a negative differential effect of 1, 11 percentage points in the share
of intra-firm trade. These results are robust to well known determinants of offshoring, multi-
national firm organization and the patterns of specialization. Amongst others, effects remain
significant when controlling for factor endowments as well as for institutional determinants
such as financial development or judicial quality. Moreover, results are robust to the inclu-
sion of measures for overall economic development as well as trade openness. Additionally,
several robustness checks are performed in order to validate the results. Results hold when
using alternative measures of information technology adoption as well as when employ-
ing alternative estimation techniques. Besides, I replace my measure of product complexity
with an alternative measure reflecting the intensity in routine tasks by industry. Consistent
with the predictions, the coefficients point to a reverse pattern with the effect of information
4A country is defined as Southern if GDP per capita (at PPP) is lower than 50% of the US level in the year
2000.
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technology decreasing in routine intensity.
The paper relates to several literatures. Firstly, the paper contributes to the literature on
the costs of international knowledge transfer and the organization of knowledge in multi-
nationals. Keller and Yeaple (2013) find large barriers for US multinationals to transferring
knowledge from headquarter to affiliate. Similarly, Oldenski (2012b) finds US multination-
als to be more likely to offshore production stages abroad the more intensively they employ
routine tasks and the less intensively they are in communication. Moreover, Costinot, Old-
enski, and Rauch (2011) identify the non-routine quality of production tasks as a source
of contractual frictions between the multinational headquarter and its supplier. Their re-
sults show that intra-firm trade tends to be decreasing in more routine intensive industries.
Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) study the organization of knowledge in cross-
country teams and Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) consider the interaction of
host country communication technology and human capital. Secondly, the paper relates to
the literature on the determinants of global sourcing. Whereas previous literature concen-
trates on the impact of intellectual property rights (e.g. Ethier and Markusen (1996) and
Javorcik (2004)), financial development (e.g. Carluccio and Fally (2012)), factor intensities
(e.g. Antràs (2003)) and contract enforcement (e.g. Antràs and Helpman (2008) and Nunn
and Trefler (2008, 2013)) I focus on the role of digitization in altering the global sourcing
decisions of multinationals. Besides, the paper is based on a large literature which intro-
duces the property-rights theory of the firm to international trade theory in order to study
the organization of multinationals (e.g. Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Antràs (2005)).5
Thirdly, several researchers have addressed the effect of the internet on trade flows. Freund
andWeinhold (2002, 2004) assess the impact of the internet on international trade in services
and goods. Higher internet penetration is associated with both, an increase in growth in ser-
vices and bilateral goods trade. Ultimately, my paper is also related to the literature on the
economic consequences of information and communication technology. Abramovsky and
Griffith (2006) consider the role of information and communication technology in outsourc-
ing and offshoring of business services. Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and van Reenen (2014) deal
5See Antràs (2013) and Antràs and Yeaple (2015) for a survey about the literature on incomplete contracts and
the organization of multinational firms.
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with the differential impact of information and communication technology on the autonomy
of employees within firms and Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) analyze the impact of the
adoption of new information technologies on organizational changes in the trucking indus-
try. This paper aims to contribute to these various strands of literature by studying how the
advances in information technology affect the organization of the multinational firm along
the global supply chain.
Section II.2 introduces a simple model of offshoring and the role of information technol-
ogy. Section II.3 presents the data, the empirical strategy and the results of the econometric
analysis. Section II.4 offers some concluding comments.
II.2 A Simple Model of Information Technology and Global Sourc-
ing
II.2.1 Setup
Based on the theory of the product cycle by Antràs (2005), this section develops a simple par-
tial equilibrium model in which contractual frictions illustrate how information technology
determines the offshoring decisions of Northern firms and affects the international organi-
zation of production.
The world consists of two countries, North and South. Labor is the only factor of produc-
tion in order to produce a single good y and cannot move across borders. The wage rate in
the North is denoted by wNand in the South by wS. Throughout the model, wages in North
are higher than in the South wN > wS.
II.2.1.1 Preferences
Consumer preferences are given by a standard CES utility over a range of final goods given
by
U =
ˆ N
0
log
[
ˆ nj
0
yαj(i)di
] 1
α
dj, 0 < α < 1. (II.1)
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Total consumption of variety i in industry j is given by yj(i). N is the number of industries
in the economy and nj is the number of varieties in industry j. Varieties enter the utility
function symmetrically with an elasticity of substitution equal to ǫ = 1/(1−α). The elasiticty
between industries is one. Demand by the representative consumer for any variety yj(i) is
therefore given by
yj(i) = λj p
−1/(1−α)
j(i)
, λj =
1
N
E
´ nj
0 p
−α/(1−α)
j(i)
di
, (II.2)
where pj(i) is the price and λj is a function of total income and an aggregate price index
taken as given by the consumer.
II.2.1.2 Production
Consider the production process of a final good i in industry j. Production of any final good
yj(i) consists of two steps: It requires the provision of headquarter services such as engineer-
ing and marketing represented by a special and distinct high-tech input h, and it necessitates
final assembly and production described by a special and distinct low-tech input m, provided
by a manufacturing firm. It is assumed that the headquarter engages in a contract with an
independent manufacturing firm. Output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production
function given by
yj(i) =
(
hj(i)
1− zj
)1−zj


exp
(
´ 1
0 logmj(i) (s) ds
)
zj


zj
, 0 ≤ zj ≤ 1, (II.3)
where the parameter zj describes the output elasticity of the manufacturing process m
of the final good. The relative intensity of manufacuring zj can also be interpreted as the
degree of standardization of the final good in industry j. The larger zj, the less significant
are headquarter activities such as engineering and other problem solving services and the
more standardized the good is. Production of one unit of a high-tech input requires the
employment of one unit of Northern labor. The South however, is much less efficient at
producing the high-tech input. By assumption, the productivity advantage of the North
is sufficiently high enough to ensure that headquarter services are always located in the
North. Labor requirements for the production of one unit of low-tech input are assumed to
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be equal to 1 in both North and South. High- and low-tech input are relationship-specific
and have to fit precisely the needs of its counterpart, otherwise no positive output can be
produced.6 In order to focus on the impact of information technology and communication
costs on the provision of inputs, headquarter services h are not subject to costly transmission
of information and fully non-contractible.
The specialized manufacturing input m is produced with a set of activites indexed by
points on the interval [0, 1].7 Activities related to input m(s) in the range [0, µs] where 0 ≤
µs≤ 1 are considered as basic tasks which are fully contractible. Activities in the fraction
(µs, 1] represent complex taskswich are non-contractible and due to a hold-up problemwhen
investment costs are already sunk. Complex tasks may be either of good or bad quality
which cannot be verified ex-ante. If they are of bad quality, total output of the final good y is
zero. The nature of non-contractible activities is only resolved when investments are already
made. If non-contractible investments are of bad quality, production costs can be neglected.
Both inputs h and m can be freely traded and no transport costs accrue. Altogether, the
parties engage in a partially incomplete contract leading to a two-sided hold-up problem.
Thus they need to bargain about the joint surplus created by the relationship.8
In order to successfully implement final assembly of the final good engineered by the
headquarter firm, both parties need to communicate. As a result communication costs Γ > 1
arise. So as to reflect the fact that international production sharing is associated with higher
costs of communication than domestic fragmentation, it is assumed that communication
costs only occur if the manufacturing firm is located in South. Communication costs Γ how-
ever are only related to the set of complex and non-contractible activities (µs, 1] on behalf
of the manufacturer. Following Keller and Yeaple (2013) communication costs Γ take the
form of additional labor requirements in Southern labor and are incurred by the Southern
manufacturer. Higher costs of communication result in a less efficient production process
associated with larger costs expressed as larger labor requirements. Most importantly, I as-
6An input designed to fit with a particular headquarter or manufacturing firm cannot be employed in the
production of other varieties. Therefore, they are useless outside the relationship.
7See Antràs and Helpman (2008) and Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman (2007).
8By assuming that headquarter services h are fully non-contractible, it is implicitly assumed that the head-
quarter produces only complex activities.
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sume that more sophisticated information technology reduces the costs of communication
and coordination Γ.
Before a headquarter decides to produce a high-tech input it needs to decide whether
to engage in a relationship with a manufacturing firm located in the North or to opt for an
international fragmentation of the production process and contract with a manufacturing
firm in the South. The timing of events characterizing the contract is the following: The
headquarter first offers potential manufacturing firms a contract defining themanufacturer’s
required investment in contractible activities {m(s)}
µ
0 and an upfront lump-sum transfer T.
9
Hence, the contract stipulates the investment levels for the contractible activities but does
not specify the investment levels in the remaining (1− µ) non-contractible activities. The
manufacturing firm may therefore choose to withhold its services in these activites from
the headquarter firm. By assumption, there is a large pool of potential applicants, such
that competition among them makes T adjust such that the final manufacturing firm exactly
breaks even. The ex-ante outside option of manufacturing firms is normalized to zero in
both countries. Subsequently, the manufacturer chooses its investment level in contractible
activities and both, the headquarter and the manufacturer independently decide about their
non-contractible investments h and m(s) where s ∈ (µ, 1]. Ultimately, the resulting output
is sold, and the Nash bargaining leaves each party with one-half of the revenues (i.e. the
quasi-rents).
By assumption, the setting is one of complete contracts if the manufacturing firm is lo-
cated in the North.10 However, the relationship turns into an partially incomplete contract
in case of international fragmentation of production.11 The headquarter decides whether to
engage with a manufacturing firm in North or South by maximizing its ex-ante expected
profits. Whenever manufacturing takes place in the South the two parties bargain over the
surplus after inputs have been produced. Following Antràs (2005) the parties conduct ex
9The transfer T can be either positive or negative.
10Whenever the manufacturing stage is located in the North it is assumed that the headquarter firm can hire
an outside party in order to enforce a quality-contingent contract which monitors the ex-ante investments in
non-contractible investments h and m(s) where s ∈ (µ, 1].
11If international production sharing occurs, no third party can observe whether the inputs provided are of
good or bad quality and no quality-contingent contract can be written. Likewise, no outside party can control
the size of ex ante investments of the manufacturing firm and no contracts can be written contingent on revenues
earned when the final good is sold.
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post symmetric Nash bargaining and equally share the rents created by the relationship. If
the parties fail to agree on the bargaining outcome, both receive nothing.
Overall, costs of international fragmentation are incorporated by contractual frictions
which mirror the imperfect transmission of information across borders. More efficient infor-
mation technology reflected by lower costs of communication Γ reduces these distortions.
II.2.2 Partial Equilibrium
This section considers the choice of the final-good producer of variety i in industry j whether
to source inputs from an independent supplier located in North or South. As noted earlier,
wages in South are assumed to be lower than in the North wN > wS. However, whenever
production occurs in South, contracts are partially incomplete and communication costs oc-
cur.
II.2.2.1 Production by a Manufacturing Firm in the North
If the headquarter decides to fragment production domestically and engage in a relationship
with a Northern manufacturer, both parties can write a complete contract.12 The contract
stipulates production levels of headquarter and manufacturing services such that the head-
quarter’s ex-ante profits are maximized. Considering the transfer T , the headquarter’s prof-
its are given by πN(z) = λ1−α (h/1−z)α(1−z) · (m/z)αz − hwN −mwN . Maximizing with respect
to h and m results in ex-ante profits for the headquarter given by
πN(z) = (1− α)λ
(
wN
α
)−α/(1−α)
. (II.4)
II.2.2.2 Production by a Manufacturing Firm in the South
Whenever transaction occurs between a Northern headquarter and a manufacturer in the
South, the contract stipulates the investment levels in contractible activities m(s), s ∈ [0, µ],
and the lump-sum transfer T. Overall, if non-contractible inputs are of good-quality, and
12Complete contracts are not subject to ex-post renegotiation since investment levels in headquarter h and
complex manufacturing activities m (s), s ∈ (µ, 1], are specified and can be controlled by a third party.
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bargaining does not fail, revenues are given by R = λ1−α (h/1−z)α(1−z) · (m/z)αz. Due to
relationship-specificity, the inputs have no value outside the relationship and the outside
option of every player is zero. Therefore, if bargainig fails, output is zero and so are rev-
enues. Symmetric Nash bargaining gives each party its outside option plus one-half of the
ex-post gains from the relationship (i.e. the difference between the sum of the player’s pay-
off under trade and their sum under no trade). The payoffs of the headquarter firm and the
manufacturer are therefore given by 0.5R.13 Since both parties do not capture the full sur-
plus created by the relationship, this induces both parties to underinvest relative to a setting
with Northern manufacturing and complete contracts. The game is solved by backwards
induction. Rolling back in time, the headquarter and manufacturing firms first choose their
investment levels in non-contractible activities. The firms’ optimization problems are given
by
max
h
0.5λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α


exp
(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds
)
z


zα
− wNh (II.5)
max
{ms}
1
µ
0.5λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α
(
exp(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds)
z
)zα
− ΓwS
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds, (II.6)
subject to contractible investments m(s), s ∈ [0, µ]. The first order conditions can be simpli-
fied to describe the equilibrium investments
m(s) =
zα0.5R
wSΓ
, s ∈ (µ, 1] (II.7)
h =
(1− z)α0.5R
wN
. (II.8)
Obviously, larger costs of communication Γ create an additional distortion and reduce
the amount of investment in complex activities of the manufacturing firm.
From there, the amount of revenues given contractible investment levels can be calculated
and one can solve for investments in non-contractible activities on behalf of the headquarter
13Note that 0+ 0.5 (R− 0− 0) = 0.5R.
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h and the manufacturing firm m (s) where s ∈ (µ, 1]
m(s)1−α(1−µz) = λ1−ααξαz

exp


µ
ˆ
0
logm(s)ds




αz
(
0.5(1− z)
wN
)α(1−z) ( 0.5z
wSΓ
)1−α(1−z)
(II.9)
h1−α(1−µz) = λ1−ααξαz

exp


µ
ˆ
0
logm(s)ds




αz
(
0.5(1− z)
wN
)1−α(1−µ)z ( 0.5z
wSΓ
)α(1−µ)z
.
(II.10)
Larger costs of communication Γ lower the investments in complex tasks of the manu-
facturing firm and reduce joint revenues. This gives rise to a negative feedback effect on
headquarter activities which equally drop due to the presence of costly communication. The
distortion created by costly information transmission declines with the range of basic activi-
ties µ and increases with the range of complex activities (1− µ). The contract offered by the
headquarter needs to satisfy the manufacturer’s participation constraint which is equal to
0.5R− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds− wSΓ
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds + T ≥ 0, (II.11)
where non-contractible activities in the range (1− µ) are given by equation (II.9) and con-
tractible investments h and m(s), s ∈ [0, µ], are as specified in the contract. The headquarter
in turn maximizes its payoff
0.5R− wNh− T , s ∈ (µ, 1]. (II.12)
The transfer T is set such that the manufacturer exactly breaks even and its participation
constraint is binding. For this reason, the optimization problem of the headquarter firmwith
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respect to contractible manufacturing investments reduces to
max
{m(s)}1µ
π = R− wNh− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds− wSΓ
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds. (II.13)
Combining this with non-contractible activities given in equation (II.9) and (II.10) one can
solve for contractible investments on behalf of the manufacturing firm and derive profits.
Profits of the headquarter are finally equal to
πO = (1− α)λ
[
ααw
−α(1−z)
N w
−αz
S Γ
−αz(1−µ) 0.5
αθ (1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
] 1
1−α
, (II.14)
where θ = (1− µz). Profits decline with less efficient information technology Γ. This
effect is larger for more standardized production processes relying to a greater extent on
efficient manufacturing and for intermediates containing a larger fraction of complex invest-
ments.
II.2.3 Information Technology and Offshoring
When deciding whether to produce in North or South, the headquarter firm has to trade off
the benefits of free information transmission in North with the costly information transmis-
sion in South for a given wage differential between both regions. By comparing profits of
Northern and Southern manufacturing it follows that the headquarter will decide to pur-
chase the low-tech input in the South only if πS ≥ πN and A(z, µ, Γ) ≤ ω ≡ wN/wS, where
wN
wS
≥
(
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
0.5αθ (1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
) 1
z
Γ(1−µ) ≡ A(z, µ, Γ). (II.15)
It can be shown that A(z, µ, Γ) is decreasing in the degree of standardization z with
lim
z→0
A(z, µ, Γ) = +∞ and A(1, µ, Γ) > 1. If wages in North are larger than in South wN > wS,
a threshold level of standardization z ∈ (0, 1) arises: As long as z < z ≡ A−1(ω, µ, Γ) final
assembly is located in the North. If z > z≡ A−1O (ω, µ, Γ) holds, final assembly takes place
in the South. Hence, only when the final good is sufficiently standardized and the manu-
facturing stage sufficiently important in production, lower wages in the South are able to
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outweigh contractual frictions and communication costs.14 Most importantly, the required
wage differential ω ≡ w
N
wS
for a specific threshold level z of standardization increases with
larger costs of communication Γ. This effect is stronger for final goods which exhibit a larger
range of complex activities m(s), s ∈ (µ, 1].
II.2.4 Information Technology and the Mode of Firm Organization
Given that the final good producer decides to produce in South, it may now integrate the
manufacturing firm and engage in FDI. Consider the same setup as in the previous section.
However, it is now assumed that communication costs do not arise in case of vertical inte-
gration whereas contracting with an independent manufacturer in South is subject to costly
communication.15 This assumption is meant to reflect that offshoring is connected with less
efficient communication if the headquarter opts for outsourcing than in case of integration.
This can be justified, as whenever production of intermediates occurs within the boundaries
of the firm, the headquarter may fully exert control over the Southern manufacturer and
thus align the modes of communication in North and South. It may for instance substitute
managers in South by managers from North and improve the efficiency of knowledge trans-
mission. Ownership dictates the residual rights of control over assets. As given in Antràs
(2005), if the manager of the manufacturing plant refuses to trade after investments have
been conducted, the headquarter manager may fire the manager in South and take posses-
sion of the amount of intermediates produced by the manufacturing plant. Failed bargaining
is costly and firing the manufacturing manager is associated with a loss in the amount of the
output produced equal to (1− δ)y with δ < 1. The final good producer can then only gener-
ate sale revenues equal to δαR. This yields quasi rents given by (1− δα)R. Consequently, the
headquarter firm chooses its optimal investment level with respect to anticipated revenues
0.5(1+ δα)R whereas the manufacturing firm sets basic and complex investments with re-
spect to 0.5(1 − δα)R. Accordingly, outsourcing provides the manufacturing firm with a
larger share of the joint surplus (0.5R > 0.5(1− δα)R) for which reason it faces larger incen-
14Note that if wages were identical in North and South, manufacturing would always take place in North.
15See Defever and Toubal (2013) for recent research in international trade wich combines the incomplete
contracting approach to the theory of the firm with similar key elements of the transaction cost approach by
Williamson (1985).
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tives to invest in the joint relationship than with integration. Therefore, ex ante efficiency
requires to prefer outsourcing over integration whenever the manufacturing firm becomes
relatively more important in the production process (i.e. z increases).16 This however relates
to additional distortions due to costly information transmission which in turn gives advan-
tage to integration. Solving the game along the lines of section II.2.2 yields profits of the
headquarter firm given by
πVI = (1− α) λ
[
ααw
−α(1−z)
N w
−αz
S
0.5αθ (1− δα)α(1−µ)z (1+ δ)α(1−z)△(1−αθ)
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
] 1
1−α
, (II.16)
with △ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))] and θ = (1− µz). Thus, the headquarter
firm has to trade off the efficiency loss due to costly information transmission with the level
of incentives provided to the manufacturing firm when choosing between integration and
arm’s-length contracting. The trade-off is governed by the relative importance of the manu-
facturing firm and the costs of information transmission. An increase in the relative impor-
tance of the manufacturer favors outsourcing whereas larger costs of information transmis-
sion promote integration. This effect is exacerbated by a wider range of complex activities.
Considering the choice between offshoring via FDI and arm’s-length contracting, it can be
inferred that production of intermediates will take place in South within the boundaries of
the firm whenever πVI > πO. This can also be written as
A∗(z, µ, Γ) ≡
(
(1− δα)αz(1−µ) (1+ δα)α(1−z)△(1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
) 1
αz
Γ1−µ ≥ 1. (II.17)
A∗(z, µ, Γ) is decreasing in the manufacturing intensity z with limz→0 A∗(z, µ, Γ) = +∞ and
A∗(1, µ, Γ) > 1 for all z ∈ (0, 1). Hence a cutoff z∗ ∈ (0, 1) arises. Whenever z < z∗ the
headquarter opts for integration. If the manufacturing firm is sufficiently important in the
production process and z > z∗ the headquarter prefers outsourcing.
16The reverse pattern holds for the headquarter firm which faces a larger fraction of the joint surplus under in-
tegration compared to outsourcing (0.5 (1+ δα) R > 0.5R). The headquarter firm therefore has larger incentives
to invest if both parties integrate. Thus, ex ante efficiency implies that integration is preferred over outsourcing
if the headquarter firm is relatively more important in the relationship (i.e. z is low).
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II.2.5 Empirical Predictions
The impact of information technology in the partial equilibrium model has direct implica-
tions for the optimal sourcing strategies of industries. In the first instance firms offshore
production in order to exploit differences in labor costs across countries. The model alludes
that the overall pattern of offshoring might be affected by the necessity to transmit informa-
tion between the headquarter in North and its manufacturing counterpart in South. Hence,
by considering varying degrees of complexity across industries, the model illustrates how
information technology leads to differential effects across industries which depend to a dif-
ferent extent on knowledge transmission.
Consider now the impact of information technology on the choice whether to source
inputs in South in equation (II.15). Taking the derivatives of the log of the A(z, µ, Γ)-curve
with respect to communication costs Γ and the degree of complexity of the final good µ yields
∂ ln A(z, µ, Γ)
∂Γ
> 0 ,
∂ ln A(z, µ, Γ)
∂Γ∂µ
< 0. (II.18)
Hence, an increase in the costs of communication Γ shifts the A(z, µ, Γ)-curve to the right
as for any given relative wage w
N
wS
industries shift production to the South only at a higher
level of relative importance of the manufacturing firm z (i.e. a later stage of standardization).
This effect is dampened, the larger the range of basic activities µ and the smaller the range
of complex activities (1 − µ) in an industry. Overall, considering an increase in the costs
of communication, the new equilibrium threshold level z̄ at which offshoring occurs has in-
creased. Considering the reverse case of more efficient information technology: A reduction
in the cost of communication and coordination reduces the cutoff level z at which an in-
dustry offshores production to the South. More efficient information transmission alleviates
contractual frictions in South and thereby permits international fragmentation of production
at lower levels of manufacturing intensity z.17 Figure A.1 depicts the impact of an increase in
the efficiency of information technology Γ′ < Γ for a varying degree of product complexity
17An alternative interpretation would be that more efficient information technology allows for international
fragmentation of production at an earlier stage of the life cycle of a product. Thus, advances in information
technology shift comparative advantage in manufacturing from North to South and speed up the product cycle.
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µ
◦
< µ on the cutoff level z at which an industry starts to offshore production. A reduction in
the costs of communication Γ′ < Γ shifts the A(z, µ, Γ)-curve to the left and lowers the cutoff
level z̄. This effect however is stronger for the more complex industry characterized by a
smaller fraction of contractible activities µ
◦
< µ. By emphasizing differences in complexity
across industries and differences in information technology infrastructure across countries,
the model can be used to derive a prediction about the geography of offshoring.
Prediction 1 Industries are more likely to import inputs from a country with a higher level of
information technology infrastructure. This effect is more pronounced for more complex industries.
Turning towards the mode of firm organization, less sophisticated information technol-
ogy increases the costs of outsourcing and favors vertical integration. Since costly communi-
cation applies only to the complex fraction of inputs, this effect drops with the level of basic
activities µ and increases with the range of complex activities (1− µ):
∂ ln A∗(z, µ, Γ)
∂Γ
> 0 ,
∂ ln A∗(z, µ, Γ)
∂Γ∂µ
< 0. (II.19)
Hence, the cutoff level of standardization z∗ at which firms adapt their mode of organi-
zation increases and more firms purchase intermediate inputs within the boundaries of the
firm. Figure A.2 displays the reverse case of an increase in the efficiency of information tech-
nology Γ′ < Γ. More efficient information technology reduces the costs of outsourcing and
shifts the A∗(z, µ, Γ)-curve to the left. Thus, distortions created by information transmission
are reduced for which reason outsourcing becomes the more viable mode of organization at
even lower levels of importance of the manufacturing process z. Again, the effect is stronger
for the more complex industry featuring a smaller fraction of contractible activities µ
◦
< µ as
a larger range of complex activities reinforces the distortions of costly communication. From
there I can conclude:
Prediction 2 Outsourcing is more likely to occur in countries with a higher level of information
technology infrastructure. This effect is more pronounced for more complex industries.
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II.3 Empirical Evidence
This section first describes the data used to test the predictions of the model. Subsequently, I
assess how information technology determines the geography of offshoring. Last, I estimate
the impact of information technology on the sourcing mode. Several robustness checks are
included within each of the empirical sections. Testing the empirical predictions requires in
first instance data on North-South vertical offshoring, the degree of product complexity and
the level of information technology.
II.3.1 Data Description
II.3.1.1 Global Sourcing
Estimations with respect to the geography of offshoring (Prediction 1) are based on trade
data provided by the NBER.18 This data provides a detailed documentation of the entire set
of industries and countries exporting to the US up to the 10-digit level of the Harmonized
System (HS). In order to focus on North-South trade and follow the setup of the model, I
restrict the set of trading partners to countries located in the South, where I follow Romalis
(2004) and define the South to be any country with per capita GDP (at PPP) lower than
50% of the US level in the year 2000. In addition, so as to measure vertical offshoring and
trade in intermediates, I make use of the end-use classification established by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis and drop all final goods and rawmaterials following Feenstra and Jensen
(2012). The proxy variable to model the geography of offshoring is given by the number
of intermediate goods per industry that a country exports to the US. This is because in the
model Prediction 1 and the geography of imports captures the extensive margin of offshoring.
A good is defined as a 5-digit SITC category and an industry is classified by a 4-digit NAICS
category.19 The focus of the analysis is on the years 2002 - 2006.
18See Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002).
19See Basco (2013) for recent research using a similar approach in order to quantify the number of imported
goods by industry. In the econometric analysis industry fixed effects control for the fact that the number of goods
may be varying in different industries.
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Estimation of the impact of information technology on firm organization (Prediction 2)
is based on related party trade data collected by the US Census Bureau. US cross-border
shipments are required to report whether a transaction occurs between related parties such
that the data covers almost the entire universe of related party shipments. The data reports
both, the scale of related party (intra-firm) and non-related party (arm’s-length) US imports.
A related party transaction is defined as a transaction between two parties in which one
owns at least 6% of the outstanding voting stock or shares of its counterpart. A shortcom-
ing of the data is that it is not possible to infer whether the US importer is a US parent firm
or a foreign-based affiliate. Nunn and Trefler (2013) investigate all headquarter-subsidiary
pairs for global multinationals for which the headquarter firm or the subsidiary are from
the US. They find that for a large range of countries the US can commonly be considered as
the headquarter. Moreover, countries for which this turns out not to be the case are mostly
developed countries. Therefore, once more I concentrate on North-South trade and drop all
trading partners if per capita GDP (at PPP) is lower than 50% of the US level in the year
2000. I follow Nunn and Trefler (2008, 2013) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010)
and compute the share of related party imports by industry and country to the US in order
to measure the degree of vertical integration of the offshoring activities of an industry. Al-
ternatively, for the purpose of further robustness tests, I construct a dummy variable which
indicates whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the distribution.
Estimation is again at the 4-digit NAICS level and for the years 2002 - 2006.
II.3.1.2 Country Variables
The level and efficiency of information technology infrastructure is measured by the interna-
tional internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user derived from the ICT indicators database
provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). International internet band-
width refers to the capacity that backbone operators provide to carry internet traffic. As such,
the international bandwidth represents the maximum quantity of data transmission from a
country to the rest of the world. An internet connection with a larger bandwidth can move
a given amount of data much faster than an internet connection with a lower bandwidth.
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Thus, countries with a higher international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user are
characterized by a more efficient information technology infrastructure.20 Table A.6 in the
appendix presents the top and bottom 10 countries in information technology infrastructure
in the data. In my robustness tests I also employ various alternative measures of informa-
tion technology adoption. First of all, I rescale the level of international internet bandwidth
(bit/s) with the population in order to account for country size. Moreover, I directly exploit
the share of internet users per 100 people (ITU) as well as the number of secure internet
servers per 1 million people (World Bank). While internet users provide extensive infor-
mation about internet adoption in developing countries, secure servers protect data from
unauthorized interception and reflect the security level of online transactions within the lo-
cal information technology network.
I introduce several controls in order to take account of prior research on the determinants
of offshoring. There is a considerable amount of research which studies the role of financial
frictions on trade and investment. Carluccio and Fally (2012) study the impact of access
to external finance on French multinationals and find evidence, that financial development
provides comparative advantage in the supply of complex products and promotes arm’s-
length contracting relative to intra-firm imports. Similar evidence has been produced by
Beck (2003) and Manova (2013) who demonstrate how financial frictions act as a source of
comparative advantage and affect firms’ export decisions at the micro-level. I follow the
literature and concentrate on the share of financial resources provided to the private sector
(i.e. loans, nonequity securities, trade credits) as a share of GDP. The variable is procured
from the Global Financial Development Database provided by the World Bank.
Similarly, a related strand of literature emphasizes the quality of the contracting envi-
ronment (’rule of law’) as a further source of comparative advantage and determinant of
multinationals’ organization. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) find that the quality of a
country’s legal system provides comparative advantage in contract intensive industries. Ac-
cording to Antràs and Helpman (2008) judicial quality also affects the decision whether to
integrate the foreign production facility. The measure for the rule of law is taken from Kauf-
20This approach is similar to Freund and Weinhold (2002, 2004) who use the number of top-level host domain
names in order measure the adoption of information technology at the country level.
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mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). I also control for the level of intellectual property rights
since firms might refrain from offshoring and outsourcing sensitive production processes in
countries featuring little protection of intellectual property.21 The index of patent protection
is drawn from Ginarte and Park (1997, 2008).
Next, using data from Hall and Jones (1999) I take account of traditional trade theory
and control for factor endowments as determinant of comparative advantage.22 Moreover,
in order to control for a country’s degree of integration into global trade, I use the sum of
imports and exports over GDP as measure of openness. Finally, the overall level of economic
development is considered by the level of GDP per capita (at PPP). Both variables are drawn
from the Word Development Indicators (World Bank).
II.3.1.3 Industry Variables
The measure for the costs of knowledge transmission and product complexity is based on
task level data. Production processes that are based on more complicated activities (i.e. non-
routine tasks) are subject to less codifiable information and exhibit higher costs of knowledge
transmission between the headquarter and the manufacturing firm. Therefore, they rely to
a larger extent on efficient information technology. In the model, more complex production
processes being subject to more costly transmission of information, are reflected by non-
contractible inputs. Information technology is supposed to ease knowledge transmission
and to reduce the inefficiencies generated by contractual incompleteness. I follow the con-
struction of task intensities by Oldenski (2012a,b). Raw data on tasks is taken from the De-
partment of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) which comprises data on
the importance of 277 worker and job characteristics in about 800 occupations. The O*NET
data distinguishes between seven broad categories of worker and job characteristics given by
abilities, interests, knowledge, skills, work activities, work context and work values. I follow
Oldenski (2012a,b) and focus on work activities. So as to match the relevant task measures
to the industry level trade data, I aggregate the raw O*NET scores up to the 4-digit NAICS
level by combining them with employment data from the Occupational Employment Statis-
21See e.g. Ethier and Markusen (1996).
22See Romalis (2004) for recent evidence.
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tics (OES) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.23 The importance of a task i in a sector
s is given by
Mis = ∑
o
αsoℓio, (II.20)
where o denotes occupations and αso is the share of occupation o in an industry s. ℓio in
turn measures the importance of task i in occupation o.24 Summing over occupations for a
given industry yields Mis which is an index for the unscaled importance score for a task i
in industry s. Ultimately, each raw score is then divided by the sum of scores for each task.
This results in an intensity measure for each task i in each industry s:
Iis =
Mis
∑i Mis
. (II.21)
Since offshoring activities might likewise influence the task composition of industries, the
measure is constructed for the year 2000 which precedes the panel data under investigation.
Subsequently, I create a measure of complexity (i.e. non-routine intensity) by computing the
average task intensity of ’analyzing data and information’, ’developing objectives and strate-
gies’, ’interacting with computers’, ’making decisions and solving problems’, ’provide con-
sultation and advice’ and ’thinking creatively’. This procedure is akin to Oldenski (2012a,b).
The basic idea is to capture tasks that are sufficiently complex such that they exhibit a low
degree of codifiability and high costs of information transmission thereby making the use of
information technology more valuable. In order to conduct further robustness checks I also
construct a measure of routine intensity by building the average intensity of ’handling and
moving objects’, ’controlling machines and processes’ and ’performing general physical ac-
tivities’. Table A.7 in the appendix displays the correlations between the task intensities and
the measures for complexity and routine intensity. As expected, the measures for routine
intensive and non-routine intensive tasks are highly negatively correlated.
23The O*NET dataset and the occupational employment shares by the Bureau of Labor Statistics both use 6-
digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes such that both datasources can be combined without
concordance problems.
24ℓio is a 0− 100 score reported by O*NET in order to measure the importance of each task in each occupation.
The data is derived from surveys of individuals in different occupations and normalized to a 0− 100 scale by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CHAPTER II. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL SOURCING 39
Moreover, I control for R&D intensity as additional proxy for product complexity. R&D
intensity is given by R&D expenditures over sales and taken from Keller and Yeaple (2013).
Additionally, I also employ a dummy variable indicating whether an industry represents a
high-technology sector. The variable is derived from the Science and Engineering Indicators
2010 by the National Science Foundation and based on the intensity of high-technology em-
ployment within an industry. Furthermore, I include data on a sector’s contract intensity as
developed by Nunn (2007). The variable measures the importance of relationship-specific
investments based on the proportion of inputs an industry processes which are not sold on
markets or organized exchanges. Thus, an industry which uses a smaller fraction of inputs
which are traded on markets exhibits a higher degree of relationship-specificity and is con-
sidered more contract intensive.25
Ultimately, I control for the skill and capital intensity of industries by using data from
the NBER CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Skill intensity is defined as the share of
non-production workers in total employment and capital intensity is measured as the capital
stock per employee.
II.3.2 Information Technology and the Geography of Imports
II.3.2.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
Next, I turn towards the impact of information technology infrastructure on the location
choice of Northern firms where to purchase intermediates in South. Following Prediction 1,
industries are expected to prefer to source inputs from countries providing more sophisti-
cated information technology infrastructure. This effect should increase with the level of
product complexity. This implies a difference-in-differences approach.26 The dependent
variable is the number of goods imported to the US by a given industry from a specific coun-
try. For this reason I run a count data regression based on a negative binomial distribution.
In contrast to the Poisson regression, the negative binomial regression allows for overdisper-
25I focus on the proportion of inputs of products that are not traded on organized exchanges (differentiated)
but which might be reference priced based on the liberal classification of commodities into organized exchange,
reference priced, and differentiated by Rauch (1999).
26This generalized difference-in-differences approach has been pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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sion and does not assume that the mean and variance coincide.27 Moreover, I follow Allison
and Waterman (2002) who recommend to estimate an unconditional negative binomial re-
gression with dummy variables in order to take account of fixed effects.2829 This yields the
following estimation equation
E [Ncst|Xcst] = exp
[
β1 × complexitys × ITct + X
′
cstγ + µs + ηct + εcst
]
. (II.22)
The number of goods Ncst imported from country c by industry s in year t is regressed on
the interaction of sectoral product complexity complexitys and the level of information tech-
nology ITct reflected by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user in
country c in year t. The focus of the empirical strategy is on the interaction terms. Therefore,
I include country-year fixed effects ηct that control for country characteristics in a given year
that might affect sourcing activities by US industries. In addition, I also control for sector
characteristics with sector fixed-effects µs. Hence, identification of the coefficient of interest
β1 is across industries and within countries for a given year. The fixed-effects capture the
direct effects of the country and industry level variables for which reason the empirical strat-
egy mainly requires to control for variables Xcst that might affect the level of international
internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user and that might likewise be correlated with the
degree of complexity of industries. According to Prediction 1, if information technology in-
fluences the decision of firms where to source inputs, the number of imported goods should
increase with the complexity of the industry. Thus, the coefficient of interest is expected to
be positive. The regressions are based on standard erros which are clustered at the country
level. Besides, taking logs on both sides of the estimation equation allows to interpret the
coefficients as semi-elasticities.30
Table II.1 reports the estimation results. Column (1) presents the baseline equation: The
27The Poisson distribution can be considered as a particular case of the negative binomial distribution (see
Cameron and Trivedi (2009), Ch. 20 for further explanation).
28Allison and Waterman (2002) find in their simulations that an unconditional negative binomial regression
with dummy variables does not underestimate the standard errors and generate the “incidental parameters
problem”.
29This approach is similar to Carluccio and Fally (2012) who estimate the impact of financial development and
product complexity on the number of multinationals which source intermediates from a specific country.
30Taking logs implies that the coefficients reflect the impact of the explanatory variables on the log of the
expected number of imported goods.
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negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: number of imported goods
complexitys * ITct 0.0611*** 0.0445** 0.0311* 0.0356** 0.0329**
(0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0138)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000211
(0.000835)
high-techs * patent protc 0.137*
(0.0782)
contract ints * rule of lawct 1.636**
(0.738)
complexitys * H/Lc 0.816*
(0.459)
complexitys * K/Lc -0.00894
(0.0577)
complexitys * cgdpct 6.02e-06
(7.00e-06)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00376***
(0.000974)
skill ints * H/Lc 1.122* 0.574 -0.584 0.442
(0.642) (0.809) (1.190) (0.733)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.246 0.231 0.271 0.255
(0.290) (0.297) (0.301) (0.292)
alpha 0.0903 0.0877 0.0855 0.0877 0.0867
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,014 9,573 9,276 9,573 9,556
log likelihood -20,942 -20,128 -19,629 -20,119 -20,070
country clusters 86 76 68 76 76
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the num-
ber of imported goods. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of complexity at the
sector level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at the
country-year level ITct. Information technology infrastructure is measured by the in-
ternational internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complexity is measured by
the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry (see section II.3.1.3 for detailed explana-
tions). For a definition of the covariates see Table A.10. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table II.1: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Geogra-
phy of Imports
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international internet bandwith (kbit/s) per internet user is interacted with the measure of
complexity which is given by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. Consistent with
Prediction 1, the coefficient is positive and highly significant. Thus, firms relying to a larger
extent on knowledge transmission are more likely to invest in countries with better infor-
mation technology infrastructure. In the following regressions, I subsequently add several
control variables which affect multinationals’ sourcing decisions and might be correlated
with both, the level of information technology as well as complexity. In column (2) I start
with capital and skill endowments which are interacted with capital and skill intensity in or-
der to control for Heckscher-Ohlin effects. This results in a drop in the size of the coefficient
of interest which nevertheless remains highly significant. Consistent with traditional trade
theory, the interaction of skill intensity and skill endowment is positive and significant. This
however is not the case for the capital endowment and capital intensity interaction. Fur-
ther control variables in column (3) include interactions of financial development and the
protection of intellectual property rights with R&D intensity and the technology indicator
while the rule of law is interacted with contract intensity. These interactions are included
because several studies on institutions and trade have stressed the importance of financial
development and judicial quality as sources of comparative advantage in R&D and contract
intensive industries.31 Moreover, prior research has emphasized the quality of intellectual
property rights as determinant of FDI flows in industrial sectors being sensitive to the pro-
tection of intellectual property.32 The coefficient of interest remains stable in size and sig-
nificant. Overall, the control variables are in line with economic theory. The interactions of
patent protection and the high-technology dummy as well as the interaction of the rule of
law and contract intensity are both positive and significant. Hence, these results are in line
with previous studies on institution driven comparative advantage. Information technology
infrastructure however might be determined by both, a country’s skill and capital endow-
ment. In order to take account of this relationship I control for the interactions of skill as well
as capital endowment andmymeasure for complexity in column (4). The coefficient of inter-
31See e.g. Beck (2003), Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006), Nunn (2007), Levchenko (2007) and Carluccio
and Fally (2012).
32See e.g. Javorcik (2004), Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2011) and Bilir (2014).
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est is stable in size and remains significant at the 5% level. The skill endowment interaction
is likewise positive and significant, whereas this is not the case for the capital endowment in-
teraction. Ultimately, I aim to control for the overall level of economic development and for
a country’s integration in the world economy. Therefore I include per capita GDP and open-
ness and interact both measures with product complexity in column (5). The two variables
are positively correlated with the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
The additional interaction term based on openness is positive and significant. Most impor-
tantly however, the main coefficient for information technology remains unaffected, robust
and significant.33
The empirical strategy might nevertheless create doubts on the direction of causality.
An argument that could be advanced is that US sourcing activities might trigger economic
growthwhichmight drive demand formore sophisticated information technology. Similarly,
foreign firms might have an incentive to lobby for improvements in local information tech-
nology infrastructure. These effects might be systematically driven by complex industries
which rely to a larger extent on efficient information transmission. Following this reasoning,
the estimated coefficient of interest might therefore be subject to an upward bias induced
by reverse causality. The sign of the coefficient would however still be correct and in line
with the empirical prediction. Nevertheless, if demand for information technology adop-
tion is independent from sector specific product complexity, these effects are captured by the
country-year fixed effects and the coefficient of interest can be interpreted as causal.
Considering the size of the effect of information technology, I compare two industries
that differ in one standard deviation in terms of complexity (i.e. intensity in non-routine
tasks). Based on the coefficient in column (2), I then calculate the differential effect of a one
standard deviation change in information technology (i.e. international internet bandwidth
(kbit/s) per internet user) on the number of imported goods. This results in a differential
effect of about 2,35%. This appears to be a noticeable effect, given that the effect of skill
endowment with respect to industries that differ by one standard deviation in skill intensity
33Throughout all specifications, the estimated overdispersion parameter alpha is about 0.08 and the likelihood-
ratio test for alpha = 0 is rejected. This implies that the variance of the residuals is larger than the mean and the
residuals do not follow a Poisson distribution.
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is about 3,02%.
II.3.2.2 Robustness
I perform different robustness checks to test the validity of the results. In Table A.1, I estimate
the baseline specification with alternative OLS regressions where the dependent variable is
the logarithm of the number of imported inputs. Additionally, standard errors are now two-
way clustered at the country and sector level. Results indicate that the coefficient of interest
remains unaffected. Finally, in order to check that results are not sensitive to outliers, I re-
strict the sample to the 75% percentile of the distribution of the number of imported goods.
This amounts to restricting the maximum number of imported inputs to 6 imported goods.
I obtain significant coefficients that are smaller than those in the full sample, reducing the
concern of industry-country combinations importing a larger number of inputs driving the
results (see Table A.2). Table A.3 presents various additional specifications based on the
negative binomial regression. First of all, in columns (1) to (3) I control for the interaction
of institutional determinants and the measure for complexity. The coefficient of interest re-
mains positive and significant. Afterwards I substitute the complexity measure with routine
intensity. Following Prediction 1, the number of imported goods increases with the level of
information technology for more complex inputs. Consequently, the effect of information
technology is expected to decrease for industries that are more basic in nature as they rely to
a lesser extent on information transmission. The coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are both
negative. However, only the former is statistically significant. Finally, throughout columns
(6) to (7) I use alternative measures of information technology given by the international
internet bandwidth (bit/s), the amount of internet users as well as the amount of secure
internet servers relative to the population. The regressions yield a positive and significant
coefficient of interest. Altogether, the results confirm that the country of origin’s level of in-
formation technology is strongly correlated with the number of imported inputs in complex
industries compared to basic industries.
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II.3.3 Information Technology and the Mode of Organization
II.3.3.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
So far, I have tested Prediction 1 by analyzing the impact of information technology and the
complexity of traded intermediates on the number of imported inputs. I now turn towards
Prediction 2 and the effect of information technology on the optimal mode of organization.
Prediction 2 states that more efficient information technology should lead to a larger fraction
of arm’s-length contracting compared to FDI, with the effect being larger for more complex
industries. The dependent variable is therefore now given by the share of intra-firm trade
by industry and country in order to measure the optimal organizational mode of an indus-
try. Again, the empirical strategy follows the difference-in-differences approach taken in the
previous section. This allows once more to focus on the interaction terms and to control for
all unobserved sector characteristics and country characteristics that vary across years by
means of fixed effects. The estimation equation is now given by
IntraSharecst = β2 × complexitys × ITct + X
′
cstγ + µs + ηct + εcst, (II.23)
where IntraSharecst reflects the share of intra-firm trade, complexitys denotes the mea-
sure of complexity (i.e. intensity in non-routine tasks) and ITct is the level of information
technology represented by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
In addition, the specification employs sector and country-year fixed effects µs and ηct and
controls for observable factors Xcst that might have an impact on information technology
and product complexity as well as the share of intra-firm trade. Hence, identification is again
based on variation across industries within countries for a given year. Following Prediction 2,
the coefficient of interest β2 is expected to be negative: Higher levels of information technol-
ogy resolve contractual frictions in arm’s-length relationships by reducing the inefficiencies
due to imperfect knowledge transfer and raise the amount of market transactions. The ef-
fect is supposed to increase with the complexity of industries. All regressions are based on
robust standard errors which are corrected for clusters by sector as well as by country-year
combination.
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: share of intra-firm trade
complexitys * ITct -0.0205*** -0.0206*** -0.0167* -0.0194*** -0.0245***
(0.00705) (0.00708) (0.00842) (0.00714) (0.00819)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000427*
(0.000220)
high-techs * patent protc -0.0443
(0.0414)
R&D ints * rule of lawct 0.211***
(0.0330)
contract ints * rule of lawct -0.226
(0.141)
capitals * ITct -0.0237
(0.0201)
capital ints * rule of lawct 0.370**
(0.165)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00107**
(0.000416)
complexitys * cgdpct 2.40e-06
(4.09e-06)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.121 0.129 0.190 0.104 -0.0589
(0.165) (0.166) (0.234) (0.163) (0.194)
capital ints * K/Lc -0.0165 -0.0168 -0.0417 -0.0232 -0.0178
(0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0410) (0.0268) (0.0301)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,926 10,926 7,043 10,926 10,915
R-squared 0.286 0.287 0.320 0.287 0.289
sector clusters 85 85 85 85 85
country-year clusters 314 314 192 314 313
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country-year. The de-
pendent variable is the share of intra-firm trade. The coefficient of interest is the interac-
tion of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information technology
infrastructure at the country-year level ITct. Information technology infrastructure is
measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complex-
ity is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry (see section II.3.1.3 for
detailed explanations). For a definition of the covariates see Table A.10. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table II.2: Prediction 2 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Sourcing
Mode
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Results are presented in Table II.2. As before, the coefficient of interest is the interaction
of information technology and product complexity. The coefficient in column (1) is negative
and significant. Moreover, the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of the full set of sector
and country-year fixed effects as well as to controls for traditional determinants of compara-
tive advantage given by the interaction of relative factor endowments and factor intensities.
Hence, a higher level of information technology in the country of origin reduces the share of
related party imports. The relationship is stronger in more complex industries relying to a
larger extent on efficient codification and transmission of information. In column (2) I add
the interaction of R&D intensity and financial development. The main coefficient of interest
remains negative and significant. Besides, the additional control variable is negative and
significant and in line with Carluccio and Fally (2012) who find that R&D intensive inputs
are more likely to be traded intra-firm from countries with a lower level of financial devel-
opment. Subsequently, I add controls for further institutional determinants in column (3) by
including interactions of the technology indicator, R&D and contract intensity and the level
of patent protection and the quality of the legal system. The enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights might drive firms’ decisions whether to outsource or integrate if they are subject
to technological imitation. Next, firms’ organizational decisions might be affected by the
quality level of the judicial system. My coefficient of interest reduces in size and loses some
of its statistical significance while the number of observations in the estimation drops con-
siderably. Nevertheless, the coefficient remains negative and statistically different from zero
in line with Prediction 2. The coefficients of patent protection and the interaction of contract
intensity and the rule of law are insignificant. The interaction based on R&D intensity and
the rule of law however is positive and significant which is in line with the idea of rule of law
effects being larger in more contract dependent industries (see Antràs and Helpman (2008)).
In column (4) I control for the interactions of capital intensity and information technology
as well as the rule of law, respectively. Capital intensity is intended to reflect the headquar-
ter intensity of the industry. The coefficient of interest is unaffected and stays negative and
highly significant. This suggests, that the impact of information technology on the sourcing
mode is not driven by the overall level of contract enforcement and further institutional de-
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terminants. In a final step, I add controls in order to account for the degree of openness of
the country of origin and its level of economic development. My main coefficient of interest
is again robust to the controls and shows up negative in line with Prediction 2.
As in section II.3.2.1 my estimation results might suffer from reverse causality. The share
of goods purchased from integrated suppliers by multinational firms might systematically
affect the level of information technology adoption where the effect might be induced by
more complex industries that are more dependent on sophisticated information technology
infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is a priori not clear by what mechanism this might take place
for which reason the direction of the potential reverse causality bias is not obvious.
Based on the coefficient in column (1) and a comparison of two industries that differ
in one standard deviation in their level of complexity, a one standard deviation increase in
information technology creates a negative differential effect of about 1, 11 percentage points
in the share of intra-firm trade.
II.3.3.2 Robustness
I engage in various robustness tests to evaluate the validity of the results (see Table A.4).
First, I replace the sectoral degree of product complexity with routine intensity. More rou-
tine intensive industries are less dependent on efficient information transmission. In this
regard, Prediction 2 implies a positive coefficient of interest. Throughout columns (1) to (3) I
control for Heckscher-Ohlin effects as well as institutional determinants. Across all specifica-
tions, the new coefficient of interest is positive and significant. Thus, information technology
reduces the share of intra-firm trade with a less pronounced effect for routine intensive in-
dustries. In columns (4) and (5) I resort again to my main measure of complexity and control
directly for the interaction of complexity and institutional determinants. Sign and signifi-
cance of the main coefficient are unaffected. A possible problem of the estimations so far
might be that the dependent variable is given by a share that is bounded between zero and
one. Therefore, in column (6) the dependent variable is replaced with a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the distribution
in order to estimate a linear probability model. Again, the main result is stable showing a
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negative and significant coefficient of interest.34
II.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of the advances in information technology on the global sourc-
ing decisions of multinationals. While previous research has found large spatial barriers to
knowledge transmission across borders, the impact of the digitization of the business world
on the global supply chain has received only little attention.
In order to guide the empirical analysis, I provide a model based on the product cycle
theory by Antràs (2005) which illustrates the impact of information technology on the ge-
ography of offshoring and the sourcing mode. More sophisticated information technology
allows more efficient knowledge transmission between the headquarter firm in North and
its supplier in South by alleviating contractual distortions. Overall, imperfect information
transmission induces larger disruptions in the production process of more complex indus-
tries. This yields two predictions. Firstly, industries which aremore intensive in complex and
non-routine intensive activities are more likely to offshore parts of their production process
to countries with high levels in information technology infrastructure. Secondly, information
technology is expected to reduce the share of intra-firm trade with the effect being larger for
more knowledge intensive industries. The paper provides empirical evidence in support of
these hypotheses by combining data on the number of imported goods and the share of intra-
firm imports with data on the international internet bandwidth by country and the intensity
in non-routine production activities by industry. The measure of sectoral complexity and
non-routine intensity is based on data at the occupational level. The empirical strategy con-
centrates on the identification of the interaction of information technology and product com-
plexity which allows making use of a generalized difference-in-differences approach with
fixed effects along the industry and country-year dimension. Econometric results are in line
with the empirical predictions. US firms find it more profitable to offshore the production
of complex intermediates to Southern countries with higher levels of information technol-
34Replacing the share of intra-firm trade in the baseline regression in Table II.2 with the integration indicator
as dependent variable yields a negative and significant coefficient of interest throughout all specifications.
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ogy infrastructure. In equal measure, information technology creates incentives to engage
in arm’s-length contracting with the relationship being stronger in more complex industries.
Estimates suggest that a one standard deviation change in information technology yields a
differential effect of about 2, 35% in the number of imported intermediates and a differential
reduction of about 1.11 percentage points in the share of intra-firm trade when comparing
two industries that differ by one standard deviation in terms of product complexity. The
econometric estimates remain persistent in the presence of alternative determinants of the
patterns of global sourcing and firm organization such as factor endowments, institutions
and economic development.
Altogether, the paper highlights the effects of information technology adoption for the
patterns of trade and the mode of firm organization along the global supply chain. Prior
research has primarily hinted to the importance of skill endowments as well as contracting
and financial institutions in shaping the location decisions of multinationals. Nevertheless,
given that the development of human capital and trustworthy institutions takes a long time,
the adoption of information technology might be a particularly viable economic policy for
developing countries which lack these factors in order to attract knowledge intensive foreign
investment and outsourcing.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figures and Robustness
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Figure A.1: The Impact of Information Technology on Offshoring
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Figure A.2: The Impact of Information Technology on the Sourcing Mode
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log(number of imported goods)
complexitys * ITct 0.0615*** 0.0550*** 0.0414** 0.0401*** 0.0361***
(0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0108) (0.0126)
R&D ints * fin devtct 0.000130
(0.000560)
high-techs * patent protc 0.125
(0.0935)
contract ints * rule of lawct 2.013***
(0.692)
complexitys * H/Lc 1.075**
(0.506)
complexitys * K/Lc 0.00791
(0.0447)
complexitys *cgdpct 1.57e-05
(1.15e-05)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00344***
(0.00127)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.264 -0.372 -2.171 -0.609
(0.892) (0.747) (1.547) (0.836)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.421* 0.438** 0.452* 0.431*
(0.232) (0.211) (0.234) (0.229)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,007 9,566 9,270 9,566 9,549
R-squared 0.716 0.725 0.733 0.727 0.728
sector clusters 73 73 73 73 73
country clusters 85 75 67 75 75
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country. The dependent
variable is the natural log of the number of imported goods. The coefficient of interest is
the interaction of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information
technology infrastructure at the country-year level ITct. Information technology infras-
tructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
Complexity is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry (see section
II.3.1.3 for detailed explanations). For a definition of the covariates see Table A.10. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.1: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Geogra-
phy of Imports. Robustness Check 1 - OLS Regression
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log(number of imported goods)
complexitys * ITct 0.0442*** 0.0356*** 0.0278** 0.0264** 0.0218*
(0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0110) (0.0115)
R&D ints * fin devtct 0.000515
(0.000529)
high-techs * patent protc 0.102
(0.0650)
contract ints * rule of lawct 0.956**
(0.458)
complexitys * H/Lc 0.517
(0.370)
complexitys * K/Lc 0.0228
(0.0348)
complexitys * cgdpct 1.51e-05*
(8.09e-06)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00158**
(0.000726)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.598 0.0384 -0.729 -0.0438
(0.461) (0.502) (0.945) (0.488)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.122 0.118 0.135 0.128
(0.0826) (0.0776) (0.0811) (0.0796)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7,582 7,185 6,891 7,185 7,168
R-squared 0.472 0.479 0.486 0.480 0.483
sector clusters 73 73 73 73 73
country clusters 85 75 67 75 75
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country. The depen-
dent variable is the natural log of the number of imported goods which is restricted to the
75% percentile of the distribution (i.e. 6 imported goods). The coefficient of interest is
the interaction of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information
technology infrastructure at the country-year level ITct. Information technology infras-
tructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
Complexity is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry (see section
II.3.1.3 for detailed explanations). For a definition of the covariates see Table A.10. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Geog-
raphy of Imports. Robustness Check 2 - Number of Imported Goods Restricted to the 75%
Percentile. OLS Regression
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negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: number of imported goods
Measure of IT: bandwith per internet user
bandwidth
per capita
internet
users
secure
servers
complexitys * ITct 0.0469** 0.0316* 0.0333* 1.513*** 0.00665** 0.00372***
(0.0196) (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.477) (0.00321) (0.000997)
routine ints * ITct -0.0152** -0.00688
(0.00599) (0.00517)
complexitys * fin devtct 0.00108
(0.00111)
complexitys * patent protc 0.175**
(0.0839)
complexitys * rule of lawct 0.817**
(0.413)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.961 0.784 0.585 1.348** 0.909 0.861 1.512**
(0.733) (0.797) (0.791) (0.645) (0.702) (0.720) (0.620)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.247 0.236 0.249 0.239 0.248 0.258 0.191
(0.290) (0.292) (0.292) (0.290) (0.292) (0.272) (0.293)
alpha 0.0877 0.0868 0.0874 0.0909 0.0880 0.0889 0.0890 0.0895
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,565 9,284 9,573 10,014 9,573 9,644 10,056 7,852
log likelihood -20,111 -19,668 -20,115 -20,954 -20,136 -20,276 -21,054 -16,630
country clusters 76 68 76 86 76 77 76 73
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the number of imported goods. In columns (1) - (3) and (6) - (8) the
coefficient of interest is the interaction of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at the
country-year level ITct. In columns (4) - (5) the coefficient of interest is based on routine intensity at the sector level routine ints. Complexity
and routine intensity are measured by the intensity in non-routine and routine tasks by industry (see section II.3.1.3 for detailed explanations).
In columns (1) - (5) information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. In
columns (6) - (9) the measure is replaced by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per capita, the share of internet users per 100 people
and the number of secure servers per 1 million people. For a definition of the covariates see Table A.10. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Geography of Imports. Robustness Check 3 -
Routine Intensity, Institutions and Alternative Measures of Information Technology
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OLS LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: share of intra-firm trade integration
routine ints * ITct 0.00719*** 0.00724*** 0.00708**
(0.00242) (0.00243) (0.00292)
complexitys * ITct -0.0188*** -0.0181** -0.0168**
(0.00683) (0.00846) (0.00802)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000433*
(0.000220)
complexitys * fin devtct 0.00107**
(0.000461)
high-techs * patent protc -0.0420
(0.0415)
complexitys * patent protc -0.0864
(0.0565)
R&D ints * rule of lawct 0.211***
(0.0339)
contract ints * rule of lawct -0.242*
(0.142)
complexitys * rule of lawct 0.389**
(0.150)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.129 0.138 0.221 -0.0104 0.0590 0.174
(0.166) (0.167) (0.240) (0.169) (0.256) (0.183)
capital ints * K/Lc -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0371 -0.0172 -0.0446 0.00767
(0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0407) (0.0301) (0.0398) (0.0305)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,926 10,926 7,043 10,926 7,043 10,926
R-squared 0.286 0.287 0.320 0.288 0.321 0.148
sector clusters 85 85 85 85 85 85
country-year clusters 314 314 192 314 192 314
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country-year. In columns (1) - (5) the
dependent variable is the share of intra-firm trade. In column (6) the dependent variable integration
is a dummy variable indicating whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90%-percentile of
the distribution. In columns (1) - (3) the coefficient of interest is the interaction of routine intensity
at the sector level routine ints and the level of information technology infrastructure at the country-
year level ITct. In columns (4) - (6) the coefficient of interest is based on complexity at the sector level
complexitys. Complexity and routine intensiy are measured by the intensity in non-routine and routine
tasks by industry (see section II.3.1.3 for detailed explanations). Information technology infrastructure
is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. For a definition of the
covariates see Table A.10. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Prediction 2 - The Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the
Sourcing Mode. Robustness Check: Routine Intensity, Institutions and Linear Probability
Model
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A.2 Data
Table A.5: List of Countries in the Data
Algeria Czech Republic Indonesia Mozambique South Africa
Bangladesh Djibouti Iran Nepal Sri Lanka
Barbados Dominican Rep. Iraq Nicaragua Suriname
Belize Ecuador Jamaica Niger Tanzania
Benin Egypt Jordan Nigeria Thailand
Bolivia Ethiopia Kenya Pakistan Togo
Brazil Fiji Korea (Rep. of) Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Bulgaria Gabon Lao P.D.R. Paraguay Tunisia
Burkina Faso Gambia Liberia Peru Turkey
Burundi Ghana Madagascar Philippines Uganda
Cameroon Guatemala Malawi Poland Uruguay
Chad Guinea Malaysia Portugal Venezuela
Chile Guinea-Bissau Mali Romania Yemen
China Guyana Mauritania Rwanda Zambia
Colombia Haiti Mauritius Samoa Zimbabwe
D.R. Congo Honduras Mexico Senegal
Costa Rica Hungary Mongolia Seychelles
Cote d’Ivoire India Morocco Sierra Leone
Table A.6: Top and Bottom 10 Countries in Information Technology Infrastructure
Top 10 Bottom 10
country IT country IT
Hungary 8.144 Guinea-Bissau 0.019
Czech Republic 8.045 Guinea 0.040
Jamaica 6.884 Congo D.R. 0.053
Djibouti 5.757 Zimbabwe 0.055
Portugal 3.918 Nigeria 0.068
Barbados 3.481 Chad 0.074
Panama 3.094 Zambia 0.085
Romania 2.819 Kenya 0.100
Chile 2.819 Pakistan 0.102
Colombia 2.787 Malawi 0.105
Notes: Information technology is given by the average international inter-
net bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user over the 2002 - 2006 period. Data is
derived from the ICT indicators database by the International Telecom-
munication Union.
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Table A.7: Correlations of Task Intensities
analyze
data
develop
objectives
computers
solve
problems
consultation creativity complexity
handle
objects
control
machines
physical
activities
routine int
analyze data 1.00
develop objectives 0.84 1.00
(0.00)
computers 0.83 0.93 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
solve problems 0.87 0.65 0.64 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
consultation 0.82 0.93 0.96 0.67 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
creativity 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.57 0.77 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
complexity 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.84 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
handle objects -0.74 -0.88 -0.88 -0.57 -0.88 -0.61 -0.86 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
control machines -0.55 -0.84 -0.84 -0.36 -0.86 -0.61 -0.78 0.89 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
physical activities -0.80 -0.85 -0.89 -0.64 -0.88 -0.79 -0.91 0.88 0.77 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
routine int -0.74 -0.91 -0.92 -0.56 -0.92 -0.71 -0.90 0.98 0.93 0.94 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: p-values in parentheses. For a detailed exposition of the construction of task intensities and measures of complexity and routine intensity see section II.3.1.3.
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Table A.8: Top and and Bottom 10 Most and Least Complex Industries
Top 10 Most Complex Industries
NAICS 4-digit sector description complexity
3341 computer and peripheral equipment 2.901
3345 navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments 2.850
3342 communications equipment 2.763
3364 aerospace product and parts 2.740
3344 semiconductor and other electronic component 2.676
3333 commercial and cervice industry machinery 2.583
3332 industrial machinery 2.581
3343 audio and video equipment 2.550
3254 pharmaceutical and medicine 2.520
3339 other general purpose machinery 2.472
Bottom 10 Least Complex Industrises
NAICS 4-digit sector description complexity
3116 animal slaughtering and processing 1.326
3273 cement and concrete product manufacturing 1.564
3211 sawmills and wood preservation 1.719
3115 dairy product manufacturing 1.733
3131 fiber, yarn, and thread mills 1.754
3114 fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty food manufacturing 1.767
3274 lime and gypsum product manufacturing 1.792
3222 converted paper product manufacturing 1.797
3122 tobacco manufacturing 1.807
3119 other food manufacturing 1.811
Notes: Complexity is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. See section II.3.1.3
for detailed explanations on the construction of task intensities and the measure for complexity.
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Table A.9: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
global sourcing
number of imported goodscst 10682 6.123104 1 213 12.28056
log(number of imported goods)cst 10682 1.097822 0 5.361292 1.067945
share of intra-firm tradecst 11902 0.2746167 0.0000196 0.9997116 0.2813905
integration indicatorcst 11902 0.0999832 0 1 0.2999902
country level
int’l internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet userct 391 1.071124 0.0023679 12.48208 1.732975
int’l internet bandwidth (bit/s) per capitact 402 0.0175254 4.50E-06 0.4671284 0.0496992
share of internet users per 100 peoplect 420 9.057331 0.0310112 78.1 12.69666
secure servers per 1 million peoplect 291 17.15283 0.0071846 520.0945 55.04144
financial developmentct 427 32.90474 0.7735366 163.369 31.35263
rule of lawct 433 0.4154873 0.118 0.79 0.1442786
opennessct 427 77.23927 21.67383 290.4993 39.01523
per capita gdpct 433 6208.162 405.4827 27044.03 5544.011
patent protectionc 74 3.124324 1.78 4.54 0.7115526
H/Lc 77 0.482419 0.07236 1.127 0.2397439
K/Lc 77 8.663346 5.76262 10.66226 1.362734
sector level
complexitys 73 2.09736 1.32669 2.901543 0.3050399
routine ints 73 4.500416 2.254529 6.621832 0.836662
R&D ints 73 0.0588022 0 2.665776 0.312024
high-techs 73 0.260274 0 1 0.4418206
contract intensitys 73 0.8546387 0.0959204 0.9995984 0.1862124
skill ints 73 0.2799016 0.0969529 0.6265237 0.1124233
capital ints 73 0.140219 0.0155472 0.8833231 0.1412792
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Table A.10: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
variables descriptions and sources
number of imported goodscst Number of 5-digit SITC products by 4-digit NAICS industry which are imported to the US. Raw materials
and final goods are dropped according to the end-use classification following Feenstra and Jensen (2012).
The sample is based on countries that exhibit per capita GDP (at PPP) of less than 50% of the US level in the
year 2000. Data is derived from the NBER trade database.
log(number of imported
goods)cst
Natural logarithm of the number of 5-digit SITC products by 4-digit NAICS industry which are imported to
the US. See above for further explanations.
share of intra-firm tradecst Share of related party transactions in both related and non-related party transactions of US imports at the
4-digit NAICS level. A related party transaction is defined as a transaction between two parties in which
one owns at least 6% of the outstanding voting stock or shares of its counterpart. The sample is based on
countries that exhibit per capita GDP (at PPP) of less than 50% of the US level in the year 2000. Data is from
the US Census Bureau. For a discussion of the data see section II.3.1.1.
integrationcst Dummy variable that indicates whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the
distribution. See above for further explanations.
ITct Information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per
internet user. Alternative measures are the international internet bandwith (bit/s) per capita, the share of
internet users per 100 people and the number of secure servers per 1 million people. Data for the first three
measures is from the ICT indicators database by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Data on
secure servers is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
financial developmentct Domestic credit to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP. Data is
from the Global Financial Development Database (World Bank).
rule of lawct Index of the quality of contract enforcement, the protection of property rights, the police, and the courts as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Data is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013.
opennessct Ratio of the sum of imports and exports over GDP taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
per capita gdpct GDP per capita at PPP and current international Dollar taken from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank).
patent protectionc Index of the protection of patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997, 2008) for the year 2005.
H/Lc Natural logarithm of human capital augmented labor relative to total labor which is based on estimations
of the returns to schooling by Hall and Jones (1999) .
K/Lc Natural logarithm of physical capital relative to total labor. See Hall and Jones (1999) for more detailed
explanations.
complexitys Reflects the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. Task intensities are contructed based on worker and
job characteristics provided by the Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) for about
800 occupations. The task measures are aggregated to the 4-digit NAICS industry level by weighting them
with employment shares from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data is for the year 2000. complexitys is the average of selected tasks representing non-routine activities. See
section II.3.1.3 for a detailed explanation.
routine intensitys Reflects the intensity in routine tasks by industry at the 4-digit NAICS level. Routine intensity is the
average of selected tasks representing routine activities. See section II.3.1.3 and above for more detailed
explanations.
R&D intensitys R&D expenditures over sales at the 4-digit NAICS level taken from Keller and Yeaple (2013). The measure
is based on firm-level data from COMPUSTAT.
high-tech indicators Dummy variable indicating whether a 4-digit NAICS sector represents a high-technology industry. Data is
from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 by the National Science Foundation. The classification is based
on the intensity of high-technology empoyment within an industry. An industry is considered a
high-technology industry if employment in technology-oriented occupations (scientific, engineering and
technician occupations) accounts for a proportion of that industry’s total employment that is more than
twice the average for all industries.
contract intensitys Reflects the share of inputs that are relationship-specific. The measure is based on the proportion of inputs
of products that are not traded on organized exchanges but which might be reference priced based on the
liberal classification of commodities into organized exchange, reference priced, and differentiated by Rauch
(1999). The data is aggregated to the 4-digit NAICS level by means of the BEA’s input-output table on input
use. See Nunn (2007) for a detailed exposition.
skill intensitys Share of non-production workers in total employment at the 4-digit NAICS level. Data is from the NBER
CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
capital intensitys Capital stock per employee at the 4-digit NAICS level. Data is from the NBER CES Manufacturing Industry
Database.
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A.3 Theory
A.3.1 Profit Maximization with Manufacturing Firm in North
The headquarter firm’s optimization problem is given by
max
h,m
πN(z) = λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)α(1−z)
(m
z
)αz
− hwN −mwS. (II.24)
From the first order conditions the optimal investment levels can be characterized by
h
m =
1−z
z . Plugging this back into the first order conditions, one can solve for the first best
levels of investments in headquarter and manufacturing activities:
h =
(
αλ
wN
) 1
1−α
(1− z) (II.25)
m =
(
αλ
wN
) 1
1−α
z. (II.26)
Inserting the first best investment levels into the profit function given in equation (II.24)
yields:
πN = (1− α) λ
(
wN
α
)
−α
1−α
. (II.27)
A.3.2 Profit Maximization with Manufacturing Firm in South
Headquarter firm and manufacturing firm first choose their investment level in non-
contractible activities h and m (s), s ∈ (µ, 1] :
Headquarter
max
h
φλ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α


exp
(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds
)
z


zα
− wNh (II.28)
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∂
∂h
= (1− z)αφh−1λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α


exp
(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds
)
z


zα
− wN = 0 (II.29)
h =
(1− z)αφR
wN
(II.30)
Manufacturer
max
{ms}
1
µ
(1− φ)λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α


exp
(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds
)
z


zα
− ΓwS
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds (II.31)
∂
∂m
= zα(1− φ)m(s)−1λ1−α
(
h
1− z
)(1−z)α


exp
(
´ 1
0 logm(s)ds
)
z


zα
− wSΓ , s ∈ (µ, 1]
(II.32)
m(s) =
zα(1− φ)R
wSΓ
, s ∈ (µ, 1]. (II.33)
Plugging non-contractible headquarter andmanufacturing activities into revenues R and
solving for R yields:
R1−α(1−µz) = λ1−αξαz
(
(1− z)αφ
wN
)(1−z)α

exp


µ
ˆ
0
logm(s)ds




αz
(
(1− φ)zα
wSΓ
)(1−µ)αz
,
(II.34)
with ξαz = (1− z)
−(1−z)z−z.
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Solving for the level of non-contractible headquarter activities h:
Reinserting revenues R in the first order condition of headquarter acitivities gives
h1−α(1−µz) = λ1−ααξαz

exp


µ
ˆ
0
logm(s)ds




αz
(
φ(1− z)
wN
)1−α(1−µ)z ( (1− φ)z
wSΓ
)α(1−µ)z
.
(II.35)
Solving for the level of non-contractible manufacturing activities m (s), s ∈ (¯, 1]:
Reinserting revenues R in the first order condition of manufacturing activities gives
m(s)1−α(1−µz) = λ1−ααξαz

exp


µ
ˆ
0
logm(s)ds




αz
(
φ(1− z)
wN
)α(1−z) ( (1− φ)z
wSΓ
)1−α(1−z)
.
(II.36)
Solving for the level of contractible activities on behalf of the manufacturing firm:
The headquarter offers the manufacturing firm a contract that satisfies the participation con-
straint:
(1− φ)R− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds− wSΓ
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds + T ≥ 0. (II.37)
The participation constraint is satisfiedwith equality and the final good producer chooses
a contract that maximizes its payoff φR− wNh− T :
max
{m(s)}
µ
0
π = R− wNh− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds− wSΓ
1
ˆ
µ
m(s)ds. (II.38)
This can be rewritten as:
max
{m(s)}
µ
0
π = R− wNh− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds− wSΓ(1− µ)m(s). (II.39)
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Plugging in the first order conditions characterizing non-contractible investments yields:
max
{m(s)}
µ
0
π = [1− (1− z)φα− z(1− µ)(1− φ)] R− wS
µ
ˆ
0
m(s)ds. (II.40)
The first order condition of the profit maximization problem is given by:
∂π
∂m(s)
= [1− (1− z)φα− z(1− µ)(1− φ)]
∂R
∂m(s)
− wS = 0 , s ∈ [0, µ] , (II.41)
where
∂R
∂m(s)
=
αz
1− α(1− µz)
m(s)−1R , s ∈ [0, µ] . (II.42)
Contractible investments can then be expressed by:
m(s) =
[1− αφ(1− z)− α(1− φ)(1− µ)z]
1− α(1− µz)
αz
wS
R. (II.43)
Inserting revenues R from equation (II.34), solving for m(s) with s ∈ [0, µ] and rearrang-
ing finally gives the level of contractible investments in manufacturing:
m(s) =
{
(1− αφ(1− z)− α(1− φ)(1− µ)z
1− α(1− µz)
}
1−α(1−µz)
1−α
{
αλ1−αξαz
(
φ(1− z)
wN
)α(1−z) ( (1− φ)z
wSΓ
)α(1−µ)z
} 1
1−α
( z
wS
)
1−α(1−µz)
1−α
. (II.44)
Solving for profits:
From equation (II.40) profits can be rewritten as
π = [1− (1− z)φα− z (1− µ) (1− φ)] R− wSµm(s) , s ∈ [0, µ] . (II.45)
Plugging in contractible investments from equation (II.43):
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π = (1− α)
(
1− (1− z)φα− z(1− µ)(1− φ)
1− α(1− µz)
)
R. (II.46)
Profits can now be derived by combining contractible investments from equation (II.44)
with revenues R given by equation (II.34). Revenues R are then given by:
R = λα
1
1−α (1− φ)
αz(1−µ)
1−α φ
α(1−z)
1−α w
−αz(1−µ)
1−α
S w
−α(1−z)
1−α
N Γ
−αz(1−µ)
1−α
[
1− αφ(1− z)− α(1− µ)(1− φ)z
1− α(1− µz)
]
(
α(1−z)+αz(1−µ)
(1−α)(1−α(1−µz))
)
.
(II.47)
Combining this with equation (II.46) and setting θ = (1− µz) finally yields:
π = (1− α)λ
[
ααw
−α(1−z)
N w
−αz
S Γ
−αz(1−µ)
(1− φ)α(1−µ)zφα(1−z) (1− αφ(1− z)− α(1− µ)(1− φ)z)(1−αθ)
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
] 1
1−α
.
(II.48)
Outsourcing:
• φ = 0.5
πO = (1− α)λ
[
ααw
−α(1−z)
N w
−αz
S Γ
−αz(1−µ) 0.5
αθ (1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
] 1
1−α
. (II.49)
Vertical Integration:
• φ = 0.5 (1+ δα)
πVI = (1− α) λ
[
ααw
−α(1−z)
N w
−αz
S
0.5αθ (1− δα)α(1−µ)z (1+ δ)α(1−z)△(1−αθ)
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
] 1
1−α
,
(II.50)
with△ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))].
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A.3.3 Location Choice: The A(z, µ, Γ)-curve
Comparing profits in North πNand South πS, production takes place in South if
πN
πS
≤ 1, (II.51)
which can be rearranged to get
wN
wS
≥
(
(1− αθ)(1−αθ)
0.5αθ (1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
) 1
z
Γ(1−µ) ≡ A(z, µ, Γ). (II.52)
A(z, µ, Γ) is a decreasing function of z since
lim
z→0
(
(1− α(1− µz)(1−α(1−µz))
0.5α(1−µz)(1− α0.5 (1− µz))(1−α(1−µz))
)
=
(1− α)(1−α)
0.5α (1− α0.5)(1−α)
> 1, (II.53)
from where
lim
z→0
A(z, µ, Γ) = +∞, (II.54)
follows. Moreover, note that
lim
z→1
(
(1− α(1− µz)(1−α(1−µz))
0.5α(1−µz)(1− α0.5 (1− µz))(1−α(1−µz))
)
=
(1− α (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
0.5α(1−µ) (1− α0.5 (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
> 1
, (II.55)
for which reason
lim
z→1
A(z, µ, Γ) =
(
(1− α (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
0.5α(1−µ) (1− α0.5(1− µ))(1−α(1−µ)
)
Γ1−µ > 1, (II.56)
since Γ > 1. Most importantly, note that f (b) = (1− ab)1−a ba is increasing in b for
b ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the A(z, µ, Γ)-curve is downwardsloaping. As long as the
relative wage w
N
wS
is large enough, a cutoff z̄ ∈ (0, 1) emerges such that for z < z profits with
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Northern manufacturing are larger than profits with Southern manufacturing πN > πS.
Thus, for any z > z manufacturing in South is more profitable πN < πS.
A.3.4 Mode of Organization: The A∗(z, µ, Γ)-curve
Comparing profits with vertical integration and outsourcing, the headquarter firm opts for
integration if
πVI
πO
≥ 1, (II.57)
which can be rearranged to obtain
A∗(z, µ, Γ) ≡
(
(1− δα)αz(1−µ) (1+ δα)α(1−z)△(1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
) 1
αz
Γ1−µ ≥ 1, (II.58)
with△ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))].
A⋆(z, µ, Γ) is a decreasing function of z since
lim
z→0
(1− δα)αz(1−µ)(1+ δα)α(1−z) [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))](1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
=
(1+ δα)α (1− α0.5 (1+ δα))(1−α)
(1− 0.5α)(1−α)
> 1
, (II.59)
which implies that
lim
z→0
A∗(z, µ, Γ) = +∞, (II.60)
and
lim
z→1
(1− δα)αz(1−µ)(1+ δα)α(1−z) [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))](1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
=
(1− δα)α(1−µ) (1− α0.5 (1− δα) (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
(1− α0.5 (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
< 1
, (II.61)
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which implies that
lim
z→1
A∗(z, µ, Γ) =
(
(1− δα)α(1−µ) (1− α0.5 (1− δα) (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
(1− α0.5 (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
) 1
α
Γ1−µ < 1, (II.62)
if Γ is not too large. Again, note that this is because f (b) = (1− ab)1−a ba is increasing in
b for b ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1) . Hence, ∃ z ∈ (0, 1) such that πO (z∗) = πVI (z∗).

CHAPTER III
Import Competition and the Composition of Firm Investments
III.1 Introduction
Firms invest in expectation of some future benefits. A vigorous policy debate is in progress
over the origins and consequences of short-term corporate behavior: when firms in the econ-
omy face short-term incentives and do not invest sufficiently long-term, into assets that pay
off in distant future, this can be impedimental for economic growth. The literature has iden-
tified that credit crunches, uncertainty, investor pressures or agency problems can be causal
for short-term investment behavior (see Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2010),
Garicano and Steinwender (2016), Terry (2015), Garicano and Rayo (2016) and Bénabou and
Tirole (2016)). In this paper, we put forward another reason for corporate short-termism: we
argue that foreign competition can induce firms to distort investments away from assets that
payoff in distant future towards short-term assets.
Falling trade barriers leading to a dramatic rise in international trade flows is a defining
feature of the past century. The associated increase in competitive pressure from abroad can
threaten domestic firms. When competition lowers future price-cost margins and thereby re-
duces the quasi-rents from durable investments, import competition might discourage long-
This chapter is joint work with Jan Schymik and Jan Tscheke.
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term firm investments.
In this paper, we study how trade shocks affect the composition of firm investments with
respect to durable and nondurable assets. We think that this investment compositionmatters
due to three reasons. First, when firms do not sufficiently consider the long-term perspec-
tive when facing investment decisions but strongly react to short-term pressures, they might
not fully exploit their growth potential in the long-run.1 Second, when the amount of in-
vestment into nondurable assets increases, firms need to refinance more frequently as their
assets deplete earlier. As a result, financing costs of firms increase. Third, changes in the in-
vestment composition due to trade shocks potentially affects the firm size distribution when
investment responses are heterogeneous.
To guide our empirical analysis, we provide a simple model. We consider a firm in a
two-period economy which engages in two types of investment: a short-term one and a
long-term one. While short-term investments reduce production costs today and yield an
immediate payoff, investments into more durable assets reduce future production costs and
therefore pay off at a later point in time. When tougher competition from abroad reduces
future price-cost margins, firms are incentivized to shift their investment expenditures to-
wards nondurable investments. Furthermore, we show that firm heterogeneity matters for
the relative size of this effect. Although tougher foreign competition shifts the composition
of investments towards nondurable assets on average, larger firms are expected to respond
less to competition shocks since they have more market power.
To estimate the effect of foreign competition on the investment composition inside firms,
we use our model to derive a within-firm difference-in-differences estimator. Our model
predicts that within a firm in a given year, tougher foreign competition should lead to a
relatively larger reduction in long-term investments vis-à-vis short-term investments. We
1Hillary Clinton’s US presidential election campaign is a prominent example for this policy debate about
short-term corporate behavior. Creating stronger incentives for firms to plan for the long-run is part of the
program of the Democratic Party for the upcoming legislative period: “We need an economy where companies plan
for the long run [. . . ] - leading to higher productivity, better service, and larger profits.”, Hillary Clinton, 2016. Part of
this debate also comes from business experts themselves. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment
firm BlackRock stated: “Over the past several years, I have written to the CEOs of leading companies urging resistance to
the powerful forces of short-termism afflicting corporate behavior. Reducing these pressures and working instead to invest in
long-term growth remains an issue of paramount importance for BlackRock’s clients, most of whom are saving for retirement
and other long-term goals, as well as for the entire global economy.”
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use data for the population of stock listed manufacturing firms in the US between 1995 and
2009 to test this prediction. Using data on listed firms has two major advantages for our
empirical analysis. First, listed firms disclose investment expenditures across different asset
categories which differ in their durability. Similar to Garicano and Steinwender (2016), we
exploit variation in durability across asset groups to distinguish between short- and long-
term investments.2 Second, we can use the volatility of each firms’ stock returns within a
given year to control for variation in the level of uncertainty that firms face.
With the data at hand, we estimate how changes in the sectoral degree of foreign com-
petition lead to a shift of firms’ investment composition. We find that between 1995 and
2009, firms became on average more short-term oriented when the level of sectoral import
competition increased. Specifically, our estimates suggest that the average increase in im-
port competition by 60% during our sample period has reduced the lifespan of firm assets
by 72 days on average, which corresponds to 4.6% of the average asset lifespan. Presuming
a refinancing rate of 3%, this would impose an additional cost of 6$ for each 1000$ invested.
We find this result to be robust to controlling for several alternative channels that could
counteract our results. First, trade liberalization could be associated with a rise in perceived
uncertainty. For firms that face a higher level of uncertainty, the real option value of future
investment opportunities increases, leading to a postponement of long-term investments
(see Bloom (2009), Handley and Limão (2015) and Novy and Taylor (2014)). We find that
a higher level of trade-induced uncertainty cannot fully explain our effects, exploring vari-
ation in firm-level stock return volatility across time to control for changes in the level of
uncertainty that firms face. Second, the level of import competition could be correlated with
developments in the domestic industry. For example, if US industries become more produc-
tive over time, this might lead to relatively more long-term investments and a lower level of
import competition. When we control for changes in total factor productivity, value added,
capital- and skill-intensity of the US manufacturing industries our estimated effect is indeed
smaller yet remains significant, both statistically and economically. Third, we find our re-
2Specifically, we consider seven investment categories which we group according to their durability bymeans
of depreciation rates derived from accounting rules: Advertising expenditures, Computer expenditures, expen-
ditures on R&D, expenditures on Transportation Equipment, expenditures onMachinery, expenditures on Build-
ings and expenditures on Land.
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sults to be robust to controlling for financial frictions like credit constraints or the 2007-2009
financial crisis. Fourth, as our estimation is based on the within-firm responses across invest-
ment categories, we are able to take account for potential alternative firm-specific demand
or technology shocks.
Additionally, we investigate the role of firm heterogeneity on investment responses. Our
model suggests that a competition shock has a larger impact on profits of smaller, less pro-
ductive firms since their residual demand is relatively more elastic than residual demand for
larger firms. We find support for that prediction in our data. When comparing investment
responses across the size distribution, we find that shifts in investments towards less durable
assets as a response to foreign competition are more vigorous among smaller firms. Compar-
ing a firm at the 10th percentile with a firm at the 90th percentile of the firm size distribution
(in terms of assets), we find that the lifespan of assets decreases by about 15 days more in the
small firm.
Lastly, we exploit the WTO accession of China in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment to
study how firms’ investment composition changes in response to an exogenous increase in
foreign competition. The increase in US imports from China was mainly due to changes in
China’s internal conditions rather than rising demand in the US. Furthermore, Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson (2016) argue that China’s comparative advantage in industrial goods resulted
primarily in a large supply shock for manufacturing goods and a large demand shock for
raw materials in the US. Since US imports from China vastly exceeded US exports to China,
our identification strategy is likely capturing manufacturing import competition rather than
export potential. We use the average effectively applied tariffs on imports from China over
the years 1995 to 1999 as our treatment variable. Although tariff rates have already been
reduced during the 1990s, the change in China’s WTO membership status in 2001 led to a
reduction in expected US imports tariffs on Chinese goods (see Pierce and Schott (2016)). In
line with our model, we find that firms in industries with high pre-WTO tariffs shifted their
investments towards less durable assets as a response to the rise in import competition from
China. Our estimates suggest that between 1999 and 2003, firms with pre-WTO tariffs at the
25th percentile reduced the life span of investments by about 143 days more than a firmwith
CHAPTER III. IMPORT COMPETITION AND INVESTMENT COMPOSITION 75
pre-WTO tariffs at the 75th percentile.
This paper relates to studies that analyze how firms adjust their investment expenditures
to international trade. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) examine the impact of Chinese
import competition on within firm productivity changes and find that the absolute volume
of innovation increases within the firms most affected by Chinese imports. Bustos (2011)
and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) study how access to foreign markets can induce investments
in technology upgrading. Both studies find that firms respond to better exporting opportu-
nities with investments in productivity improvements. While these papers study the absolute
level of firm investments in response to trade liberalization, our focus is on changes in the
composition of investments within firms with respect to more or less durable assets.
Furthermore, the paper is also related to a nascent literature that studies the impact of
international trade on corporate finance. Fresard (2010) finds that large corporate cash hold-
ings lead to systematic future market share gains at the expense of industry rivals when an
industry is hit by an import competition shock. Valta (2012) studies how the costs of bank
credit respond to foreign competition and finds that firms face higher loan spreads when
import competition toughens. Xu (2012) studies the financing response during periods of
higher competition and finds that firms reduce their leverage by issuing equity and selling
assets to repay debt when experiencing increases in import competition. While previous
studies show that credit constraints determine firms’ opportunities to participate in export-
ing (see e.g. Manova (2013), Foley and Manova (2015)), our paper studies the impact of
foreign competition on the composition of firm investments which affects demand for credit
itself.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section III.2 presents the theoretical
framework, section III.3 describes the data, identification and the empirical results. Finally,
section III.4 concludes.
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III.2 Theoretical Framework
To understand the impact of competition on firms’ investment behavior, we lay out a frame-
work which incorporates the inter-temporal investment decision of a firm with respect to
short- and long-term investments. The main goal of the section is to guide our empirical
work.
III.2.1 Demand and Industry Structure
We consider an economy that exists for two time periods t ∈ {0, 1}. During each period t the
economy is composed of Lt consumers which derive their demand from a linear-quadratic
utility function following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). As a result, firms face a linear de-
mand
qit = At −
Lt
γ
pit, (III.1)
where the intercept is given by At ≡
αLt
ηNt+γ
+ ηNtηNt+γ
Lt
γ p̄t. The degree of product dif-
ferentiation is described by γ, Nt reflects the number of consumed varieties and p̄it =
(1/Nt)
´
i∈Ωt
pitdi characterizes the average price level in the economy. Linear demand im-
plies an upper price bound pmaxt =
αγ
ηNt+γ
+ ηNtηNt+γ p̄t at which demand for a variety is driven
to zero. This upper price bound pmaxt is an inverse measure of the toughness of competition.
A larger degree of differentiation γ, a larger mass of competing varieties Nt or a lower av-
erage price level p̄t all trigger a decline in the price bound p
max
t such that firms are forced
to charge lower prices in order to generate positive demand for their product.3 Firms face a
larger price elasticity of demand if they set higher prices or if the intensity of competition in
the economy increases.4
3The parameters α and η are both positive and determine the pattern of substitution between a numéraire
good and the differentiated varieties. An increase in α and a decrease in η induce an upward shift in the con-
sumption levels of the differentiated varieties relative to the numéraire. If γ = 0, the varieties are perfect substi-
tutes and consumers only focus on the total level of consumption. A rise in γ however implies that the degree of
differentiation augments and consumers care about the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
4The price elasticity of demand is given by εit ≡ |(∂qit/∂pit) (pit/qit)| = [(p
max
t /pit)− 1]
−1. This stands in
contrast to a CES demand where price elasticity is uniquely determined by the level of product differentiation γ.
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III.2.2 Production and Investment Decision
Production in the differentiated goods sector occurs at constant returns to scale with
marginal costs c∗ representing the corresponding unit labor requirement. Most importantly,
we assume that profit maximizing firms can opt for two types of investment in order to re-
duce their marginal costs of production c∗. Short-term investments k reduce the unit costs of
production instantaneously to c0 = c∗− (c∗)
θ k0.5 in period 0. Long-term investments z yield
larger productivity gains which however only materialize during the subsequent period 1
and reduce the firm’s unit production costs to c1 = c
∗ − ϕ (c∗)θ z0.5 with ϕ > 1.5 Higher
levels of investment relate to lower unit costs with decreasing returns to scale.6 The magni-
tude of cost reductions however depends on firm productivity c∗ and the parameter θ. With
θ > 0 a unit of investment reduces marginal costs to a larger extent for less productive firms
whereas θ < 0 implies that low cost firms are more efficient in cutting costs. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume a unit of short-term investment k and long-term investment z are both
equally costly and require r units of labor to finance the investment.
In both periods firms compete on a monopolistically competitive market and take the
average price level p̄t as well as the number of firms Nt as given. This yields profits given by
π (ct) =
Lt
4γ
(
cDt − ct
)2
. (III.2)
If a firm’s unit costs are just as high such that it earns zero profits, it is indifferent about
remaining in the industry. This firm is characterized by marginal costs of production cDt
such that p
(
cDt
)
= cDt = p
max
t . Thus, c
D
t reflects the intensity of competition in the economy
as the threshold incorporates the impact of both, the average price level and the number of
firms. A reduction in cDt implies a rise in the toughness of competition, as firms need to
exhibit lower costs of production in order to produce profitably. Moreover, cDt integrates the
impact of competition on firms’ prices, demand and profits. Intuitively, firms with lower
5The basic setup of the investment function is akin to Dhingra (2013).
6In order for the effective marginal costs c not to become negative, investments k and z are restricted by firm
productivity c∗. This however is no critical assumption since our primary interest is in the composition and not
in the absolute level of short- and long-term investments.
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marginal costs charge lower prices for which reason they generate larger demand and earn
higher profits. Beyond that, they face a lower price elasticity of demand which allows them
to set higher markups of price over marginal costs. An increase in market size Lt raises
profits whereas more intense competition, reflected by a reduction in cDt , decreases demand
and squeezes markups implying that firms loose earnings.
Having explained the basic organization of production, we now turn towards firm in-
vestments and the choice between short- and long-term investments. Taking the size of the
market Lt and the level of competition c
D
t as given, the firm optimizes profits discounted
with a factor δ ∈ (0, 1) over time
max
k,z
π (c0) + (1− δ)π (c1)− rk− rz. (III.3)
Determining the first order conditions with respect to short- and long-term investments and
solving for the optimal level of k and z yields
k0.5 =
[
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
]−1
(
cD0 − c
∗
)
(c∗)θ (III.4)
z0.5 =
[
4γr
L1 (1− δ) ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
]−1
(
cD1 − c
∗
)
(c∗)θ . (III.5)
From equations (III.4) and (III.5) it becomes clear that stronger competition (smaller cD)
reduces the marginal return of investment and thus diminishes investment volumes. How-
ever, we are not interested in the effects on the investment volume of firms but want to study
the composition of investments inside firms. Building ratios of equations (III.4) and (III.5) and
taking logs finally leaves us with the following expression for the relative composition of
short-term and long-term investments k and z:
ln (k)− ln (z) =
2
{
[
ln
(
cD0 − c
∗
)
− ln
(
cD1 − c
∗
)]
−
[
ln
(
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
)
− ln
(
4γr
L1(1−δ)ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
)]}
.
(III.6)
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III.2.3 The Impact of Import Competition on Investment Composition
We now analyze the effect of import competition on the relative composition of short-term
and long-term investments. An increase in competition cD1 < c
D
0 reduces firms’ profits in
period 1 which in turn diminishes the value of long-term investments relative to short-term
investments. As such, tougher competition in period 1 incentivizes firms to adjust their
investment composition towards short-lived investments. Figure B.1 illustrates the effect.
Firms choose the investment composition that equalizes the marginal return of short- and
long-term investments.7 The optimal composition of investments (k∗, z∗) is therefore given
by the intersection of the marginal return of short- (MRk) and long-term investments (MRz).
According to our model, an increase in the intensity of competition reduces the return of
long-term investments for any level of z thereby shifting the MRz-curve downwards (the
red, dashed curve). A new intersection of both marginal return curves emerges giving rise to
a larger fraction of short-term investments and a smaller fraction of long-term investments.
In order to identify the investment distortion created by international competition, we
compare the investment composition of a firm affected by an increase in import competi-
tion (open economy) with the investment composition of a firm facing no increase in import
competition (closed economy). If import competition increases between period 0 and pe-
riod 1, relative investments [ln (k)− ln (z)]open are given by equation (III.6). If the economy
however remains closed and cD1 = c
D
0 it follows that
[ln (k)− ln (z)]closed = −2
{
ln
(
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
)
− ln
(
4γr
L1 (1− δ) ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
)}
. (III.7)
Hence, in the closed economy relative investments are exclusively determined by market
size in both time periods. Subtracting the investment composition in the closed economy
case (equation (III.7)) from the investment composition in the open economy case (equation
(III.6)) provides us with the following difference-in-differences equation identifying the shift
in the relative composition of investments induced by import competition
7If a firm expected a larger return in one type of investment than in the other, the firm would invest more into
that investment type. Since we assumed decreasing marginal returns, the firm would increase investments until
marginal returns are equalized.
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[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed = ln
(
cD0 − c
∗
)
− ln
(
cD1 − c
∗
)
. (III.8)
Summing up, international competition from abroad entails tougher competition in pe-
riod 1. This shrinks the effective market size and lowers firms’ market power and profits
such that the value of long-term investments relative to short-term investments is reduced.
Thus, import competition incentivizes firms to shift their investment expenditure towards
investments characterized by a shorter lifespan. Based on these theoretical considerations
we derive the following testable result.
Prediction 1 Import competition increases the amount of short-term relative to long-term invest-
ments.
III.2.4 Heterogeneous Investment Responses across Firms
From our difference-in-differences equation (III.8) it becomes obvious that the size of the in-
vestment shift depends on a firm’s productivity c∗. For less productive firms, the relative
loss in profits in period 1 compared to period 0 is more pronounced than for firms with
lower unit costs. Hence, while all firms loose profits and market power, the relative change
in profits across time decreases with firm productivity. Accordingly, this leads to a smaller
reduction in the marginal return of long-term investments MRz relative to the marginal re-
turn of short-term investments MRk for more productive firms. Thus, high-cost firms shift
their composition of investments to a larger extent towards more short-lived investments.
In our theoretical framework, more productive firms are characterized by larger sales and
employment. Therefore, we employ different measures of firm size as empirical counterpart
to firm productivity.8
8Based on survey data, Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudhry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2015) provide recent evi-
dence for a positive relationship of the level of markups and firm size. They therefore consider firm size to be
the best proxy for the productivity parameter in heterogeneous firm models based on Melitz (2003).
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Prediction 2 Import competition increases the amount of short-term relative to long-term invest-
ments less for larger firms.
III.2.5 The Impact of Market Size on Investment Composition
Given that trade liberalization is typically associated with both, higher import competition
and larger export markets, we also study what an increase in market size would imply for
our difference-in-differences estimator. From equations (III.4) and (III.5) it becomes clear that
a larger market size Lt generates additional demand such that the marginal return of short-
and long-term investments increases resulting in a higher level of firm investments for a
given level of cDt (for both types of investments).
9
An increase in market size L1 > L0 in period 1 raises demand and profits and thus the
relative value of long-term investments, such that firms become less short-term oriented.
Hence, the market size effect works in the opposite direction to the competition effect. In
Figure B.2, this is depicted by an upward shift of the MRz-curve as the marginal return of
long-term investments increases for any level of z. As a result, the new intersection of the
marginal return of short- and long-term investments shifts to the left implying a reduction
in the fraction of short-term investments while the fraction of long-term investments in-
creases.10 In the empirical analysis, we therefore also take account of this market size effect
to control confounding effects.
9These effects of trade liberalization on the investment volume of firms have been studied empirically by
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2011).
10The magnitude of the effect depends again on firm productivity c∗. However, the role of productivity is
ambiguous and depends on the sign of the parameter θ which determines the impact of firm productivity on the
efficiency of investments. If θ > 0, less productive firms are more efficient in cutting costs and thus they face
relatively larger incentives to engage in long-term investments. If θ < 0, high productive firms are more effective
in lowering unit costs such that an increase inmarket size in period 1 creates larger incentives for high productive
firms to shift investment expenditures towards long-term investments. As long as θ = 0, firm productivity has
no impact on the magnitude of cost reductions.
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III.3 Empirical Analysis
III.3.1 Identification
Equation (III.8) serves as our theoretical guideline to set up the econometric estimation strat-
egy in order to identify the effect of import competition on the composition of firm invest-
ments. Based on equation (III.8) we derive the following difference-in-differences specifica-
tion where Iisct denotes investments by firm i in investment category c at time t
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β1 × ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc + X
′
isctζ + λc + λit + ε isct (III.9)
where ImpCompst is our measure of import competition varying across industries s and
years t and Short-Termc reflects the duration of an investment category c. In order to dis-
tinguish between long- and short-term investments, we rank each firm’s investments into
different assets according to their time to payoff. We follow here the approach suggested
by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit expenditures on Advertising, Computer
Equipment, R&D, Transportation Equipment, Machinery Equipment as well as on Buildings
and Land. In our specification, the rate of duration follows an ordering where a higher rank-
ing implies a more short-lived investment category. Alternatively, we also use depreciation
rates. X′isct is a vector of control variables. λc and λit are fixed effects for different investment
types as well as for firm-year combinations in order to sweep out unobserved firm-specific
factors that vary across time and affect the investment decisions of firms. Notably, this in-
cludes demand shocks, credit shocks or technology shocks as long as they do not affect short-
and long-term investments differently. Identification is therefore based on variation across
investment categories within a firm for a given year. Most importantly, in this specification
β1 identifies the distortion in the relative composition of firm investments created by import
competition and reflected in our theoretical model in equation (III.8).11 Altogether, following
Prediction 1, if import competition leads firms to adjust their composition of investments to-
wards short-term investment categories, the coefficient of interest is supposed to be positive
11β1 = [ln (k)− ln (z)]
open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
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β1 > 0.
Transferring this approach to firm size and its impact on the effect of import competition
on firm investments, we obtain a triple difference specification of the following form
ln (Iisct) = β0+ β2× ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc× Sizei +X
′
isctζ +λc +λit + ε isct. (III.10)
The coefficient β2 measures the distortion created by competition and its differential impact
across the firm size distribution.12 Again, the specification makes use of investment cate-
gory as well as firm-year fixed effects such that identification rests upon variation across
investment types within firm-year combinations. According to Prediction 2 we expect import
competition to have a more negative influence on short-term relative to long-term invest-
ments for larger firms. Thus, our coefficient of interest is expected to be negative (β2 < 0) in
order to be in line with the theoretical prediction.
As an additional step, we use China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 in order to identify
the effect of foreign competition on the investment composition of firms based on a similar
difference-in-differences strategy. China’s WTO accession marked an inflection point in the
evolution of Chinese exports and gave rise to a dramatic increase in exports to the US. The
econometric specification is given by
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β3 × Post2000t × Pre-WTO-Tari f fs × Short-Termc + X
′
isctζ + λc + λit + ε isct.
(III.11)
Post2000t is a dummy variable equal to one for years within the panel which succeed China’s
WTO entry. Pre-WTO-Tari f fs represents the average US tariff level on Chinese imports by
industry during the period preceding the accession. We expect firms in industries with larger
average tariffs prior to China’s WTO entry to be subject bigger increases in import compe-
tition thereafter. Again, we expect the coefficient of interest to be positive. By exploiting
the competition effect triggered by China’s WTO accession as a quasi-natural experiment,
we aim to provide corroborative evidence of capturing a causal and economically significant
12β2 =
{
[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
}
c∗′
−
{
[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
}
c∗
, c∗′ <
c∗
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effect.
In all estimation equations the within-firm identification strategy allows for a clean iden-
tification of the effect of competition on investments as potential firm-specific demand and
supply shocks that symmetrically affect investment categories are captured by the firm-year
fixed effects. Therefore, the specification mainly requires to control for investment determi-
nants that vary at the firm or sector level and differentially affect a firm’s composition of
short- and long-term investments.
III.3.2 Data
We employ data on the population of listed manufacturing firms in the US for the years 1995
- 2009. The firms in our sample are obtained from the CRSP database. We match all CUSIP
identifiers in the CRSP database for firms with a primary US SIC industry code between 2000
and 3999 with firm-level information from the Compustat and the Worldscope databases.
Overall, we end up with 4,428 stock market listed manufacturing firms in our sample.
Measuring Firm Investment and Size
We follow the approach suggested by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit expen-
ditures on Advertising, Computer Equipment, R&D, Transportation Equipment, Machinery
Equipment as well as on Buildings and Land. Garicano and Steinwender (2016) assign the
following depreciation rates to these investments based on a survey of the accounting litera-
ture to proxy for Short-Termc:
13 60% for Advertising, 30% for Computer Equipment, 20% for
R&D, 16% for Transportation Equipment, 12% for Machinery, 3% for Buildings and 0% for
Land. Besides using these explicit depreciation rates, we also employ a simple ranking that
orders the investments from the most long-term one (Land with a durability rank of 1) to the
most short-term one (Advertising with a durability rank of 7). Tables B.4 and B.5 in the data
appendix provide detailed information on the investment data.
To explore the second empirical prediction, we use three different measures of firm size
(Sizei): a firm’s total assets, employment and sales. Since firm size responds endogenously
13Note that an investment’s depreciation rate is the inverse of its time to payoff in years.
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to the level of investments, we hold firm size constant throughout all our estimations and
construct firm-specific averages over the years 1995 - 1999, winsorized at the top 1%.
Measuring Foreign Competition and Trade Exposure
We measure import competition at the sector level s for a given year t following Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) by
ImpCompst =
Impst
Prodst + Impst − Expst
, (III.12)
where Impst and Expst represent the value of total US imports and exports at the 3-digit
US SIC level derived from UN Comtrade data. Prodst reflects the value of US domestic
shipments at the 3-digit US SIC level taken from the NBER CES manufacturing database.
Along the same lines we compute a sector’s share of export in domestic consumption
ExpMarketst =
Expst
Prodst + Impst − Expst
. (III.13)
Finally, the sectoral degree of openness is given by the ratio of the sum of total US imports
and exports over domestic shipments:
Opennessst =
Impst + Expst
Prodst
. (III.14)
We implicitly assume that all firms within an industry are subject to the same level of foreign
competition as well as export market exposure and openness. In order to measure the level
of tariff protection prior to China’s WTO entry, we average the effectively applied US tariff
on Chinese imports at the 3-digit US SIC level over the years 1995− 2000. Data on tariffs are
again taken from UN Comtrade.
Firm and Sector Level Controls
Two alternative channels that can have an impact on the investment composition at the firm-
level are changes in financial constraints and changes in the degree of uncertainty faced by
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firms. To control for changes in financial constraints, we use firms’ current ratio, external
financial dependence as well as capital cost. Table B.5 provides a detailed definition of these
variables. Since trade liberalization can also be associated with an increase in the degree of
uncertainty perceived by firms, we use the annual standard deviation of daily stock returns
to proxy for variation in uncertainty.
Moreover, firms’ investment composition as well as the level of foreign competition
might be affected by sector specific attributes. If import competition is primarily traced back
to low-wage countries such as China, the factor proportions framework predicts firms in
capital or skill intensive sectors to be relatively less affected than their counterparts in labor
or low-skill intensive industries. Furthermore, trade exposure might be related to trends
in technology adoption which alter the demand for skill and capital and determine sector
specific productivity. We therefore use the capital stock per worker and the share of non-
production worker wages in total compensation in order to control for capital and skill in-
tensity at the sector level. Ultimately, we control for sector specific productivity and size
by measures of total factor productivity and value added. The entire set of industry level
controls is obtained from the NBER CES manufacturing database.
III.3.3 Baseline Results
Table III.1 presents our main results from estimating equation (III.9). In panel A we use the
simple ordering as our measure of duration. The ordering of categories follows the order-
ing of depreciation rates and ranges from 1 (Land) to 7 (Advertising). Panel B repeats all
specifications using absolute depreciation rates from the literature as a measure of duration.
By offering two distinct measures we aim to ensure that our results do not hinge on specific
assumptions regarding the duration of investments, except for a broad ordering. We will
show that our story goes through irrespective of the measure chosen.
In discussing our results, we will focus on the sign of the interaction between import
competition and duration in a log-log specification, allowing us to compare how long-term
investments react relative to short-term investments (both measured in percentage terms),
when sector level import competition is increasing by one percent. According to Prediction
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1, if import competition induces firms to shift their investments towards less durable cate-
gories, we expect our coefficient of interest β1 to be positive. This implies that higher import
competition is associated on average with a relative shift of investments towards more short-
term categories, i.e. categories with a higher rate of depreciation.
All specifications include our measure of interest, category fixed effects and firm-year
fixed effects. We correct for two-way clustered standard errors. We cluster at the firm-level
and additionally, we cluster at the industry-year level, as our measure of import competi-
tion is the same for all firms in a given industry and in a given year. The level of import
competition is sector-year specific and thus absorbed by the fixed effects. Thus, we do not
identify the average effect of import competition on investments. Similarly, due to the inclu-
sion of category fixed effects, we do not identify the between-category difference in average
investments. We include these fixed effects because they allow us to effectively control for
alternative channels that otherwise would potentially be confounding our results.
For example, sectors and firms will be exposed to temporary shocks that, on average,
will have an impact on investments. Think about a domestic demand shock that reduces the
demand for durable consumer goods. Potentially, this demand shock will be correlated with
our sectoral measure of import competition. In response to the shock, firms in the durable
goods sector might reduce average investments. Because this decision is due to the demand
shock and independent of investment durations, the relative composition of short and long-
term investments within firms and industries would remain constant. Nevertheless, our co-
efficient of interest might falsely pick up the variation if the investment composition in the
durable goods sector happens to be on average more long-term than in other sectors. The
uniform investment reduction in the durable goods sector would then shift the economy-wide
investment composition towards more short run investments. Consequently, we would find
a positive coefficient on the durability interaction and wrongly conclude that import compe-
tition was causing firms to invest more short-term. The inclusion of firm-year fixed effects
will account for these confounding effects at the firm or sectoral level, as long as the change
in investments is uniform across the different types of investment.
The fixed effect specification implies that identification, as well as potential confounding
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Table III.1: Import Competition and Investment Composition - Baseline Results
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0455*** 0.0347*** 0.0330*** 0.0333***
(0.00813) (0.00886) (0.00906) (0.00903)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.143 0.252*** 0.237** 0.248**
(0.0901) (0.0968) (0.0994) (0.0998)
Industry Controls * Depreciation no yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation no no yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 89,735 89,436 81,912 72,064
Firm Clusters 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
Industry-Year Clusters 2,163 2,163 2,163 2,163
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Build-
ings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%),
Advertising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depre-
ciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance sheet data
on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken
from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (Im-
pComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus
imports minus exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity,
skill-intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of
daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at
the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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effects, all hinge on factors that vary across firms, years and investment categories. In specifi-
cation (1), only the interaction of import competition with duration fulfills this requirement.
No other controls are included. The coefficient is positive as predicted for both measures of
depreciation but significant only for the ordered measure.
The problem with specification (1) is that a lot of systematic variation across the three
dimensions is now potentially projected on the import channel. Thus, other sectoral devel-
opments with a direct impact on investment composition might interfere with our results
provided that they are correlated with import competition. We therefore add interactions
of the depreciation measure with various sector-level controls in specification (2). Specifi-
cally, we interact depreciation with time-varying measures of capital intensity, skill intensity,
tfp and value added. The import competition coefficient remains positive and now turns
significant for both measures of depreciation.
In specification (3), we add an interaction with firm-level volatility of stock returns. This
is supposed to disentangle the import competition effect proposed in the theoretical frame-
work from other effects due to trade induced uncertainty. As our coefficient of interest re-
mains significant, we conclude that import competition must have an impact on investment
composition other than through market insecurity.
Specification (3) is our baseline regression. Consider the following example in order to
understand the meaning of our coefficients: a higher level of import competition creates a
wedge between investments into different investment categories. Suppose for example that
the level of import competition increases by 10%. Then our coefficient in panel A implies
that this wedge is equal to 0.33%. Thus, if an exemplary firm reduces its land investments
(the most long-term category) by 10%, we would expect that firm to reduce its investments
in buildings by 9.67%, its machinery investments by 9.34%, its transportation investments by
9.01%, its R&D investments by 8.68%, its computer investments by 8.35% and its advertising
investments (the most short-term category) by 8.02%.
To evaluate the economic significance of our estimates, we invoke a simple thought ex-
periment. We consider the average increase in import competition over the sample period
1995-2009, i.e. 60% over the 15-year period. Additionally, we assume that Land investments
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respond inelastically to an import competition shock.14 Using the results from Table III.1,
panel B, specification (3), we can then calculate the change in the average depreciation rate
that results from the increase in import competition.15 Our estimates suggest that the average
increase in import competition by 60% during our sample period has reduced the lifespan of
firm assets by 72 days on average, which corresponds to 4.6% of the average asset lifespan.
Presuming a refinancing rate of 3%, this would impose an additional cost of 6$ for each 1000$
invested. Thus, import competition is associated with a significant shift towards relatively
short-term investments.
In specification (4), we exclude the years 2008 and 2009 from our sample in order to
assure that our effect is not picking up specifics of the financial crisis. Garicano and Stein-
wender (2016) show for Spanish manufacturing firms that the credit crisis in 2008 effectively
worked like an additional tax rate on long-term investments. If import competition was in-
creasing during the crisis, we would not be able to distinguish the two effects. Dropping the
crisis years however does not alter our results significantly. If anything, the estimated effects
become stronger, indicating that omitting to control for the crisis actually led us to slightly
underestimate the effect of import competition.
III.3.4 Firm Heterogeneity
In our theoretical frameworkwe show that the import competition effect on investment com-
position should be less pronounced for larger firms.
In Table III.2, we confront this prediction (Prediction 2) with the data, using a triple inter-
action with measures of firm size in order to see whether the effect of import competition on
investment composition varies along the firm size distribution. We use total employment,
net firm sales and total assets as measures of size. Adding the size interactions increases
the coefficient on the original interaction (β1) compared to the baseline. The interaction re-
mains significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The triple interaction with size has the
expected negative sign in all specifications, implying that the shift towards short-term in-
14When regressing import competition on Land investments and adding firm and year fixed effects, we find
Land investments to be inelastic with respect to import competition.
15See the data appendix for details on this calculation.
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Table III.2: Import Competition and Investment Composition - Heterogeneous Investment
Responses Across Firms
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
Measure of Size
Employment Sales Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0396*** 0.0403*** 0.0401***
(0.00906) (0.0101) (0.00985) (0.00966)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.000599 -3.42e-06* -3.32e-06***
(0.000385) (1.74e-06) (1.22e-06)
Depreciation * Size -0.000736 -3.00e-06 -4.83e-06
(0.000950) (3.97e-06) (3.36e-06)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.321*** 0.335*** 0.326***
(0.0994) (0.109) (0.106) (0.105)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.00647* -3.86e-05** -3.58e-05***
(0.00371) (1.85e-05) (1.23e-05)
Depreciation * Sales 0.00421 2.51e-05 -2.82e-06
(0.0102) (4.54e-05) (3.62e-05)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 73,136 75,578 75,660
Firm Clusters 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Industry-Year Clusters 2,381 2,381 2,381 2,381
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Ma-
chines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The or-
dering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are ei-
ther derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and
Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition
(ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports mi-
nus exports. Measures of size are from Compustat and represent firm averages over the years
1995 to 1999. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and value
added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Stan-
dard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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vestments is less pronounced for larger firms. Statistically, the effect is significant at the 1%
level for total assets, independent of the depreciation measure chosen. The effects are less
significant for sales and employment and on average stronger when we use the depreciation
rate as our measure of duration. Using assets as a measure of size, the coefficients for the
depreciation rank imply that for any two neighboring investment categories, a 10% higher
import competition is associated with a 0.4% higher decrease in the long-term investment
compared to the neighboring shorter-term investment for the median firm. Using an anal-
ogous back-of-the-envelope calculation as in the baseline with respect to the estimates from
panel B, we compare a firm at the 10th percentile with a firm at the 90th percentile of the firm
size distribution (in terms of assets). We find that the lifespan of assets decreases by about
15 days more in the small firm.
III.3.5 Reordering and Omitting Investment Categories
In order to determine whether our results hinge on the assumed ordering of investment cate-
gories in terms of depreciation rates, we omit and regroup various categories for the ordered
measure of depreciation in Table B.1.16 Specification (1) repeats our baseline regression. In
specification (2) we omit investments into R&D in order to see whether R&D expenses are
driving our result. For example, a rise in import competition might lead firms to foster inno-
vation by investing more heavily in research activities.17 This decision is independent of the
duration of R&D investments, but would still render our coefficient positive because R&D
expenditures just happen to be classified as relatively short-term. The inclusion of category
fixed effects does not help us against this type of disturbances, as the unobservable effect
varies over time. Omitting R&D investments reduces the number of observations by more
than a quarter and diminishes the size of our coefficient. But our results remain robust at the
5% level of significance, indicating that R&D is an important, but not the only driver of our
results.
In specification (3) we further omit investments in Advertising. Because different from
16Specifications (1) to (4) are robust to using the depreciation rate instead.
17Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) show that Chinese import competition increases technical change
within firms, among other things, by increasing the amount of R&D.
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the other categories, both R&D and Advertising expenses are taken from the income state-
ments rather than being derived from asset data, one concern is that our results are due
to these constructional differences. The results in specification (3) show that our results go
through when restricting the sample to asset data. Specification (4) omits Transportation
and Computer investments. Computer investments are reported only for the years 1999 and
onwards and Transportation is reported very little over the full range of years. Accordingly,
these two categories might not be very representative and specifically prone to be affected by
outliers. But again, our results remain robust when estimating the equation for the remaining
categories.
Because estimates of depreciation rates vary in the literature, we regroup assets that are
close to each other into single categories in specifications (5) to (7). In specification (5), we
assign the same rank to Land, Buildings and Machinery. R&D and Computer investments
are grouped into another category. The coefficient almost doubles in size and remains highly
significant. Adding Transportation to the group of long-term investments in specification
(6) further increases the coefficient, confirming that switching from one rank to another now
has a higher impact on investment duration. Because the depreciation rate of Transportation
is relatively close also to R&D and Computer, specification (7) assigns it into one group with
these categories. Again, our results are not significantly altered.
Finally, it could be that firms increase research expenditures in order to remain compet-
itive in the future, rendering R&D effectively a long-term investment. Then our ranking of
investment categories would be flawed. Specification (8) therefore ranks R&D as the most
long-term investment. The effect vanishes and we conclude that our original ordering is
more coherent, given that R&D investments are not the sole driver of our results.
III.3.6 Alternative Financial Channels
In Table B.2 we try to rule out some alternative stories that might affect our results. Gari-
cano and Steinwender (2016) argue that credit shocks reduce the relative value of long-term
investments because firms might have to liquidate before the payoff materializes. Since we
want to identify a competition shock, we need to make sure that time varying financial char-
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acteristics are properly controlled for. In specifications (2) to (5) we therefore add interac-
tions of the depreciation measure with measures of the current ratio, external dependence,
capital cost and a financial crisis dummy. While some of these controls appear to have an
effect on the investment composition, the results for our measure of import competition are
not significantly altered. We therefore conclude that import competition is not just working
through changes in firms’ financial characteristics and probably better explained by changes
in demand.
III.3.7 Differentiating between Import Competition and Market Access
In subsection III.2.5 in the theory, we argue that higher market access should have effects
exactly opposed to the effects of import competition. Table B.3 addresses this point. Because
better market access implies higher demand in the future, we would expect firms to shift
investments towards this future market. Accordingly, the results for import competition
documented so far are probably biased in the opposite direction.
Specification (2) shows that our assumptions regarding the market access effects are con-
firmed in the data. When regressing investments on the interaction of depreciation with
export market size, our estimates suggest that firms are shifting investments towards long-
term categories when faced with better export opportunities. The effects for exports are
slightly larger than for imports and highly significant. In specification (3) we add the export
market interaction to the baseline specification to see how our original results are affected.
Stable signs indicate that the impact of both imports and exports remain as the theory would
predict. The increase in size of our coefficient of interest shows that failing to control for ex-
port opportunities biases our coefficient on import competition in the opposite direction.18
Given these findings, we consider our previous results to represent a conservative estimate
of the actual effect. Finally, in specification (4) we use an openness measure that incorporates
both import competition and export opportunities and find that mixing up the two effects
conceals much of the impact trade has on investment composition. Because the coefficient
remains positive and marginally significant for the ordering measure, we conclude that im-
18The same holds vice versa for export opportunities.
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port competition might have slightly outweighed the effect of export opportunities for the
firms in our sample.
III.3.8 The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on the Composition of Firm In-
vestments in the US
In order to substantiate our claim that it is the surge in imports that induces a realloca-
tion of investments towards long-term investments, we will exploit a quasi-natural experi-
ment based on the large competition effect caused by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
China’s WTO accession is a useful experiment for mainly two reasons.
First, China’s accession to the WTO, and the dramatic increase of exports to the world
that followed thereafter,19 was driven mostly by the change in China’s internal conditions
and not by the rising import demand of receiving countries. As Autor, Dorn, and Hanson
(2013a) point out, this interpretation is corroborated by the fact that China had an average
annual TFP growth in manufacturing of 8% during that time, compared to only 3.9% for
the US. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) cite several studies indicating that the prospect of
formal WTO accession was a major force stimulating the underlying restructuring of the
manufacturing industry. The increasing privatization of public enterprises, the extension of
trading rights for private firms, greater access to imported intermediates and a solidification
of the MFN status, providing security to Chinese exporters, all helped to foster a new level
of productivity growth after 2001. Thus, although China had already been granted most-
favored nation status (MFN) during the 80s, the surge in exports significantly accelerated
after 2001. This surge can be treated as mostly exogenous to dynamics in the US market
which is crucial for identification.20
Second, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) argue that China’s comparative advantage in
industrial goods implies that China’s growth resulted primarily in a large supply shock for
manufacturing goods and a large demand shock for raw materials. Given that US imports
19Between 2000 and 2007, the low-income country share of US imports almost doubled from 15 to 28%, with
China accounting for 89% of this growth. Compare Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a). Additionally, see Figure
B.6 in the data appendix for the average share of imports from China in total US imports for the industries in our
sample.
20See Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013a) for a similar argument.
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from China vastly exceeded US exports to China, this suggests that our identification strat-
egy is likely going to capture manufacturing import competition rather than export poten-
tial.21
While we argue that the results we are going to present in this section represent a causal
effect of imports on the investment composition, we are aware that we cannot precisely de-
termine the channel through which imports are affecting the investment choices of firms.
Thus, while we claim that import competition is the driving force behind our results, part
of the variation we are using might be due to a rise in imported intermediates rather than
final goods. Yet, note that cheaper intermediates should have a positive effect on the future
market potential of US firms. Thus, if the surge in US imports to China was driven by a
surge in intermediate imports, if anything, it would make it more difficult for us to detect a
shift towards short-term investments.
Technically, the approach we use is related to Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), as we also use
the average pre-trade-agreement level of tariffs to identify the firms most affected by trade
liberalization. Specifically, we use the US effectively applied import tariff vis-à-vis China,
averaged over the years 1995 to 1999 and specific to firms within US SIC three digit indus-
tries.22 As noted by Pierce and Schott (2016), the change in China’s WTOmembership status
in 2001 had two effects: it ended the uncertainty associated with annual renewals of China’s
MFN status and it led to a substantial reduction in expected US imports tariffs on Chinese
goods. It is the latter aspect that we will use for identification.23 Accordingly, we look at
the differential change in investment behavior before and after the Chinese WTO accession
in 2001, where we make use of the fact that the threat of tariff reductions is larger in high-
tariff industries. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of a post-2000 dummy with the
pre-trade-agreement level of tariffs. In all specifications, we focus our sample on a sample
period between 1999 and 2003, around China’s WTO entry in 2001.
21Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016), Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013a) and Utar (2014) also use the
WTO accession of China as a natural experiment for an increase in import competition.
22The effectively applied tariff is defined as the lowest available tariff, given by preferential tariffs if existent
and MFN tariffs otherwise.
23In fact, the average tariffs remained relatively stable after 2000. Nevertheless, for the years 1999 to 2003, we
find that industries with pre-WTO accession tariff levels above the median experienced a 66% larger increase in
Chinese import competition than industries with pre-WTO accession tariffs below the median.
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Table III.3: Import Competition and Investment Composition - The Impact of China’s WTO
Accession
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Duration rank
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00636** 0.00550* 0.00539* 0.00430
(0.00290) (0.00301) (0.00300) (0.00313)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.0359*** -0.0241* -0.0219 -0.0123
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0148)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00489 0.00541 0.0181*** 0.0184***
(0.00344) (0.00352) (0.00371) (0.00378)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.0642** 0.0548* 0.0549** 0.0447
(0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0270) (0.0282)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.642*** -0.577*** -0.500*** -0.376**
(0.146) (0.154) (0.147) (0.157)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.134*** 0.155***
(0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0351) (0.0364)
Industry Controls * Depreciation no no yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation no yes no yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 30,949 27,804 30,517 27,428
Firm Clusters 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%),
Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%).
The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment ex-
penses are either derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines,
Transportation and Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertis-
ing). Sample period 1999-2003. Post2000 is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the year is
2001 or later. Pre-WTO-Tariff is the simple industry average (over the years 1995-2000) of
the effectively applied tariff on US imports from China as reported in the WITS/Comtrade
data base. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and
value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given
year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table III.3 shows the results for the two measures of depreciation. Again, we allow errors
to be clustered at the firm level and include category and firm-year fixed effects in all speci-
fications. In specifications (1) to (4), we subsequently add the time varying sector-level and
uncertainty controls interacted with our measure of duration. Adding all controls simulta-
neously leads to insignificant results, but the triple-interaction of interest is significant at the
5% or 10% level when restricting the controls to one set or the other. The coefficient of inter-
est is positive in all specifications, implying that the WTO accession of China led to a higher
decrease (or lower increase) in long-term investments, compared to short-term investments,
and that this effect was more pronounced in sectors that had higher average tariffs during
the second half of the 1990s.24 Specifically, using the results from specification (3) in panel
B, we find that for a firm at the 25th percentile of our tariff measure, the average investment
duration increased in the years after 2001 by roughly 106 days more than for firms at the 75th
percentile of the pre-2000 tariff distribution.
III.4 Conclusion
This paper examines how the exposure to foreign competition affects the composition of
short-term relative to long-term investments within firms. In order to guide our empiri-
cal strategy, we develop a stylized framework which illustrates the investment decision of
a representative firm with respect to short- and long-term investments. An increase in the
toughness of competition reduces the relative value of long-term investments and induces
firms to shift their investment composition towards short-term investments. The magni-
tude of this effect varies with firm size. We test these predictions based on the population
of listed US manufacturing firms by using data on seven asset classes which we order ac-
cording to their depreciation rates. Based on our framework, the empirical strategy employs
a difference-in-differences estimator. This approach allows using firm-year fixed effects as
well as investment category fixed effects in order to identify the effect of trade induced com-
24Note that the negative coefficient on the interaction of our measure of depreciation with the post-2000
dummy implies that on average firms with a zero tariff-level invested relatively more long-term after 2000.
This is a materialization of the general trend towards more long-term investments over time which can be seen
in Figures B.5 and B.4.
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petition on the composition of investments within firms. The empirical results are in line
with our predictions. Import competition shifts the composition of investments towards
more short-lived categories and the effect depends on firm size. Our results are robust to the
inclusion of controls that account for alternative channels at the firm and sector level such
as various measures of financial constraints and factor intensities. In order to provide fur-
ther supportive evidence of a causal effect, we exploit the rise in Chinese imports to the US
due to China’s accession to the WTO as quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we also explore
the impact of exporting on the composition of investments. Our results suggest that expo-
sure to export markets works in the opposite direction, and induces a reallocation towards
long-term investments.
We believe that adjustments in the composition of investment have important economic
implications. If trade induced competition incentivizes firms to disregard the long-term per-
spective this implies a loss in sustainability, higher financing costs as well as changes in the
firm size distribution. This suggests new research directions. Future research might for ex-
ample study how changes in the composition of investment relate to the welfare effects of
globalization.
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B Appendix
B.1 Figures and Robustness
Figure B.1: The Impact of Tougher Competition on the Composition of Investments
Figure B.2: The Impact of an Increase in Market Size on the Composition of Investments
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Table B.1: Altering Investment Categories
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0194** 0.0236* 0.0334*** 0.0634*** 0.104*** 0.0896*** -0.0133
(0.00906) (0.00918) (0.0128) (0.00935) (0.0166) (0.0281) (0.0273) (0.00870)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excluded categories none R&D R&D/ Transportation/ none none none none
Advertising Computer
Number of categories 7 6 5 5 4 3 3 7*
Observations 81,912 58,441 49,572 76,822 81,912 81,912 81,912 81,912
Firm Clusters 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D
(20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates in specification (1)-
(4). Specification (5) groups Land, Buildings and Machinery into one category and R&D and Computer into another. Specification (6)
additionally takes Transportation into the category with Land, Buildings and Machinery, while specification (7) takes it into the category
with R&D and Computer. In specification (8), R&D is ordered as the most long-term investment. Investment expenses are either derived
from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D
and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus
exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard
deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.2: Alternative Financial Channels
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0302*** 0.0319*** 0.0313*** 0.0331***
(0.00906) (0.00904) (0.00919) (0.00912) (0.00906)
Current Ratio * Depreciation 0.00963***
(0.00223)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.000198**
(9.86e-05)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -0.200***
(0.0233)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.00795
(0.0187)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.233** 0.229** 0.221** 0.241**
(0.0994) (0.0987) (0.100) (0.0989) (0.0993)
Current Ratio * Depreciation 0.00579
(0.0247)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.00159*
(0.000821)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -2.116***
(0.290)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.260
(0.209)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 79,083 78,956 78,963 81,912
Firm Clusters 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cat-
egories resembles the ordering of depreciations rates. Investment expenses are either derived from
balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken
from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at
the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Financial controls
are time varying at the firm level derived from Compustat: Current Ratio is the total of current as-
sets over current liabilities, External Dependence is capital expenditure net of EBIT over total capital
expenditure, Capital Cost is capital expenditure over total liabilities. Crisis is an indicator equal to
1 for the years 2007-2009. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp
and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year.
Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.3: Import Competition and Access to Foreign Markets
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0767***
(0.00906) (0.0123)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.0360*** -0.0814***
(0.00908) (0.0118)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0146*
(0.00763)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.644***
(0.0994) (0.126)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.489*** -0.847***
(0.0994) (0.117)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0894
(0.0840)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 81,912 81,912 81,912
Firm Clusters 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings
(3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Adver-
tising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation
rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance sheet data on assets
(Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are im-
ports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus ex-
ports. Export market size (ExpMarket) are exports at the sectoral level, relative to
domestic production plus imports minus exports. Openness is the sum of exports
and imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports mi-
nus exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity,
tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock re-
turns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at
the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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B.2 Data
Table B.4: Depreciation Rates of Investments
Firm Investment:
Applied
Depreciation
Rate:
Duration
Rank:
advertising 60% 7
computer 30% 6
R&D 20% 5
transportation equipment 16% 4
machines 12% 3
buildings 3% 2
land 0% 1
Notes: Applied depreciation rates are obtained from Garicano and Steinwender (2016) who derive the
investment-specific depreciation rates from various sources of the accounting literature.
Figure B.3: Shares of Investment Categories in Total Investments
Transportation Computer
Land Advertising
Buildings Machines
R&D
Notes: The figure shows the sample average composition of investment categories.
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Figure B.4: Shares of Investment Categories over Time
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Notes: The figure shows the development of the composition of investment categories over time.
Figure B.5: Average Rate of Depreciation over Time
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Notes: The figure shows the average depreciation rate over the years for the firms in our sample.
The average is constructed by weighting each investment specific depreciation rate with its average
investment share across all firms in a specific year. Investment categories and assumed depreciation
rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%),
Advertising (60%). See section B.3 in the appendix (Calculation of the Marginal Effects) for a detailed
description on how the average depreciation rate is calculated.
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Figure B.6: Share of Chinese in Total US Imports
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Notes: The figure shows the average share of imports from China relative to total imports of the US
for the US SIC 3-digit industries in our sample.
CHAPTER III. IMPORT COMPETITION AND INVESTMENT COMPOSITION 107
Table B.5: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
variables descriptions sources
Firm Investments
advertisingit advertising represents the cost of advertising media (i.e., radio, television, and
periodicals) and promotional expenses in millions USD; Compustat variable name: XAD
Compustat
computerit computer software & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × computer software & equipment (period
t− 1); computer software & equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represents
computer equipment and the information a computer uses to perform tasks in millions
USD
Worldscope
R&Dit research & development expenses (period t) represent all direct and indirect costs related to
the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products
with commercial possibilities in millions USD
Worldscope
transportation equipmentit transportation equipment (period t) - 0.95 × transportation equipment (period t− 1);
transportation equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represents the cars, ships,
planes or any other type of transportation equipment in millions USD
Worldscope
machinesit machinery & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × machinery & equipment (period t− 1); machinery
& equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represent the machines and machine
parts needed by the company to produce its products in millions USD
Worldscope
buildingsit buildings (period t) - 0.95 × buildings (period t− 1); buildings (gross property plant and
equipment) represent the architectural structure used in a business such as a factory,
office complex or warehouse in millions USD
Worldscope
landit land (period t) - 0.95 × land (period t− 1); land (gross property plant and equipment)
represents the real estate without buildings held for productive use, is recorded at its
purchase price plus any costs related to its purchase such as lawyer’s fees, escrow fees,
title and recording fees in millions USD
Worldscope
Firm Controls
employmenti average firm employment in thousands over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top
1%; Compustat variable name: EMP
Compustat
salesi average firm sales in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top 1%;
Compustat variable name: SALE
Compustat
assetsi average firm assets in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top 1%;
Compustat variable name: AT
Compustat
current ratioit current ratio is an indication of a firm’s market liquidity and ability to meet creditor’s
demands; defined as current assets divided by current liabilities during a given year t
(banker’s rule: >2 for creditworthiness); Compustat variable names: ACT/LCT
Compustat
external dependenceit external dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures that are not financed by internal
capital flows during a given year t; Compustat variable names: (CAPX− EBIT)/CAPX
Compustat
capital costit capital cost is defined as capital expenditures over liabilities during a given year t;
Compustat variable names: CAPX/LT
Compustat
sd(stock return)it standard deviation of the daily firm stock returns (Pd/Pd−1) during a given year t CRSP
Trade Variables
import competitionst ImpComp is defined as
ImpComp = importsWorld/
(
domestic shipments + importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
; at the
3-digit US SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN Comtrade
for exports and
imports
export market exposurest ExpMarket is defined as
ExpMarket = exportsWorld/
(
domestic shipments + importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
; at the
3-digit US SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN Comtrade
for exports and
imports
opennessst Openness is defined as Openness = (exportsWorld + importsWorld)/domestic shipments; at
the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN Comtrade
for exports and
imports
pre-WTO tariffs simple industry average tariff over the years 1995-2000 of the effectively applied US
tariff on imports from China; at the 3-digit US SIC level
UN Comtrade
Industry Controls
capital-intensityst total real capital stock in thousands USD per employee; at the 3-digit US SIC level
during a given year t; NBER CES variable names: CAP/EMP
NBER CES data
skill-intensityst share of compensation for non-production workers in total compensation; at the 3-digit
US SIC level during a given year t; NBER CES variable names: (PAY− PRODW)/PAY
NBER CES data
tfpst 5-factor NBER TFP index with base year 1995; t f p′95 = 1 NBER CES data
value addedst industry value added in millions USD; at the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t;
NBER CES variable names: VADD
NBER CES data
Other Controls
economic crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2007-2009
post 2000 is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2001-2003 and equal to 0 for the years 1999-2000
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B.3 Calculation of the Marginal Effects
For every firm in our sample, we calculate the sum of expenses in each year. Then we ex-
press the individual category investment as share of total firm investments for each year.
Next, we use these shares to calculate the average investment share of each category across
all firms and years in the sample. Because the resulting average shares do not add up to one,
we re-weight the shares accordingly.25 We use the resulting shares to construct an average
depreciation rate, where we weight the category specific depreciation rates with the respec-
tive average share in investment. This way, we obtain an average sample depreciation rate
of 23.1%, which implies that the average firm investment lasts 1579.8 days [= (1/r)× 365].
Now we consider an increase in import competition of 60%. This corresponds to the
increase of the import competition variable in our estimation sample (from 22.4% in 1995 to
35.7% in 2009). We use the regression results to calculate the relative change in each category.
Because we do not know the level effect of import competition on investments, we addition-
ally need to assume the investment elasticity in one base category. Here, we use a 0% change
in Land investments with respect to a trade shock (when regressing import competition on
Land investments and adding firm and year fixed effects, we find Land investments to be
inelastic with respect to import competition).
Applying the relative percentage changes in each category, we can then construct new
after-trade-shock investment shares. As before, we use these shares to obtain the new av-
erage depreciation rate (23.28% for specification (3) in panel B of Table III.1). Investments
now fully depreciate after 1507.8 days, implying that import competition has reduced the
duration of investments by about 72 days on average.
Note that these results depend on the critical values chosen for the increase in import
competition and the elasticity of Land investments with respect to import competition. Thus,
letting the percentage change in Land vary from -10% to +10% (holding constant the increase
in import competition at 60%) changes the reduction in days from -79 to -66.1.
25See Figures B.3 and B.4 for the average investment composition in our sample.

CHAPTER IV
Low-wage Country Import Competition and Firms’ Pricing Strategy
IV.1 Introduction
Among the most significant aspects of globalization is the integration of low-wage
economies into the world trading system. The dramatic rise in international trade between
rich OECD countries and low-wage economies looms large as imports from low-wage coun-
tries constitute the fastest growing fraction of manufacturing imports in both the EU and
the US. As a consequence, trade integration has led to an ever fiercer international competi-
tion to which firms are exposed. Low-wage country import competition has therefore been
identified as a major threat for employment and wages in the manufacturing sector in in-
dustrialized countries, creating vigorous public debates about the benefits of globalization
and its impact on developed countries. This has raised interest among economists how firms
react and adapt to trade competition.
This paper investigates whether import competition from China affects the pricing de-
cisions of German manufacturing firms by holding down prices and inflationary pressure.
Using survey data, the paper tests whether increased import competition from China influ-
ences firms’ pricing decisions by inducing a reduction in relative prices. From a microeco-
nomic perspective the adjustment of prices is an essential component in modern theoretical
models of international trade. Stronger trade competition squeezes markups and induces a
110
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reduction in prices and profits. Ultimately, the less efficient firms eventually exit the econ-
omy, thereby inducing a reshuffling of market shares. As the composition of firms in the
industry changes, this gives rise to sectoral productivity gains. The effect of trade induced
competition on prices thus appears as an important driver of industrial change. From a
macroeconomic perspective, the topic relates to the impact of globalization on the pattern
of inflation. Even though globalization has been a primary driver of economic growth, it
has been accompanied by subdued patterns of inflation.1 As a result, observers (e.g. Rogoff
(2004) and Carney (2015)) have claimed that this effect might be traced back to international
competition and a reduction in monopoly pricing power.
The paper is based on detailed survey data covering the German manufacturing sector
from 1995 − 2012 and concentrates on the impact of import competition originating from
China. Firms differ in their exposure to import competition due to their affiliation to differ-
ent types of manufacturing industries. Product level data is at a monthly frequency and pro-
vides detailed information about the timing and the direction of price changes. In addition,
the data provides an extensive insight to the evolution of a firm’s demand, its overall state
of business and its future expectations. This allows a clean separation of demand conditions
and the Chinese supply shock in order to set the ground for the identification of the effect
of import competition on firms’ pricing decisions. Identification of the impact of low-wage
country imports on prices needs to consider two major aspects of endogeneity. Firstly, im-
port shares are endogenous to local demand conditions. Secondly, prices might have reverse
feedback effects on low-wage country imports as the latter might target markets character-
ized by higher price levels so as to gain market shares by undercutting incumbents’ prices.
To estimate the causal effect of Chinese import competition on German firms’ pricing de-
cisions and rule out issues of reverse causality, the paper instruments for Chinese import
competition using the level of lagged import tariffs to the European single market as well
as the lagged level of the Chinese import penetration ratio. Thus, the aim is to isolate the
component of China’s exports that affects pricing decisions of German manufacturing firms
and is explained by internal supply shocks in China.
1See e.g. Rogoff (2004), Borio and Filardo (2007) and Pain, Koske, and Sollie (2008).
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In a second step, the paper extends its analysis in order to explore the heterogeneity of
firms’ pricing strategy in response to Chinese import competition along two dimensions.
Firstly, it is analyzed whether the pro-competitive effects of Chinese imports are muted in
more differentiated sectors. It is assumed that high-tech sectors characterized by larger R&D
expenditures are less prone to price based competition as they offer a larger degree of vertical
differentiation. As such, firms in R&D intensive sectors are expected to be more likely to
successfully escape from low-wage country competition. Secondly, the paper examines the
role of firm heterogeneity by concentrating on the effects of capital intensity. Drawing on the
factor proportions framework, capital intensive firms are supposed to be less susceptible to
low-wage country competition than their more labor intensive counterparts. This is because,
to the extent that a firm’s input intensity reflects its type of products, the products of capital
intensive firms are expected to be consistent with comparative advantage of capital abundant
Germany vis-à-vis labor abundant China.
The econometric evidence suggests a positive and significant causal impact of Chinese
import competition on the probability of a price reduction. Thus, competitive pressure ex-
erted by Chinese imports on average induces firms to lower their prices. Several alternative
specifications and methodologies are applied in order to quantify the effect of imports on
firms’ pricing strategy and provide additional robustness tests. Results point out that a 1%
increase in Chinese import competition may increase the probability of a price reduction by
about 0.03 percentage points. This implies that throughout the 1995− 2012 period covered
by my data, this amounts to a rise in the likelihood of a downward price adjustment of 23
percentage points. As firms rarely change their prices and the share of price reductions in
the data is very small and accounts for only 8.38%, this appears to be a noticeable effect.
However, this effect turns out to vary substantially across sectors and firms. Firms in
more vertically differentiated sectors are less likely to lower their prices. Hence, this evidence
implies that price adjustments by firms in less vertically differentiated sectors where price
competition is more prevalent tend to drive the aggregate price response. Similarly, the
results stress the role of firm heterogeneity in capital intensity in determining the impact of
low-wage country competition on firm performance. In line with trade theory, the evidence
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shows that the pro-competitive effects of imports are muted with respect to firms’ capital
intensity.
The question whether imports from low-wage countries affect prices in industrialized
economies has already been subject to prior research. Only few papers however succeed
in establishing a causal relationship between low-wage imports and prices.2 Exceptions are
Auer and Fischer (2010) and Auer, Degen, and Fischer (2013) who study the effect of low-
wage country import competition on US and European inflationary pressure. Overall, they
find industries more exposed to import competition to reduce output prices. Furthermore,
Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2009) analyze the impact of trade openness on producer prices in
seven EU manufacturing industries. Their findings suggest that international trade induces
a pro-competitive effect which induces a temporary reduction in prices in the short run.
Nevertheless, these studies are restricted to data at the industry level. To date, the only
study which investigates the impact of low-wage country import competition using firm
level price data has been recently provided by Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2015) for Italy.3
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to add to the literature by investigating the impact of
low-wage country import competition on pricing decisions at the firm-product level and by
using unique survey data on pricing decisions in German manufacturing. Extending the
literature to the firm level is important as estimation results at the industry level might be
compounded by compositional effects. If low productivity firms characterized by higher
output prices are not able to sustain the increased level of competition, they might exit the
industry and thereby induce a reduction in the aggregate price level. In addition, these
studies do not take account of sector and firm heterogeneity.
The effects of low-wage country imports on firms and workers in industrialized
economies have raised considerable interest among researchers. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2006) analyze the impact of exposure to international trade with low-wage countries in the
2See e.g. Borio and Filardo (2007), Glatzer, Gnan, and Valderrama (2006), International Monetary Fund (2006)
and Kamin, Marazzi, and Schindler (2006). Overall, the literature fails to take account of the endogeneity of
low-wage country imports to changes in domestic demand. Thus, the literature is not able to separate domestic
demand shocks from foreign supply shocks.
3While Auer, Degen, and Fischer (2013) do not find any significant price effect for Italy at the sector level,
Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2015) find a significant effect in their study based on price data at the firm level.
This corroborates the limits of studies based on price data at the industry level.
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US and find a negative impact on plant survival and employment growth. In addition, firms
respond to increased competition by adjusting their product mix. Mion and Zhu (2013) study
the impact of imports from different origins on employment, market exit and skill upgrad-
ing in Belgian manufacturing. Chinese competition reduces firm employment and induces
skill-upgrading while offshoring to China increases the probability of firm survival. Amiti
and Khandelwal (2013) focus on the effect of import competition on product quality. Their
findings show that tougher import competition spurs quality upgrading of products close
to the world quality frontier and diminishes quality upgrading of products located far away
from the technology frontier. Similarly, Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) explore the
impact of Chinese import competition on various measures of technology upgrading such
as patents, IT adoption and productivity. They conclude that Chinese import competition
has induced about 15% of European technology upgrading over the period 2000 – 2007. Au-
tor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013b) and Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014) assess the effect
of Chinese import competition on US labor markets. Rising import competition relates to
higher unemployment rates and reduced wages and earnings in labor markets that are more
exposed to Chinese trade competition. Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2014) extend these
studies to the German labor market. In equal measure, their results unveil that industries
competing with imports from China and Eastern Europe are subject to job losses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section IV.2 discusses the theoretical and
empirical background of Chinese imports, competition and prices in order to motivate the
empirical analysis. Section IV.3 presents the data. Section IV.4 discusses the empirical strat-
egy and provides the econometric estimates. Section IV.5 expands the inquiry to sector and
firm heterogeneity and section IV.6 concludes.
IV.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background
In this section the theoretical background of trade, prices and competition is reviewed in
order to consider how growth in German imports from China affects price setting.
Throughout the past two decades, China experienced spectacular economic growth and
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a surge in exports which is mainly traced back to its transition to a market oriented economy.
The share of total German spending on Chinese manufacturing goods rose from roughly 3%
in 1995 to about 10% in 2012. Similarly, China’s share in world exports more than trippled
over the same time period (see Figure IV.1). Obviously, China’s trade shock offers the con-
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Figure IV.1: China’s Share of World Manufacturing Exports and China’s Share of Imports in
German Manufacturing, 1995 - 2012
venience of being temporally well identified with an inflection point in 2001 when China
joined the WTO and was granted most-favored nation status among the 153 WTOmembers.
As such, China’s export growth has been identified as a major source of disruption to the
manufacturing sector in high-wage countries. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013b) estimate
that the rise of Chinese exports to the US explains about 21% of the aggregate decline in
US manufacturing employment in the past 20 years. Besides, Schott (2008) documents the
strong overlap in China’s exports with products of industrialized high-income economies.
Finally, with competitive pressure stemming from Chinese imports being mostly price based
(cf. Schott (2008)), it appears particularly appealing to concentrate on import penetration
from China, in order to gauge the impact of low-wage country competition on domestic
firms’ pricing decisions.
The negative impact of trade competition on prices is an inherent part of several seminal
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models of international trade based on monopolistic competition. Krugman (1979) provides
a model of international trade, variable price elasticity of demand and pro-competitive ef-
fects in a model with symmetric firms. Opening up to trade increases the number of active
firms and varieties in the market. As a result, consumption of each variety declines and the
price elasticity of demand increases. Trade therefore yields a pro-competitive effect by re-
ducing the markup of price over variable costs of production. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
extend the Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous firms and trade and develop a model with
firm heterogeneity and endogenous toughness of competition and variable markups in a
setting of monopolistic competition. Firms’ markups and prices respond to the extent of
trade integration as firms in more integrated markets exhibit lower markups due to tougher
trade competition. Firms that do not break even exit the market. Consequently, competition
induces a reallocation of market shares and resources which then increases average firm pro-
ductivity as only the most productive firms are able to survive. The model by Melitz (2003)
features no explicit pro-competitive effect since it is based on a CES demand function, sec-
toral productivity gains however lead to a reduction of the aggregate industry price index.
By means of a different market structure, namely oligopolistic competition, Markusen (1981)
highlights the pro-competitive effect from trade due to the reduction in market power of a
domestic monopolist. Hence, the following testable hypothesis is considered.
Hypothesis 1 Firms reduce their domestic sales prices with increasing industry exposure to
imports from China.
The theoretical and empirical background related to sector and firm heterogeneity is pre-
sented later on in section IV.5.
IV.3 Data Sources and Measurement
In this section details about the data are provided and the methodology used in order to
construct the measure of Chinese import competition is set forth.
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IV.3.1 Measuring Import Competition
Industry-level imports data comes from the Comext database provided by Eurostat. The
database provides detailed data on merchandize trade conducted by the member countries
of the EU and is compiled by Eurostat by using the official statistics from the member coun-
tries. I extract data on German manufacturing imports from China by 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1
industry for the period 1995–2012. Exposure to import competition faced by German manu-
facturing firms is measured as the share of imports from China in domestic consumption at
the 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1 level following Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006). It is therefore
assumed that firms within an industry experience a similar extent of competitive pressure
on their final goods which can be proxied by the importance of imports within the respective
sector. The measure is defined by
Import competitionChinast =
ImpChinast
Prodst + ImpWorldst − Exp
World
st
. (IV.1)
The variable ImpChinast denotes the value of imports from China from sector s in year t,
whereas ImpWorldst and Exp
World
st represent German manufacturing imports and exports with
respect to the entire universe of trading partners. The variable Prodst is German domestic
production. Data on total imports and exports by industry as well as domestic production
are taken from the PRODCOM database which is also constructed by Eurostat.
IV.3.2 Data on the Pricing Strategy of Firms
Data on firms’ pricing strategy is based on the Ifo business tendency survey for German
manufacturing firms collected by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research.4 The Ifo busi-
ness tendency survey is carried out on a monthly basis and concentrates on firm-specific
appraisals and future expectations concerning the business as well as the market conditions.
The data is at the product level. Moreover, since firms might respond to multiple question-
naires for different business units and product groups, the observation unit is a firm-product
combination. Firms take part in the survey on a voluntary basis for which reason not ev-
4For more information on the survey data see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008) and Abberger, Hofmann, and
Wohlrabe (2007).
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ery firm responded every month yielding an unbalanced dataset. In order to obtain a more
consistent sample, we drop firm-product observations for a given year if the product is cov-
ered less than 6 months. Finally, with my sample running from January 1995 to December
2012, this leaves us with 2539 firms and a total of 2829 firm-product combinations. Overall,
the survey does not request firms to provide absolute or monetary figures for which reason
the participating companies are mostly presented with binary or ordinally scaled response
categories.
One of the survey questions relates to the pricing decision of the firm with respect to the
domestic prices of sale versus the previous month. The answer is on an ordinal scale and
firms indicate whether their domestic sales prices increased, remained unchanged or de-
creased. In the subsequent econometric analysis, the firms’ pricing decision will be coded as
as a binary response variable indicating whether a firm has decreased product prices or not.
Alternatively, in order to test the robustness of the results, we also use an ordinal response
variable signalling whether prices have been increased (+1), remained unchanged (0) or
decreased (−1). Figure C.1 depicts the evolution of the share of price increases per year as
well as the annual inflation rate in the German manufacturing sector. Both variables follow
a uniform path, suggesting that the pricing decisions by the sample of firms are highly rep-
resentative for the German manufacturing sector as a whole. Overall in the entire sample,
price reductions and price increases constitute a fraction of 8.38% and 10.17% respectively,
whereas in 81.45% of all observations prices remained constant (see Table C.6). On average,
firms change the price of a specific product about 2.17 times by year. In doing so, prices are
reduced about 0.95 times and increased about 1.21 times per year on average (see Table C.7).
5
Table C.5 displays the average share of price decreases in total price adjustments as well
as the average degree of import competition in each 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1. industry before
(1995 – 2000) and after China’s accession to the WTO (2001 – 2007). The period 2008 - 2012 is
dropped in order not to falsify the descriptive statistics with the impact of the economic re-
cession due to the 2008 - 2009 financial crisis. Import competition from China increased in all
5Since firms may change product prices multiple times per year, we prefer to remain with the data at the
monthly level and not to aggregate it to the year level.
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manufacturing industries. The pattern of price reductions across industries nevertheless is
less obvious. Computing a simple correlation between the average share of price reductions
and the average change in import penetration yields a positive though slightly insignificant
coefficient of 0.32. Restricting the set of industries to low-tech and medium low-tech sectors
results in a large and highly significant correlation of 0.57which drops again to 0.24 and turns
insignificant once we concentrate on high-tech and medium high-tech sectors.6 Altogether,
this is consistent with the idea of Chinese imports exerting competitive pressure by selling
at a discount and forcing firms in sectors which are less in line with German comparative
advantage to cut prices.
IV.3.3 Firm and Product Level Controls
Measuring the impact of import competition on domestic sales prices requires data which
allows to control for both, the costs of production and the demand and market situation of
firms.
Data describing a firms’ demand and market environment is again extracted from the Ifo
business tendency survey at a monthly frequency. Amongst others, the survey provides de-
tailed information about a firms’ situation of demand. More precisely, firms specify whether
their demand situation has improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated compared to the
previous month. In addition, firms are requested to evaluate their current state of business.
A firm may appraise its state of business as good, satisfactory or bad. Ultimately, the survey
also includes questions on the expected future of the firm. As such, firms indicate whether
their expectations for the next six months with respect to the economic development of their
business situation are rather more favorable, about the same or rather more unfavorable.
With respect to all three variables, the ordinal scale of the three response categories is coded
as +1 (improvement/ good/ favorable), 0 (unchanged/ satisfactory/ same) and -1 (deterio-
ration/ bad/ unfavorable).7 Controlling for a firm’s demand is fundamental in order to take
6The ranking of industries according to different technology intensities follows the Eurostat indicator on
high-tech industries which classifies industries based on the share of R&D expenditures in value added.
7When a company assesses its current or future state of business, its response is likely to depend on the
respective interpretation of the questionnaire. Questions related to the firm’s business situation relate to the
overall economic conditions with which the firm is confronted. It is the firm which is charged with choosing the
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account for potential demand shocks such as the 2008 – 2009 financial crisis. Moreover, it al-
lows to disentangle domestic demand shocks from the Chinese import shock as trade flows
are endogenous to the development of local demand conditions: If firms in an industrial sec-
tor in Germany are subject to a positive demand shock, prices increase. This might in turn
lead to a rise in low-wage country imports, as firms from low-wage countries might seek to
expand their presence in the domestic market with cheap imports. In addition, the variable
allows taking into account the impact of competition induced by the overall set of domestic
and foreign competitors other than Chinese importers. In equal measure, controlling for the
present state of business and future commercial expectations captures the economic perfor-
mance of the firm. These two aspects are again affected by the competitive pressure the firm
is facing and thereby reflect the market situation of a firm on its domestic product market in
Germany. The survey also provides information about the export status of a product. Goods
which are exported might suffer less from Chinese import competition as profit losses on the
domestic market might be compensated by export revenues from foreign markets.
Furthermore, prior theoretical research suggests a relationship between the market
power of a firm and its size. In the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) larger firms ex-
hibit lower unit costs and exhibit higher market power by charging larger markups. Atkin,
Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2015) provide empirical evidence how
markups systematically increase in firm size even in narrowly defined product categories.
Firm size is primarily measured by the number of employees which is drawn from both, the
Ifo business tendency survey and balance sheet data from the Amadeus and Hoppenstedt
databases. In case that the balance sheet data does not provide the annual number of em-
ployees, we use employment numbers given by the survey data at the firm-product level
which are then aggregated across months and business units at the firm-year level. In ad-
dition, so as to capture further alternative measures of firm size, we control for total fixed
assets as well as operating revenues.
In order to account for the costs of production further variables at the firm level are used.
The main data source is again annual balance sheet data taken from the Amadeus and Hop-
fundamentals on which to make its appraisal (see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008)).
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penstedt databases and matched with the Ifo survey data. Wages and salaries are measured
by the amount of staff expenses and the proxy for a firm’s input costs is given by the costs
of materials. Labor costs are included in order to hold constant the impact of rising Chinese
imports on wages and employment in import competing industries. Similarly, material costs
intend to control for changes in the costs of inputs which might be affected by imports of
cheaper Chinese intermediates as well as competitive pressure exerted by Chinese produc-
ers on the price level of intermediates.
Since a notable fraction of firms is not represented with balance sheet information, com-
bining the survey data with the balance sheet data causes a large loss of observations. Nev-
ertheless, the resulting panel still comprises about 1500 units of observation.
IV.4 Empirical Strategy
IV.4.1 Econometric Specification
This section examines the effects of Chinese imports on the pricing strategy of firms and
presents the basic identification strategy and results. The aim of the empirical strategy is to
isolate the effect of import competition from China. For that reason the empirical specifica-
tion attempts to consider all major price determinants which might be related to low-wage
country imports. The pricing strategy of a firm and product combination is a binary vari-
able and reflects the decision to reduce the price with respect to the previous month or not.
Hence, we fit a linear probability model (LPM) of the following form:
price reductionismt = β1 × ln
(
ImpCompCNst
)
+ X′ismtγ + µi + µs + µm + µt + ε ismt. (IV.2)
The pricing strategy of a firm with respect to a specific product i in month m within year
t is regressed on its exposure to import competition at the sectoral level s from China and
a set of control variables Xismt as well as a set of fixed effects. Import competition is de-
noted by ImpCompCNst and is given by the log of the measure developed in section IV.3.1. If,
according to Hypothesis 1, the rise of Chinese import competition forces German manufac-
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turing firms to reduce their domestic prices in order to remain on the market, the coefficient
of ln
(
ImpCompCNst
)
is expected to be positive.
Xismt is a vector containing controls at the product and firm level that account for fur-
ther aspects that affect product level prices namely demand, market power and production
costs.8 These determinants are incorporated as they are potentially correlated with the de-
gree of Chinese import competition. First of all, as noted earlier, the market environment
might interact with the level of Chinese imports. Therefore the situation of demand, the
state of business, commercial future expectations and export status are included. Market
power reflected by firm size is considered by employing the number of employees, assets
and revenues. Finally, labor costs and costs of inputs are included based on measures for
staff expenses and material costs.
Lastly, µi is a set of fixed effects controlling for unobserved and time-invariant firm-
product characteristics and µs are industry fixed effects that eliminate unobserved time-
invariant factors that vary across sectors at the NACE rev. 1.1 4-digit level. Year fixed effects
µt and month fixed effects µm are included to sweep out variation across time common to all
firms and industries such as the business cycle, seasonal fluctuations and technology shocks.
Standard errors are robust and two-way clustered at the firm-product level and at the 4-digit
NACE rev. 1.1 sector level.
IV.4.2 Causality: Endogeneity and IV Strategy
The empirical model set forth above might suffer from an endogeneity problem even after
inclusion of the range of different price determinants presented in section IV.3.3 and section
IV.4.1. More precisely, price based Chinese importers might target specific sectors in which
firms are less prone to decrease their prices so as to undercut the price level and gain market
shares. Thus, the pricing strategy of firms could cause Chinese imports to be more present
in certain industries. This causes the analysis to suffer from reverse causality and creates a
correlation of Chinese import competition with the error term which is expected to provoke
a downward bias of the OLS estimates. Similarly, an upwards bias could arise if firms in
8For the sake of simplicity a firm and firm-product combination are both denoted with the subscript i.
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sectors that are not price competitive and less likely to reduce their price, engage in lobby-
ing against Chinese imports. The time-invariant ability of firms and sectors to compete on
prices is captured by fixed effects. Primarily however, so as to tackle this problem, I use most
favored nation tariffs (MFN) applied to Chinese imports in the EU single market from the
UN Comtrade database in order to instrument for import competition. The tariff measures
are a weighted average of ad valorem tariffs for traded products (tariff lines) at the HS 8-digit
level where more weight is given to products with larger import flows.9 Subsequently, the
data is concorded to the NACE rev. 1.1 classification and aggregated to the 2-digit level.
Furthermore, the tariff measures are lagged by two years. Figure C.2 presents the correla-
tion between the log of tariffs and the log of the import competition and Figure C.3 presents
the development of the average most favored nation tariff rate and average import compe-
tition across all manufacturing industries for the period 1995− 2012. Both graphs exhibit
the negative relationship which is employed in the first stage regressions. Clearly, tariffs are
assumed to be exogenous to the pricing behavior of firms and hence permit identification of
the impact of Chinese import competition on the pricing strategies in German manufactur-
ing. This premise however could be violated if for example firms in price sensitive sectors
are able to lobby for tariff protection from cheap low-wage country imports. In addition, I
follow Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) and employ the lag of Chinese import competi-
tion ln
(
ImpCompCNst−2
)
as supplementary instrument based on the assumption that a firm’s
pricing strategy in the present has no impact on the rate of Chinese imports in the past.
IV.4.3 Baseline Results
This section presents the econometric results with respect to Hypothesis 1 and equation (IV.2)
and the fundamental question whether Chinese import competition involves firms in de-
creasing their prices. Table IV.1 presents the results of the OLS and the 2SLS estimations. As
noted earlier, all regressions control for fixed effects along the firm-product, sector, month
and year dimension.
The first column in Table IV.1 reports the coefficient from regressing the binary variable
9Non ad valorem tariffs have been transformed to ad valorem equivalents following the UNCTAD 1 method.
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LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0230*** 0.0234*** 0.0196* 0.0317*** 0.0303** 0.0482**
(0.00535) (0.00549) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0235)
demand changeismt -0.0201*** -0.0168*** -0.0210*** -0.0183***
(0.00328) (0.00365) (0.00339) (0.00395)
state of businessismt -0.0581*** -0.0533*** -0.0579*** -0.0524***
(0.00733) (0.00670) (0.00737) (0.00676)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0296*** -0.0332*** -0.0294*** -0.0335***
(0.00304) (0.00474) (0.00305) (0.00475)
exportismt -0.00430 -0.0105 -0.00494 -0.0161
(0.0119) (0.0214) (0.0126) (0.0226)
log(employment)ist 0.00240 -0.00311 0.00153 -0.00441
(0.00496) (0.00790) (0.00493) (0.00667)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00800 -0.00460
(0.00899) (0.00885)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00632 0.00363
(0.00650) (0.00690)
log(revenue)ist -0.00116 -0.00384
(0.00895) (0.00920)
log(assets)ist 0.0116* 0.0115*
(0.00603) (0.00626)
2SLS first stage
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.608*** 0.608*** 0.533***
(-0.0308) (-0.0309) (-0.038)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.142***
(-0.0612) (-0.061) (-0.0416)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 270.5 267.8 110.8
Hansen J statistic 1.829 2.671 1.353
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.176 0.102 0.245
Observations 170,390 169,768 81,469 164,269 163,653 76,184
R-squared 0.256 0.279 0.286 0.261 0.283 0.295
firm-product clusters 2,829 2,828 1,504 2,798 2,797 1,476
industry clusters 212 212 190 211 211 189
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry.
The dependent variable price reduction is a binary variable indicating whether the domestic price of
sale of a specific product has been reduced or not compared to the previous month. The coefficient
of interest log (ImpComp)st is the log of Imports
China
st /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
.
Instruments are the two-year lag of the log of Chinese import competition and of most favored nation
tariffs (MFN) on the European single market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of
the covariates see Table C.9. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-
effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table IV.1: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: LPM and
2SLS Estimation
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indicating whether a firm has engaged in a price reduction on the log of import penetration.
The coefficient is positive and highly significant suggesting a positive relationship between
Chinese imports and the probability of lowering prices. As argued in section IV.4.2, the entry
of Chinese importers on the Germanmarket might however depend on the pricing strategies
by German manufacturing firms, as Chinese exporters might be attracted by sectors where
firms are less price competitive. Following this line of reasoning, the specification might suf-
fer from reverse causality and the coefficient of import competition is expected to be biased
downwards. Considering the corresponding 2SLS estimation in column (4), the coefficient of
interest is both positive and highly significant. Futhermore, the coefficient increases in size,
hereby affirming the concern of reverse causality. Altogether these findings are in line with
Hypothesis 1 and suggest that firms on average reduce their domestic sales prices as response
to low-wage country competition. Next, I add controls that capture a firm’s market environ-
ment and size to the specification in column (2). More precisely, the change in demand with
respect to the previous month, the assessment of the current state of business, commercial
expectations as well as export status and firm employment are included. The coefficient of
interest shows up positive and statistically significant and remains constant in size. Overall,
the impact of the control variables appears to be reasonable and in line with expectations.
An increase in demand, a favorable state of business as well as positive commercial expecta-
tions are negatively associatedwith a firm’s likelihood of a price reduction. Export status and
firm employment however are insignificant. Considering the estimation results of the 2SLS
regression in column (5), the coefficient of interest is likewise positive and significant and
points towards a stable positive impact of Chinese imports on price reductions even when
taking into account reverse causality. Finally, column (3) controls for costs and further size
measures at the firm level by employing staff expenses and costs of materials as well as total
assets and revenues. Still, exposure to Chinese imports induces a reduction in a firm’s do-
mestic sales price according to both, the OLS estimates in column (3) and the 2SLS estimates
in column (6), as the coefficient of interest is positive and significant. The OLS coefficient is
stable in size whereas the 2SLS coefficient increases slightly compared to its counterparts in
columns (4) and (5). While assets are positively related to a price reduction, the remaining
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firm level controls are insignificant. Furthermore, in each specification the instruments pass
the tests of weak instrumentation (Kleibergen-Paap Wald F) and overidentification (Hansen
J) as indicated by the test statistics at the bottom of Table IV.1. In addition, the sign of the
instruments in the first stage regressions are consistent with expectations: The coefficients
of lagged tariffs exhibit a negative sign and lagged import shares are positively related with
the contemporaneous level of import competition.
In total, these results point towards a negative causal impact of competitive pressure
exerted by Chinese imports on domestic sales prices. Given the coefficent in column (5), a
1% increase in import competition from China induces an increase in the probability of a
price reduction by 0.03 percentage points. As my measure of import competition increased
from 1.94% to 16.27% on average across all industries within the 1995-2012 period covered
by my sample, this implies a rise in the likelihood of a price reduction of about 23 percentage
points. Against the background that price reductions only account for 8.38% of the data, this
seems to be a noticeable effect.
Adding balance sheet variables leads to a considerable drop in the number of observa-
tions. In order to investigate the impact of this change in sample size on the estimation
results, I rerun my specifications with the sample fixed to firms providing balance sheet in-
formation. This entails a dataset which contains only about half of the original number of
observations but which still counts about 1500 firm-products. Results are presented in Table
IV.2. Columns (1) and (4) repeat the previous baseline regressions where controls for both
demand and cost factors are included. Subsequently, controls are restricted to the demand
and market conditions in columns (2) and (5) prior to focusing only on controls for produc-
tion costs, assets and revenue in columns (3) and (6). The test statistics on the performance of
the 2SLS estimations are always satisfied and the size of the coefficient of interest is constant
throughout the set of OLS and 2SLS estimations. While the OLS coefficients are equal to the
results when using the full sample in Table IV.1, this does nevertheless not hold for the 2SLS
coefficients. Hence, whereas the change in sample size does not affect the size of the OLS
coefficients, this seems to be slightly the case for the 2SLS estimates.
Chinese imports might exert a pro-competitive effect that leads to losses in market power
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LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0196* 0.0201* 0.0197* 0.0482** 0.0487** 0.0508**
(0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0235) (0.0238) (0.0248)
demand changeismt -0.0168*** -0.0168*** -0.0183*** -0.0183***
(0.00365) (0.00367) (0.00395) (0.00397)
state of businessismt -0.0533*** -0.0530*** -0.0524*** -0.0525***
(0.00670) (0.00660) (0.00676) (0.00664)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0332*** -0.0332*** -0.0335*** -0.0334***
(0.00474) (0.00475) (0.00475) (0.00476)
exportismt -0.0105 -0.0108 -0.0161 -0.0173
(0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0227)
log(employment)ist -0.00311 -0.00108 -0.000194 -0.00441 -0.00292 -0.000511
(0.00790) (0.00840) (0.00803) (0.00667) (0.00692) (0.00734)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00800 -0.000828 -0.00460 0.00258
(0.00899) (0.00897) (0.00885) (0.00871)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00632 0.00485 0.00363 0.00134
(0.00650) (0.00729) (0.00690) (0.00800)
log(revenue)ist -0.00116 -0.0136 -0.00384 -0.0154*
(0.00895) (0.00850) (0.00920) (0.00869)
log(assets)ist 0.0116* 0.0129** 0.0115* 0.0128**
(0.00603) (0.00597) (0.00626) (0.00617)
2SLS first stage
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.533*** 0.534*** 0.533***
(0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0383)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.141***
(0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0416)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 110.8 107.9 109.6
Hansen J statistic 1.353 1.408 0.970
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.245 0.235 0.325
Observations 81,469 81,469 81,469 76,184 76,184 76,184
R-squared 0.286 0.286 0.267 0.295 0.295 0.275
firm-product clusters 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,476 1,476 1,476
industry clusters 190 190 190 189 189 189
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1
industry. The sample is restricted to firm-product observations that are matched with infor-
mation from balance sheet databases. The dependent variable price reduction is a binary vari-
able indicating whether the domestic price of sale of a specific product has been reduced or
not compared to the previous month. The coefficient of interest log (ImpComp)st is the log of
ImportsChinast /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
. Instruments are the two-year lag of the
log of Chinese import competition and of most favored nation tariffs (MFN) on the European sin-
gle market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of the covariates see Table C.9. All
specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table IV.2: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: LPM and
2SLS Estimation with Sample Restricted to Firms Represented with Balance Sheet Data
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on the domestic market which induces firms to reduce prices by squeezing their markups.
Firms might nevertheless also adapt their production costs by engaging in innovations, by
changing the composition and wages of the labor force or by adjusting the mix of intermedi-
ate inputs as well as products. Besides, a reduction in prices might be driven by outsourcing
activities and access to cheap intermediates from China.10 By improving the efficiency of
production a firm might thus reduce its output price and keep the markup constant. A pri-
ori, it is not evident which underlying mechanism drives the adjustment of prices. Given
that the specification takes account of staff expenses, input costs and different measures of
firm size, a plausible reasoning however would be to assume that the negative impact of
Chinese imports on prices reflects a competition effect that induces a reduction in markups.
Next, I aim to investigate the robustness of the baseline results.
IV.4.4 Robustness
First of all, the rise of Chinese exports might reflect the increase in global trade throughout
the last two decades. For this reason, I add a measure of import penetration by the rest of the
world but other than China to my specification. Themeasure is constructed along the lines of
section IV.3.1 by substituting Chinese imports with the difference of total world imports and
Chinese imports. The estimation results are presented in Table C.1. The organization of the
regressions follows the baseline specifications in section IV.4.3. Throughout all estimations,
the coefficient of Chinese import competition remains positive and significant. Moreover,
the coefficient is similar in size as in the baseline estimations in section IV.4.3. Import pene-
tration induced by the rest of the world however appears insignificant in all specifications.
Furthermore, note that while the 2SLS estimation in column (5) slightly fails the test of overi-
dentification, specifications in columns (4) and (6) both satisfy the Hansen J test.
Since my panel includes the 2008 – 2009 financial crisis, my estimates might be con-
10Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) provide evidence of increases in R&D expenditures, patent activity and
TFP of European firms in response to Chinese import competition. Mion and Zhu (2013) find firms to reduce
firm-employment growth and engage in skill-upgrading. Moreover they identify a positive impact of offshoring
activities to China on a firm’s survival probability. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) find evidence for firms
adjusting their product mix in response to low-wage country competition by switching to industries that are less
exposed. Similarly, according to Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014) competition induces firms to drop badly
performing products and reallocate resources towards the best performing core products.
CHAPTER IV. LOW-WAGE COUNTRY COMPETITION AND FIRMS’ PRICES 129
founded by the dramatic price changes due to the economic recession (see Figure C.1). There-
fore, I rerunmy specifications after dropping the 2008 – 2009 period from the sample. Results
displayed in Table C.2 suggest that sign, size and significance of the coefficient of interest
once more remain unaffected.
The LPM offers the benefit of allowing to address issues of endogeneity conveniently
by 2SLS estimation. The LPM however also features several shortcomings: Firstly, it might
generate predictions for which the predicted probability is not bounded between zero and
one. Secondly, it assumes that the probability of a price reduction depends linearly on the
level of import penetration for all possible values. To deal with this concern, I estimate in
a third step a Probit model based on dummy variables to capture fixed effects. Table C.3
presents the corresponding average marginal effects. Overall, the marginal effects of import
competition from China are all similar in size to the LPM coefficients in Table IV.1 and Table
IV.2. Hence, the choice of the LPM as main estimation method does not seem to primarily
drive the results.
Lastly, I replace the binary variable indicating a price reduction with the ordinal response
variable describing the direction of price changes. A price increase now takes the value of+1,
a constant price is coded as 0 and a price reduction by −1. In order to be in line with Hypoth-
esis 1, the coefficient of Chinese import competition is now supposed to be negative. Table
C.4 presents the results. Regressing the direction of price changes on the import penetration
measure yields negative and significant coefficients in both the OLS and 2SLS estimation.
Hence, Chinese import competition again entails firms to lower prices. Beyond that, in the
2SLS estimation the coefficient increases once more in absolute size in line with the potential
concern of reverse causality. Similar results appear when controlling for demand conditions
and employment. Adding controls for staff expenses, input costs as well as assets and rev-
enues however yields an insignificant coefficient of interest in the OLS estimation (column
(3)) and the analogous 2SLS estimation (column (6)).
Overall, across all estimations the sign of the instruments in the first stage regressions
is in line with expectations. While the lagged level of most favored nation tariffs is nega-
tively related to my measure of import penetration, the level of lagged imports is positively
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related with the latter. In addition, the test statistics suggest that overidentifaction and weak
identification are of no concern.
Summing up the robustness tests, the baseline estimations turn out to be valid in several
alternative specifications thereby substantiating the main result.
IV.5 Sector and Firm Heterogeneity
The analysis is now extended in order to provide amore detailed understanding of themech-
anisms and patterns of price responses to Chinese competitive pressure across firms and
sectors. Additionally, this intends to increase the validity of the baseline results.
IV.5.1 Theoretical and Empirical Background
In focusing on sector heterogeneity my aim is to exploit information that indicates the ex-
tent to which competition in a given sector is based on prices. If products in a sector are
homogenous, competition is supposed to be played on prices. Since in that case the sector’s
products compete closely with each other, cheap Chinese imports are expected to severely
augment the toughness of competition in the market thereby forcing firms to cut prices in
order to preserve market shares. If products are however vertically differentiated, German
firms are expected to be less threatened by Chinese imports as competition is carried in the
first instance with respect to product-specific attributes such as product quality and the de-
gree of innovation. Khandelwal (2010) finds that heterogeneity across sectors in their scope
for quality differentiation strongly determines the impact of low-wage country competition.
In industries characterized by a large scope for quality differentiation, firms can readily es-
cape competition through differentiating their product by upgrading quality. The opposite
however arises in sectors with limited scope for differentiation where quality upgrading is
no viable option. Hence, firms in these sectors are more strongly exposed to competition
from low-wage countries. The degree of product differentiation and price based competition
is measured by industry R&D intensity. As such, R&D expenditures are the main source of
innovation for firms so as to differentiate their products. Beyond that, R&D intensive sec-
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tors are considered as skill-intensive as they occupy a large share of scientists and engineers.
Following classical factor-proportions theory, countries that are abundant in skilled labor are
supposed to exhibit comparative advantage in industries that intensively use a skilled labor
force. China being abundant in low-skilled labor is by contrast supposed to possess compar-
ative advantage in low-skill intensive industries. With China capturing larger shares in Ger-
man imports in sectors that are intensive in low-skilled labor, the latter are most threatened
by Chinese import competition compared to high-skill and R&D intensive sectors. Based on
these considerations, the following hypothesis is derived.
Hypothesis 2 The pro-competitive effect of Chinese imports on domestic sales prices is less pro-
nounced in more vertically differentiated industries.
Moreover, trade integration between a capital and skill rich developed country like Ger-
many, and a labor abundant country such as China is expected to induce a reallocation of
resources in both regions: Capital and skill intensive sectors in the developed country ex-
pand, whereas labor intensive sectors shrink. As developed countries specialize in high-skill
intensive and vertically differentiated products and developing countries specialize in low-
skill intensive and homogenous products, sectors in the developed country differ in their
exposure to low-wage country import competition according to their equivalent sector spe-
cific attributes. Following Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), this reasoning can be extended
to the firm level. Consequently, it is assumed that the input intensity of a firm displays
the factor intensity of its product mix hereby revealing the firm’s contestability to low-wage
country imports. Hence, firms with relatively capital intensive production are assumed to
produce capital intensive products. With the capital intensive sector expanding, capital in-
tensive firms are therefore expected to feature a product mix which is more in line with
comparative advantage and to be less affected by low-wage country imports.
Hypothesis 3 The pro-competitive effect of Chinese imports on domestic sales prices is less pro-
nounced for capital intensive firms.
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The following section presents the estimation strategy and results.
IV.5.2 Econometric Specification and Results
As argued before in section IV.5.1, the competitive pressure of Chinese imports is supposed
to vary across sectors with different R&D intensity and firms with varying capital intensity.
Accordingly, the regression equation is modified to take the following form
price reductionismt = β1 × ln
(
ImpCompCNst
)
+ β2 × ln
(
ImpCompCNst
)
× Γ
+X′ismtγ + µi + µs + µm + µt + ε ismt
, (IV.3)
where the variable Γ is either given by R&D intensity at the sector level s or capital
intensity at the firm level i.
IV.5.2.1 Sector Heterogeneity: Vertical Differentiation
If more R&D intensive sectors entail a larger degree of product differentiation, they are sub-
ject to a lower extent of competitive pressure by Chinese imports. Thus, β1 is expected to
show a positive sign whereas β2 is in contrast expected to show a negative sign in order to
be consistent with Hypothesis 2. Sectoral R&D intensity is measured by the volume of R&D
expenditures over the number of employees. Because I want the measure not to be affected
by German firms’ reactions to China’s rise in world trade after its entry to the WTO in 2001,
the measure is computed on the basis of US data and for the year 2000.11 The data is at the
3-digit NACE rev. 1.1 level.12 Subsequently an indicator is constructed according to which
a sector is defined as R&D intensive if the ratio of R&D expenditures per employee is above
the 75% percentile of the distribution.
Results are reported in Table IV.3. Column (1) displays the baseline specification with
11See Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) for recent evidence how European firms increase R&D expendi-
tures as response to import competition from China.
12The original US data is at the 3-digit NAICS 2002 level and mapped to the 3-digit NACE rev. 1.1 level by
means of a NAICS 2002 - NACE rev. 1.1 correspondance (see Table C.9 for more details).
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LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0233*** 0.0239*** 0.0223** 0.0310*** 0.0294** 0.0504**
(0.00545) (0.00570) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0233)
log(ImpComp China)st * R&D ints -0.0134* -0.0177** -0.0176* -0.0199* -0.0247** -0.0254**
(0.00748) (0.00733) (0.00938) (0.0108) (0.00950) (0.0116)
demand changeismt -0.0201*** -0.0168*** -0.0210*** -0.0183***
(0.00329) (0.00366) (0.00340) (0.00396)
state of businessismt -0.0580*** -0.0532*** -0.0578*** -0.0525***
(0.00735) (0.00672) (0.00739) (0.00678)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0296*** -0.0332*** -0.0294*** -0.0334***
(0.00305) (0.00475) (0.00306) (0.00476)
exportismt -0.00349 -0.00961 -0.00436 -0.0155
(0.0119) (0.0213) (0.0126) (0.0227)
log(employment)ist 0.00261 -0.00279 0.00181 -0.00401
(0.00495) (0.00783) (0.00495) (0.00664)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00788 -0.00454
(0.00916) (0.00907)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00605 0.00335
(0.00642) (0.00681)
log(revenue)ist -6.28e-05 -0.00252
(0.00915) (0.00947)
log(assets)ist 0.0113* 0.0110*
(0.00597) (0.00618)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 90.10 89.23 66.88
Hansen J statistic 2.962 3.605 2.065
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.227 0.165 0.356
Observations 169,813 169,193 81,288 163,712 163,098 76,023
R-squared 0.256 0.279 0.287 0.261 0.283 0.295
firm-product clusters 2816 2815 1496 2785 2784 1468
industry clusters 209 209 188 208 208 187
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 indus-
try. The dependent variable price reduction is a binary variable indicating whether the domestic price
of sale of a specific product has been reduced or not compared to the previous month. The coeffi-
cient of interest is the interaction of R&D intensity R&D ints and import competition from China Imp-
Comp Chinast. R&D intensity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the level of R&D expenditures per em-
ployee is above the 75% percentile of the distribution. R&D intensity is measured at the 3-digit NACE
rev 1.1 level and refers to US industries for the year 2000. Chinese import competition is the log of
ImportsChinast /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
. Instrumentation is based on the two-year lag
of the log of Chinese import competition and of most favored nation tariffs (MFN) on the European single
market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of the covariates see Table C.9. First stage
regressions are displayed in Table C.10. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year
fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table IV.3: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: Sector
Heterogeneity in R&D Intensity. LPM and 2SLS Estimation
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the measure of Chinese import competition and its interaction with the indicator for R&D
intensity. Both coefficients, the effect of Chinese imports as well as the interaction term are
statistically significant. However, while import competition is positively related to a price
reduction, the interaction term is negative. The same outcome arises when moving towards
the 2SLS estimation in column (4). Besides, the results remain robust after the inclusion of
control variables reflecting the demand and market situation of a firm as well as its size in
columns (2) and (5). Hence, these findings suggest that the negative impact of Chinese im-
ports on domestic sales prices decreases with sectoral R&D intensity. Lastly, adding controls
for staff expenses and input costs as well as revenues and assets in columns (3) and (6) still
yields the same picture although the sample size is considerably reduced. Import competi-
tion from China exerts a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of a price reduction.
The interaction term with R&D intensity however enters the equation significantly with a
negative sign.13
Considering the order of magnitude of the effect of R&D intensity throughout all spec-
ifications, the positive impact of a 1% increase in import competition on the probability of
a price reduction is less than half the size in the most R&D intensive sectors. Overall, the
pattern of results is in line with Hypothesis 2 and reveals that the competitive pressure from
Chinese imports is softened in more differentiated sectors.
IV.5.2.2 Firm Heterogeneity: Capital Intensity
Following Hypothesis 3, Chinese imports exert less downward pressure on domestic sales
prices if firms are capital intensive. Accordingly, so as to coincide with the hypothesis, the
interaction must be negative. Capital at the firm level is calculated as the ratio of fixed as-
sets and the number of employees. The ratio is built for all firms that provide balance sheet
information on their assets within the 1995− 2000 period and subsequently averaged. This
allows avoiding endogeneity issues due to firms’ adjustment of production techniques af-
ter China’s WTO accession in 2001. However, this occurs against the drawback of loosing a
large amount of observations which ultimately leaves us with only 500 firm-product com-
13Results also hold when using a continuous measure of R&D intensity.
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LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0499* 0.0494* 0.0365* 0.0570 0.0572 0.0374
(0.0298) (0.0256) (0.0190) (0.0429) (0.0396) (0.0300)
log(ImpComp China)st * capital inti -0.0490** -0.0517*** -0.0465*** -0.0540** -0.0563*** -0.0484***
(0.0195) (0.0153) (0.0123) (0.0261) (0.0184) (0.0140)
demand changeismt -0.0121*** -0.0134*** -0.0143*** -0.0160***
(0.00381) (0.00384) (0.00441) (0.00450)
state of businessismt -0.0502*** -0.0481*** -0.0476*** -0.0454***
(0.00835) (0.00790) (0.00813) (0.00772)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0363*** -0.0341*** -0.0365*** -0.0347***
(0.00679) (0.00641) (0.00684) (0.00640)
exportismt -0.0433 -0.0147 -0.0571 -0.0272
(0.0508) (0.0281) (0.0604) (0.0302)
log(employment)ist 0.000844 -0.00368 -0.00183 -0.00748
(0.00864) (0.00989) (0.00829) (0.00840)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00879 -0.00618
(0.00893) (0.00845)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00730 0.00536
(0.00643) (0.00580)
log(revenue)ist 0.00337 0.000309
(0.0113) (0.0114)
log(assets)ist 0.00562 0.00467
(0.00881) (0.00922)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 88.97 83.36 55.99
Hansen J statistic 2.329 3.913 1.724
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.312 0.141 0.422
Observations 46,707 46,585 40,526 40,742 40,625 35,305
R-squared 0.185 0.208 0.214 0.198 0.221 0.227
firm-product clusters 493 492 460 464 463 433
industry clusters 127 127 125 126 126 122
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry. The
dependent variable price reduction is a binary variable indicating whether the domestic price of sale of a
specific product has been reduced or not compared to the previous month. The coefficient of interest is
the interaction of capital intensity capital inti and import competition from China ImpComp Chinast. Capital
intensity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average level of fixed assets per employee within the 1995
- 2000 period is above the 75% percentile of the distribution. Chinese import competition is the log of
ImportsChinast /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
. Instrumentation is based on the two-year lag
of the log of Chinese import competition and of most favored nation tariffs (MFN) on the European single
market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of the covariates see Table C.9. First stage
regressions are displayed in Table C.11. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year
fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table IV.4: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: Firm Het-
erogeneity in Capital Intensity. LPM and 2SLS Estimation
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binations. Finally, a dummy variable is constructed which indicates a firm to be capital
intensive if average assets per employee are above the 75% percentile of the distribution.
Regression results are displayed in Table IV.4. In the first column both coefficients are
significant and consistent with expectations. Import competition from China is positively
associated with price reductions. The impact however declines with firms’ capital intensity.
Turning towards the 2SLS estimation in column (4), the level effect of Chinese imports shows
up statistically insignificant. Most importantly however, the interaction term remains nega-
tive and significant in line with Hypothesis 3. The same outcome appears in columns (2) and
(5) when controlling for demand, state of business, expectations, export status and firm size.
Futhermore, this pattern of results remains persistent even after extending the set of controls
with costs of production, assets and revenues. Whereas the level effect of Chinese import
competition loses its significance in the 2SLS estimation, the interaction term stays negative
and highly significant.14
According to the estimated coefficients, the impact of a 1% increase in Chinese imports on
prices is more than 0.04 percentage points smaller for capital intensive firms. Comparing this
result with the baseline estimates in section IV.4.3 (see Table IV.1 and Table IV.2) this implies
that the influence of Chinese import competition on prices is almost zero for the most capital
intensive companies.
Altogether, results on sector and firm heterogeneity emphasize the importance of product
differentiation and production technique in shaping the impact of foreign competition on
firms’ pricing decisions. Firms in more R&D intensive sectors and more capital intensive
firms are less exposed to import competition and less likely to engage in price reductions.
IV.6 Conclusion
The paper investigates the impact of Chinese import competition on the pricing decisions of
German firms in themanufacturing sector based on detailed survey data at the product level.
14In additional regressions not presented in the paper I employ sector-year fixed effects. This eliminates the
level effect of import competition from China. Throughout all LPM and 2SLS specifications the interaction terms
of import competition from China and capital intensity are significant, exhibit a negative sign and are similar
in size compared to the results displayed in Table IV.4. Moreover, results also hold when using a continuous
measure of capital intensity.
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Examining the influence of foreign competition on prices is of great importance. Firstly,
recent research in international trade has identified the adjustment of prices and markups
as the fundamental trigger for a reallocation process of resources across firms that results in
aggregate productivity and welfare gains. Secondly, this sheds light on the effect of imports
from low-wage nations on prices and inflationary pressure in high-income countries.
A positive causal impact of Chinese import penetration on the likelihood of a price reduc-
tion is identified. According to the estimates, a 1% increase in import competition fromChina
raises the probability of a price reduction by 0.03 percentage points. Against the background
that firms only rarely adapt their product prices this is a non-negligible effect. Results are
robust to controlling for the impact of import competition from countries other than China
as well as to taking account of the 2008 – 2009 financial crisis and alternative estimation
strategies.
Finally, the paper studies the differential impact of Chinese import competition across
industries and firms. The analysis concentrates on two aspects put forward by the literature:
Product differentiation and factor intensity. The results suggest that the exposure to Chinese
competition declines with increasing R&D intensity at the sector level and capital intensity
at the firm level.
Due to the qualitative nature of the survey data the analysis is restricted to analyzing the
discrete decision of firmswhether to adapt prices or not. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn
on the size of price changes. Future research might aim to gather more informative data at
the micro-level in order to separately estimate the impact of low-wage country competition
on the size of price changes, the markup and unit costs. This might provide further valuable
insights into how firms adapt their performance to international competition.
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C Appendix
C.1 Robustness
LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0229*** 0.0234*** 0.0203* 0.0316*** 0.0303** 0.0483*
(0.00544) (0.00559) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0250)
log(ImpCompWorld)st -0.00777 -0.00500 -0.00479 -0.00778 -0.00438 -0.0145
(0.00855) (0.00815) (0.0132) (0.00971) (0.00896) (0.0157)
demand changeismt -0.0201*** -0.0168*** -0.0210*** -0.0182***
(0.00328) (0.00365) (0.00340) (0.00395)
state of businessismt -0.0581*** -0.0533*** -0.0579*** -0.0524***
(0.00733) (0.00670) (0.00737) (0.00678)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0296*** -0.0332*** -0.0294*** -0.0333***
(0.00305) (0.00472) (0.00306) (0.00473)
exportismt -0.00429 -0.0104 -0.00493 -0.0157
(0.0119) (0.0214) (0.0125) (0.0226)
log(employment)ist 0.00242 -0.00299 0.00157 -0.00398
(0.00497) (0.00783) (0.00494) (0.00662)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00813 -0.00489
(0.00907) (0.00887)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00633 0.00365
(0.00650) (0.00685)
log(revenue)ist -0.00114 -0.00381
(0.00894) (0.00919)
log(assets)ist 0.0117* 0.0119*
(0.00612) (0.00643)
2SLS first stage
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.610*** 0.610*** 0.506***
(0.0371) (0.0372) (0.0629)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.162***
(0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0324)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 137.9 137.4 33.47
Hansen J statistic 2.115 2.933 1.663
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.146 0.0868 0.197
Observations 170,390 169,768 81,469 164,269 163,653 76,184
R-squared 0.256 0.279 0.286 0.261 0.283 0.295
firm-product clusters 2829 2828 1504 2798 2797 1476
industry clusters 212 212 190 211 211 189
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry.
The dependent variable price reduction is a binary variable indicating whether the domestic price of
sale of a specific product has been reduced or not compared to the previous month. The coefficient
of interest log (ImpComp)st is the log of Imports
China
st /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
.
Instruments are the two-year lag of the log of Chinese import competition and of most favored nation
tariffs (MFN) on the European single market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of
the covariates see Table C.9. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-
effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.1: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy. Robustness
Check 1 - Import Competition from the Rest of the World
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LPM 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0263*** 0.0256*** 0.0303** 0.0310*** 0.0318** 0.0465**
(0.00698) (0.00716) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0187)
demand changeismt -0.0183*** -0.0159*** -0.0192*** -0.0176***
(0.00335) (0.00372) (0.00345) (0.00396)
state of businessismt -0.0549*** -0.0530*** -0.0545*** -0.0519***
(0.00731) (0.00727) (0.00742) (0.00739)
commercial expectationsismt -0.0319*** -0.0345*** -0.0318*** -0.0349***
(0.00340) (0.00529) (0.00341) (0.00533)
exportismt -0.00454 -0.0134 -0.00582 -0.0204
(0.0105) (0.0249) (0.0112) (0.0261)
log(employment)ist 0.000472 -0.000310 -0.000798 -0.00215
(0.00438) (0.00795) (0.00424) (0.00689)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00788 -0.00496
(0.00911) (0.00936)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00503 0.00267
(0.00634) (0.00636)
log(revenue)ist 0.00197 -0.00133
(0.00993) (0.0102)
log(assets)ist 0.0102 0.0103
(0.00661) (0.00688)
2SLS first stage
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.635***
(0.0610) (0.0611) (0.0669)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.0872*** -0.0868*** -0.0822***
(0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0173)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 624.9 617.9 155.8
Hansen J statistic 0.560 1.348 0.363
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.454 0.246 0.547
Observations 142,390 141,880 70,157 136,269 135,765 64,872
R-squared 0.261 0.282 0.294 0.267 0.289 0.305
firm-product clusters 2,775 2,775 1,452 2,744 2,744 1,424
industry clusters 212 212 187 211 211 186
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry.
The financial crisis period 2008 - 2009 is excluded from the sample. The dependent variable price
reduction is a binary variable indicating whether the domestic price of sale of a specific product has
been reduced or not compared to the previous month. The coefficient of interest log (ImpComp)st is
the log of ImportsChinast /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
. Instruments are the two-year
lag of the log of Chinese import competition and ofmost favored nation tariffs (MFN) on the European
single market with respect to imports from China. For a definition of the covariates see Table C.9. All
specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.2: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy. Robustness
Check 2 - 2008 - 2009 Crisis Period Excluded from the Sample
CHAPTER IV. LOW-WAGE COUNTRY COMPETITION AND FIRMS’ PRICES 140
Probit - Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: price reduction
log(ImpComp China)st 0.0208*** 0.0189*** 0.0101**
(0.00237) (0.00228) (0.00418)
demand changeismt -0.0257*** -0.0217***
(0.00155) (0.00232)
state of businessismt -0.0819*** -0.0775***
(0.00173) (0.00256)
commercial expismt -0.0356*** -0.0422***
(0.00163) (0.00245)
exporterismt -0.00195 -0.00171
(0.00572) (0.0114)
log(employment)ist 0.00361 -0.00350
(0.00232) (0.00479)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00644
(0.00872)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00990**
(0.00468)
log(operating revenue)ist -0.00904
(0.0113)
log(assets)ist 0.0184***
(0.00452)
Observations 108,881 108,374 49,432
log-likelihood -31537 -29158 -13441
Pseudo R2 0.247 0.301 0.297
Notes: Average marginal effect with respect to a re-
duction of the domestic price of sale of a specific
product compared to the previous month. The co-
efficient of interest log (ImpComp)st is the log of
ImportsChinast /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
.
For a definition of covariates see Table C.9. All specifica-
tions include firm, sector, and year dummy variables. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.3: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy. Robustness
Check 3 - Probit Estimation - Average Marginal Effects
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OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: price direction
log(ImpComp China)st -0.0210*** -0.0216*** -0.00884 -0.0331** -0.0307* -0.0318
(0.00681) (0.00735) (0.0104) (0.0158) (0.0166) (0.0267)
demand changeismt 0.0396*** 0.0364*** 0.0411*** 0.0393***
(0.00460) (0.00597) (0.00484) (0.00655)
state of businessismt 0.0940*** 0.0898*** 0.0931*** 0.0871***
(0.00883) (0.00885) (0.00857) (0.00822)
commercial expectationsismt 0.0453*** 0.0488*** 0.0446*** 0.0478***
(0.00436) (0.00614) (0.00438) (0.00612)
exportismt 0.0199 0.00564 0.0232 0.0231
(0.0169) (0.0307) (0.0170) (0.0320)
log(employment)ist -0.00120 0.00167 9.07e-06 0.00296
(0.00684) (0.0106) (0.00695) (0.00959)
log(staff expenses)ist 0.00880 0.00574
(0.0148) (0.0147)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.000196 0.00232
(0.00906) (0.00909)
log(revenue)ist -0.0182 -0.0152
(0.0138) (0.0134)
log(assets)ist -0.0101 -0.00866
(0.00848) (0.00909)
2SLS first stage
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.608*** 0.608*** 0.533***
(0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0380)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.142***
(0.0612) (0.0610) (0.0416)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 270.5 267.8 110.8
Hansen J statistic 0.0298 0.336 0.701
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.863 0.562 0.402
Observations 170,390 169,768 81,469 164,269 163,653 76,184
R-squared 0.207 0.233 0.228 0.212 0.237 0.235
firm-product clusters 2,829 2,828 1,504 2,798 2,797 1,476
industry clusters 212 212 190 211 211 189
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-product. The dependent variable price direction is
an ordinally scaled variable which indicates whether a product price has been increased (+1), re-
mained unchanged (0) or decreased (−1)compared to the previous month. The coefficient of interest
log (ImpComp)st is the log of Imports
China
st /
(
Productionst + ImportsWorldst − Exports
World
st
)
. The Instru-
ment is the two-year lag of the log of most favored nation tariffs (MFN) on the European single market
with respect to imports from China. For a definition of the covariates see Table C.9. All specifications
include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.4: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy. Robustness
Check 4 - Direction of Price Change: OLS and 2SLS Estimation
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Figure C.1: Representativeness of the Data: Share of Increases in Domestic Sales Prices and
Domestic Output Price Inflation in German Manufacturing, 1995 - 2012
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av. share price decreases av. import competition
industry description nace rev. 1.1 95 - 00 01 - 07 Δ 95 - 00 01 - 07 Δ technology
food products and beverages 15 0.335 0.456 0.120 0.003 0.005 0.001 low tech
tobacco products 16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 low tech
textiles 17 0.366 0.667 0.301 0.039 0.095 0.056 low tech
wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 18 0.229 0.521 0.292 0.104 0.361 0.257 low tech
leather and leather products 19 0.000 0.520 0.520 0.113 0.202 0.089 low tech
wood and wood products 20 0.417 0.577 0.160 0.007 0.017 0.009 low tech
pulp, paper and paper products 21 0.419 0.477 0.058 0.001 0.002 0.001 low tech
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 0.733 0.842 0.109 0.001 0.003 0.002 low tech
chemicals and chemical products 24 0.418 0.427 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.005 medium high tech
rubber and plastic products 25 0.524 0.425 -0.098 0.009 0.016 0.007 medium low tech
other non-metallic mineral products 26 0.445 0.362 -0.083 0.006 0.018 0.012 medium low tech
basic metals 27 0.511 0.533 0.022 0.009 0.008 0.000 medium low tech
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 28 0.594 0.407 -0.186 0.011 0.020 0.009 medium low tech
machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 0.281 0.356 0.075 0.011 0.030 0.019 medium high tech
office machinery and computers 30 0.875 0.958 0.083 0.049 0.316 0.267 high tech
electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31 0.795 0.483 -0.312 0.026 0.058 0.031 medium high tech
radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 32 0.789 0.837 0.048 0.047 0.226 0.179 high tech
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 33 0.253 0.481 0.228 0.034 0.056 0.022 high tech
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 0.308 0.297 -0.011 0.000 0.001 0.001 medium high tech
other transport equipment 35 0.750 0.435 -0.315 0.014 0.044 0.030 medium high tech
furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 0.036 0.380 0.344 0.048 0.115 0.067 low tech
Notes: The average share of price decreases is the average share of downward price changes in all price adjustments for the periods 1995 - 2000 and 2001 - 2007
by 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1. industry; av.share price decreases = 1T ∑
T
t=1
#price reductionst
#price adjustmentst
. Average import competition for each 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1. industry over
the periods 1995 - 2000 and 2001 - 2007 ist given by av.import competition = 1T ∑
T
t=1 ImpComp
CN
st . Later years are not considered in order to avoid the impact of
the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis on price adjustments. The technology intensity indicator is given by Eurostat’s indicators on high-tech industries.
Table C.5: Change in Average Import Competition and the Share of Price Decreases in Total Price Changes Before and After China’s
Accession to the WTO in 2001
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price change Freq. Percent Cum.
decrease 14,278 8.38 8.38
unchanged 138,798 81.45 89.83
increase 17,338 10.17 100
Total 170,414 100
Table C.6: Fraction of Price Increases, Unchanged Prices and Price Decreases on the German
Manufacturing Market Compared to the Previous Month
variable mean std. dev. median observations
price adjustment 2.168 2.878 1 9225
price increase 1.217 2.159 0 9225
price reduction 0.951 2.188 0 9225
Notes: In order to obtain consistent statistics, firm-product com-
binations that are covered less than 12 months for a given year
have been dropped.
Table C.7: Summary Statistics on the AverageNumber of Annual Price Adjustments by Firm-
Product Combination
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Figure C.2: China Import Competition in Germany and China Import Tariffs to the EU Single
Market in the Manufacturing Sector
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Table C.8: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
product level
price reductionismt 170,390 0.083796 0 1 0.2770824
price directionismt 170,390 0.0179236 -1 1 0.4303434
demand changeismt 170,296 -0.0113567 -1 1 0.6449138
state of businessismt 170,334 0.0037749 -1 1 0.6793979
commercial expismt 170,080 0.0040863 -1 1 0.6029215
exporterismt 170,220 0.8190753 0 1 0.3849569
firm level
log(employment)ist 14,103 5.191575 1.701462
employmentist 14,103 1255.646 8934.349
log(staff expenses)ist 8,739 16.40364 1.564354
staff expensesist 8,739 6.29e+07 3.37e+08
log(cost of materials)ist 6,556 17.41348 1.788283
cost of materialsist 6,556 2.56e+08 1.72e+09
log(revenue)ist 10,270 17.47373 1.967104
revenueist 12,338 2.46e+08 1.84e+09
log(assets)ist 11,160 15.53449 2.518364
assetsist 11,231 1.18e+08 7.43e+08
average capital intensityi 416 79169.24 0 1883034 166097
capital intensity indicatori 416 0.2475962 0 1 0.4321356
sector level
log(ImpComp China)st 366 0.7682034 -7.894933 4.393843 1.976763
ImpComp Chinast 366 0.0809884 3.73e-06 0.8095089 0.1344686
log(ImpComp China)st-2 329 0.6024135 -7.894933 4.393843 2.015718
ImpComp Chinast-2 329 7.140795 0.0003726 80.95089 12.44784
log(ImpComp World)st 366 -0.6656394 -3.438418 1.763681 0.8241379
ImpComp Worldst 366 0.6818717 0.0321155 5.83387 0.5158303
log(MFN tariff)st-2 329 1.238816 -2.241961 4.287029 1.084997
MFN tariffst-2 329 6.030615 0.10625 72.75 8.554935
average R&D intensitys 88 5.370994 0.1790281 23.9309 5.435948
R&D intensity indicators 88 .25 0 1 .4354942
Notes: Minimum andmaximum values of balance sheet variables are suppressed due to data
protection.
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Table C.9: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
variables descriptions and sources
price reductionismt
price directionismt
price reduction is a binary variable which indicates whether a firm has reduced the domestic price of sale of a
specific product versus the previous month. price direction is an ordinal variable which indicates whether a
firm has reduced the domestic price of sale of a specific product versus the previous month, remained the
price unchanged or increased the price. The variable may take the values -1 (price decrease), 0 (price
unchanged) or +1 (price increase). The variables are based on the ifo business tendency survey which asks
participants whether domestic sales prices for a given product have increased, remained unchanged or
decreased compared to the previous month.
demand changeismt demand change is an ordinal variable which indicates whether the situation of demand of a specific product
versus the previous month has improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated. The variable may take the
values -1 (deterioration), 0 (unchanged) or +1 (improved). The variable is based on the ifo business tendency
survey which asks whether the demand situation (domestic and abroad) has improved, remained
unchanged or deteriorated compared to the previous month.
state of businessismt state of business is an ordinal variable which indicates whether the current state of business of a specific
product is evaluated as good, satisfactory or bad. The variable may take the values +1 (good), 0
(satisfactory) or -1 (bad). The variable is based on the ifo business tendency survey which asks participants
whether the current state of business with respect to a given product is evaluated as good, satisfactory (or
typical for the season) or bad.
commercial expectationismt commercial expectation is an ordinal variable which indicates whether the business situation of a specific
product during the next 6 months is considered as rather more favorable, about the same, or rather more
unfavorable (after elimination of purely seasonal fluctuations). The variable may take the values +1
(favorable), 0 (same) or -1 (unfavorable). The variable is based on the ifo business tendency survey which asks
participants to assess whether the business situation for a given product during the next 6 months with
respect to economic development will be rather more favorable, about the same or rather more unfavorable.
exporterismt Binary variable which indicates whether a product is exported or not. Ifo business tendency survey
employmentist Given by the number of employees at account date from the Amadeus and Hoppenstedt database. If no
balance sheet data is available, employment in production by product line from the ifo business tendency
survey is aggregated by products and business units and averaged across months to the firm-year level.
staff expensesist Staff expenses taken from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases.
cost of materialsist Cost of materials taken from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases.
revenueist Operating revenue taken from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases.
assetsist Fixed assets taken from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt databases.
capital intensityi Capital intensity is the ratio of tangible assets (Amadeus & Hoppenstedt) and employment (Amadeus & ifo
business tendency survey). Average capital intensity is computed for all firms that provide balance sheet data
within the 1995 – 2000 period across years. A dummy variable is constructed that indicates whether
average capital intensity of a firm is within the 75% percentile of the distribution.
import competition Chinast Ratio of German imports from China and the sum of German domestic production and total world imports
minus total world exports. Imports from China are from the Comext database (Eurostat) and domestic
production and world imports and exports are from the PRODCOM database (Eurostat). The data is derived
at the CPA 2002 6-digit level and aggregated to the NACE rev. 1.1 2-digit level.
import competition Worldst Ratio of total German imports minus imports from China and the sum of German domestic production and
total world imports minus total world exports. Imports from China are from the Comext database (Eurostat)
and domestic production and world imports and exports are from the PRODCOM database (Eurostat). The
data is derived at the CPA 2002 6-digit level and aggregated to the NACE rev. 1.1 2-digit level.
tariffst Data on most favored nation tariff rates (MFN) for Chinese imports to the European single market are from
UN Comtrade (World Bank). The data is derived at the HS combined 8-digit level and subsequently
transposed to the NACE rev. 1.1 classification by building a HS combined – HS 2007 – CPA 2002
correspondence. Subsequently, the data is aggregated to the NACE rev. 1.1 2-digit level.
R&D intensitys R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures and the number of employees at the industry level. Data is
for the year 2000. R&D expenditures are company and other non-federal funds for industrial R&D
performance in the US and taken from the National Science Foundation (Division of Science Resource Statistics).
Employment is from the NBER-CES manufacturing industry database. The data is at the 3-digit NAICS 2002
level and mapped to the 3-digit NACE rev. 1.1 level by means of a NAICS 2002 – NACE rev. 1.1
correspondence. A dummy variable is constructed that indicates whether R&D intensity is within the 75%
percentile of the distribution.
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log(ImpCompCN) log(ImpCompCN) * R&D int log(ImpCompCN) log(ImpCompCN) * R&D int log(ImpCompCN) log(ImpCompCN) * R&D int
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.608*** -0.0311** 0.608*** -0.0310** 0.531*** -0.0351**
(0.0304) (0.0146) (0.0305) (0.0146) (0.0364) (0.0157)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.238*** 0.00230 -0.238*** 0.00260 -0.141*** 0.00364
(0.0611) (0.00312) (0.0610) (0.00320) (0.0401) (0.00437)
log(ImpComp China)st-2 * R&D ints -0.00938 0.779*** -0.00962 0.779*** 0.0157 0.788***
(0.0792) (0.0746) (0.0790) (0.0745) (0.0949) (0.0808)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 * R&D ints 0.0354 -0.225* 0.0345 -0.226* -0.0520 -0.262*
(0.138) (0.134) (0.138) (0.134) (0.175) (0.155)
demand changeismt 0.00287* 3.88e-05 0.00220 -7.76e-05
(0.00158) (0.000797) (0.00173) (0.000984)
state of businessismt 0.00142 -0.00252 -0.00137 -0.00417*
(0.00377) (0.00193) (0.00380) (0.00242)
commercial expectationsismt 0.00316 0.000344 0.00543* 0.00260
(0.00283) (0.00104) (0.00299) (0.00170)
exportismt -0.0151 -0.00107 0.00638 0.00517
(0.0266) (0.00342) (0.0257) (0.00512)
log(employment)ist 0.00450 0.00487** -0.0108 0.00634
(0.00909) (0.00219) (0.0220) (0.00764)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.0114 0.00372
(0.0183) (0.0133)
log(cost of materials)ist 0.00515 -0.00248
(0.00665) (0.00405)
log(revenue)ist 0.0103 0.0148
(0.0128) (0.00901)
log(assets)ist 0.00488 0.000604
(0.0140) (0.00363)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 90.10 90.10 89.23 89.23 66.88 66.88
Hansen J statistic 2.962 2.962 3.605 3.605 2.065 2.065
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.227 0.227 0.165 0.165 0.356 0.356
Observations 163,712 163,712 163,098 163,098 76,023 76,023
R-squared 0.964 0.981 0.964 0.981 0.976 0.983
firm-product clusters 2785 2785 2784 2784 1468 1468
industry clusters 208 208 208 208 187 187
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table C.10: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: Sector Heterogeneity in R&D Intensity. First Stage
Regressions
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log(ImpComp CN) log(ImpComp CN) * capital int log(ImpComp CN) log(ImpComp CN) * capital int log(ImpComp CN) log(ImpComp CN) * capital int
log(ImpComp China)st-2 0.669*** -0.0495*** 0.671*** -0.0497*** 0.644*** -0.0613***
(0.0370) (0.0157) (0.0384) (0.0157) (0.0444) (0.0172)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 -0.248** 0.0171*** -0.244** 0.0158*** -0.154** 0.0241**
(0.108) (0.00549) (0.103) (0.00575) (0.0678) (0.0105)
log(ImpComp China)st-2 * capital inti 0.0430 0.864*** 0.0464 0.864*** 0.0425 0.870***
(0.0492) (0.0457) (0.0500) (0.0463) (0.0529) (0.0480)
log(MFN tariff)st-2 * capital inti 0.132* -0.167*** 0.129* -0.166*** 0.0437 -0.171***
(0.0693) (0.0523) (0.0656) (0.0519) (0.0430) (0.0453)
demand changeismt -0.00168 0.000314 0.000230 0.00119
(0.00238) (0.00138) (0.00260) (0.00155)
state of businessismt 0.00363 0.00121 0.000958 0.000775
(0.00507) (0.00374) (0.00499) (0.00386)
commercial expectationsismt 0.00318 0.00331** 0.00259 0.00417**
(0.00443) (0.00167) (0.00510) (0.00202)
exportismt -0.0774 0.00802 0.0100 0.00627
(0.0555) (0.0191) (0.0274) (0.0206)
log(employment)ist 0.00345 0.00423 -0.0212 -0.00174
(0.0121) (0.00493) (0.0159) (0.00905)
log(staff expenses)ist -0.00372 -0.00604
(0.0237) (0.00965)
log(cost of materials)ist -0.00277 -0.00541
(0.00899) (0.00454)
log(revenue)ist 0.0193 0.0135
(0.0184) (0.00985)
log(assets)ist 0.0230 0.0114
(0.0182) (0.00782)
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F stat 88.97 88.97 83.36 83.36 55.99 55.99
Hansen J statistic 2.329 2.329 3.913 3.913 1.724 1.724
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.312 0.312 0.141 0.141 0.422 0.422
Observations 40,742 40,742 40,625 40,625 35,305 35,305
R-squared 0.978 0.962 0.978 0.962 0.980 0.963
firm-product clusters 464 464 463 463 433 433
industry clusters 126 126 126 126 122 122
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by firm-product and 4-digit NACE rev. 1.1 industry. All specifications include firm-product, sector, month and year fixed-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table C.11: Impact of Import Competition from China on Firms’ Pricing Strategy: Sector Heterogeneity in R&D Intensity. First Stage
Regressions
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